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ABSTRACT
New data on highway stops and searches from across the country have spawned renewed
debate over racial profiling on the roads. The new data reveal consistently disproportionate
searches of minority motorists, but, very often, an equal or lower general success rate—or “hit
rate”—associated with those searches. Economists are developing new models of racial
profiling to test whether the data are consistent with policing efficiency or racial prejudice, and
argue that equal hit rates reflect that the police are maximizing the success rate of their
searches. Civil liberties advocates are scrutinizing the same data and, in most cases, reaching
opposite conclusions. They argue that equal hit rates merely reflect similar offending patterns
by race and thus that the disproportionate searches are racially biased. Meanwhile many
constitutional commentators decry racial profiling on the highways as “plainly
unconstitutional,” while courts draw technical legal distinctions to easily dispose of civil suits
alleging racial profiling on the roads.
The debate over racial profiling on the highways is becoming increasingly empirical,
technical, and engaged. It is also focusing increasingly on the issue of policing efficiency. The
problem is, the debate is asking the wrong question and tracking the wrong statistic. The key
question is not whether racial profiling maximizes the success rate of searches, and the key statistic
is not the comparative hit rate by race associated with those searches. Instead, the key question for
purposes of the empirical, policy, and constitutional analyses is: What are the conditions under
which is it justifiable to use race in policing? The key statistics, it turns out, are the comparative
elasticities of offending to policing and the relative offending rates of the different racial groups.
When we pose the right question properly, it becomes clear that both sides of the debate have
it wrong: the use of race in police searches is neither plainly unconstitutional nor simply efficient.
Racial profiling on the highways can be justified as an effective law enforcement tool or, from a
constitutional perspective, as a narrowly tailored policing technique that promotes a compelling
governmental interest in law enforcement if the following three conditions are satisfied: (1) racial
profiling has a long-term negative effect on the profiled crime, (2) while increasing the efficient
allocation of police resources, (3) without producing a ratchet effect on the profiled population.
These three specific conditions will only be satisfied in certain identifiable situations of comparative
elasticity and offending as between racial groups.
Under these narrow conditions, race can constitutionally be used in policing to advance a
traditional law enforcement interest in combating crime. There may be other non-law enforcement
interests that warrant using race in policing as well. There may be a compelling interest in having a
prison population that reflects more accurately the demographic distribution of the offending
population, or even of the population as a whole. There may be a compelling interest in combating
crimes committed against historically disadvantaged groups. But with regard to the traditional law
enforcement interest of fighting crime, race can only properly be used under these three narrow
conditions.
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Race in this criminal justice context should not be treated differently than in other contexts,
such as education or employment. If racial profiling satisfies the three narrow conditions, then
opposition to racial profiling should be based on the grounds of affirmative action: because of this
country’s institutional history of racism, or in order to achieve a more balanced carceral population,
or for other compelling reasons, the police should endeavor to minimize the minority representation
in prison by profiling white offenders. Conversely, if racial profiling does not satisfy any one of the
three conditions, then racial profiling should be conditioned on compensating innocent minority
motorists who are searched for wasting their time, for diminishing their dignity, and for inflicting
emotional harm. If one of the conditions is not satisfied, innocent minority motorists are being used
for other purposes—for example, to increase search success rates regardless of a ratchet effect—and
they should be compensated for the taking.
As an empirical matter, it is fair to speculate, drawing reasonable inferences from other data
sources, that minority motorists may have slightly lower elasticity of offending to policing because of
diminished job opportunities and other market alternatives, and slightly higher offending rates
because of drug trafficking patterns. As a result, racial profiling on the roadways may increase the
overall costs to society, including the amount of profiled crime, and likely produces a ratchet effect
on the profiled population, resulting in a greater disproportion of minority arrests or negative
contacts with the police over and above any possibly higher offending rate. This is going to have
significant repercussions on minority motorists: it is likely to more unevenly distribute criminal
records, supervision, and post-punitive collateral consequences, and to significantly boost the public
perception that minorities are drug users and drug dealers. Racial profiling on the highways,
accordingly, is poor crime policy and, because of the ratchet effect, is not narrowly tailored to the
governmental interest in law enforcement. Given that no federal or state agency has attempted to
establish the three narrow conditions under which race could properly be considered in policing, the
practice of racial profiling on the highways should be considered presently unconstitutional.
The important point is, however, that racial profiling on the highways is presently
unacceptable not because of any per se constitutional bar on using race in police searches, but
rather because of the mathematics of criminal profiling. The central problems with racial
profiling—possible adverse long-term effects on the profiled crime and probable ratchet effect—are
problems about criminal profiling in general, not about race. The same problems may infect any
type of criminal profiling, whether of minorities for drug possession, of the wealthy for tax evasion,
of single mothers for welfare fraud, or of white males for domestic terrorism or serial murder. To be
sure, the ratchet effect is most disturbing when it plays on race, as well as gender, social or family
status, class, or wealth. The ratchet effect violates a core principle of punishment theory, namely
that anyone who is committing the same crime should face the same likelihood of being caught, and
that race, gender, class, or status should not affect that equation. But both the ratchet effect and the
long-term effect on the profiled crime are phenomena that may undermine any scheme of criminal
profiling. In this sense, the debates over racial profiling on the highways should make us reexamine
our views on the larger question of criminal profiling more generally.
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RETHINKING RACIAL PROFILING :
A CRITIQUE OF THE ECONOMICS , CIVIL LIBERTIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL LITERATURE ,
AND O F CRIMINAL PROFILING MORE GENERALLY
© Bernard E. Harcourt

Introduction
New reporting requirements and data collection by over 400 law enforcement agencies
across the country—including entire states such as Maryland, Missouri, and Washington1—are
producing a continuous flow of new evidence on highway police searches. For the most part, the
data are consistently showing disproportional searches of African-American and Hispanic
motorists in relation to their estimated representation on the road. Economists, civil liberties
advocates, legal and constitutional scholars, political scientists, lawyers, and judges are pouring
over the new data and reaching, in many cases, quite opposite conclusions. The data have
spawned a proliferation of new academic writing, lawsuits, and court decisions on the question of
racial profiling on the highways.2

1

See Clayton J. M osher, Terance D. M iethe, and Dretha M . Phillips, The Mismeasure of Crime, 186
(Thousand O aks, UK: Sage Pub lications 2002); J. M itchell Pickerill, Clayton Mosher, M ichael Gaffney, and
Nicholas Lovrich, “Search and Seizure, Racial Profiling and Traffic Stops on Washington State Highways,” paper
prepared for and presented at the 2003 annual meeting of the Law & Society Association, Pittsburgh, PA, June 5–8,
2003, at page 11 [hereafter Pickerill et al. 2003] (reporting that “as of March 200 1, more than 400 law enforcement
agencies in the United States report collecting information on the race/ethnicity of those citizens stopped by police
officers” ); see also Katheryn K. Russell, “Racial Profiling: A Status Report of the Legal, Legislative, and Empirical
Literature,” 3 Rutgers Race and the Law Review 61, 68–71 (2001) [hereafter Russell 2001] (listing jurisdictions that
have enacted data collection mandates); Brandon Garrett, “Remedying Racial Profiling,” 33 Columb. Hum. Rights L.
Rev. 41, 8 1–8 3 (2001 ) (reviewing data co llection efforts); Debo rah Ramirez, Jack M cDevitt, and Amy Farrell, A
Resource Guide on Racial Profiling Data Collection Systems: Promising Practices and Lessons Learned (U.S.
Department of Justice Monograph, November 2000) (describing the data collection systems in place in California,
New Jersey, North Carolina, and Great Britain). Northeastern University Center on Racial Profiling has an excellent
web site that affords access to the most recent data, legislation, news, etc., at
http://www.racialprofilinganalysis.neu.edu The web site of the Institute on Race & Poverty at the University of
Minneso ta is also an important data resourc e at http://ww w1.um n.edu/irp/publications/racialprofiling.html.
2
The controversy over the definition of the term “racial profiling” has been rehearsed in several leading
articles o n racial profiling. In this article, “racial profiling” deno tes the practice of stopping and searching mino rity
moto rists at a rate in excess of their re prese ntation o n the road based on the assumption that membe rs of their
particular rac ial group are more likely to b e transp orting contraband. The term “racial p rofiling” is of recent vintage .
See generally Jerome Skolnick and Ab igail Caplovitz, “Guns, Drugs and Profiling: W ays to Target Guns and
Minimize Racial Profiling,” in Guns, Crime, and Punishment in America (Bernard E. H arcourt, ed.), New Y ork:
New Y ork University Press 2003 (discussing the history of the term). For discussions of the controversy over the
definition of racial profiling, see, e.g ., Russell 2001:65–68 ; Albert W. Alschuler, “Racial Profiling and the
Constitution,” 2002 University of Chicago Legal Forum 163, 168 n.24 (2002) [hereafter Alschuler 2002]; Samuel R.
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In one corner, economists, building on existing models from the area of optimal auditing,
mortgage lending, and bail setting, are developing new econometric models of racial profiling to
test whether the consistent findings of disproportional searches of minority motorists reflect
efficiency of policing—i.e. the desire to maximize the number of successful searches of motorists
for drug contraband or what is called “statistical discrimination”—or raw racial animus.3 Among
economists, the fact that minority motorists are being disproportionately searched is not, in itself,
decisive of whether or not the police are acting in a racist manner. What matters instead is the
rate of successful searches that discover drug contraband—what is called the “hit rate.” When
the hit rates are the same across racial or ethnic lines, some economists argue, the police are not
bigoted in their searches because they have no incentive to search more or less motorists of any
particular race based on race. At equilibrium, the police have achieved a racial balance, with a
racial imbalance at its heart, that they are unwilling to change on the basis of race—unless, of
course, they are racist and have a taste for discrimination.
Accordingly, when the data reveal equal hit rates as between different racial
groups—such as in Maryland between African-American and white motorists4—some
economists conclude that the disproportionate searches of minority drivers do not reflect a taste
for discrimination, but rather an attempt to maximize successful searches. When the data reveal
lower hit rates for minority motorists—such as in Maryland between Hispanic and white
motorists,5 or in Missouri between African-American and Hispanic motorists on the one hand
and white motorists on the other6—some economists conclude that there is racial bigotry against
minority motorists. And when the data reveal higher hit rates for minority motorists—such as in
Maryland regarding large hauls of drugs 7—economists conclude that there is reverse racism at
play—in other words, bigotry against white motorists.

Gross and Katherine Y. Barnes, “Road Wo rk: Racial Profiling and Drug Interdiction on the Highway,” Michigan
Law Review, 101 (3):____ _ (2002 ) (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=331260) [hereafter Gross and Barnes
2002 (all references to SSRN pap er)], at 2–3, 100 and notes 257–2 61; Samuel R. Gross and D ebra Livingston,
“Racial Profiling Under Attack,” 102 Columbia Law Review 1413, 1415 (2002) [hereafter Gross and Livingston
2002].
3
The leading studies include John Knowles, Nicola Persico, and Petra Todd, “Racial Bias in Motor
Vehicle Searches: Theory and Evidence,” Journal of Political Economy, 109(1): 203–229 (2001) [hereafter KPT
2001]; Rubén Hernández-Murillo and John Knowles, “Racial Profiling or Racist Policing?: Testing in Aggregated
Data,” working paper downloaded from http://www .ssc.upenn.ed u/~jknowles/HK.htm on June 9, 2003 (April 18,
2003 version) [hereafter Hernández-Murillo and Kno wles 2003]; Nicola Persico, “Racial Profiling, Fairness, and
Effectiveness of Policing,” The American Econom ic Review 92(5):1472–1497 (2002); Vani K. Borooah, “Racial
Bias in Police Stops and Searches: An Economic Analysis,” European Journal of Political Economy 17:17–37
(2001)[hereafter B orooah 200 1]; see also Vani K. B orooah, “Eco nom ic Analysis of Po lice Stops and Searche s: A
Reply,” European Journal of Political Economy 18:607–608 (2002) [hereafter Borooah 2002] and Shanti P.
Chakravarty, “Economic Analysis of Police Stops and Searches: A Critique,” European Journal of Political
Economy 18:597– 605 (20 02).
4
See, e.g, KPT 2001:219.
5
See, e.g., KPT 2001:219.
6
See, e.g., Hernández-Murillo and Knowles 2003:5.
7
See, e.g., KPT 2001:226.
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In another corner, civil liberties advocates and some legal scholars dispute the
economists’ assumptions and claims of policing efficiency.8 Several commentators focus on the
raw disparities in searches, and argue that the disparities themselves produce large numbers of
innocent minority motorists subjected to negative police interaction and state surveillance, which,
they suggest, is unacceptable on its own terms.9 Other commentators focus on indicators of
actual offending rates—such as drug consumption self-report surveys—and argue that there is no
evidence that minority motorists offend at higher rates than whites.10 From their perspective, the
equal or lower hit rates do not reflect policing efficiency or elasticity of offending to policing, but
rather constant rates of equal or lower offending among minorities. And if there are non-elastic
similar rates of offending among minority motorists, they argue, the police should not use race in
the decision to stop and search motorists. Building on this empirical foundation, many
constitutional scholars argue that it is “plainly unconstitutional” to use race in the decision to
search motorists.11 The police, they contend, can no more use race to decide who to search than a
prosecutor could use race to decide who to charge with a capital crime.12 Race simply cannot be
used to the detriment of innocent motorists.
In yet a third corner, judges and several constitutional commentators draw technical legal
distinctions to more easily resolve legal challenges to racial profiling. First, judges distinguish
between Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantee of equal treatment, and relegate the use of race in policing to the latter. In
the Fourth Amendment context, judges and some commentators distinguish between using race
exclusively or as one factor among others, and tend to disregard claims that fall in the latter
category, which tends to capture most of the cases. In the Equal Protection context, judges and
many commentators distinguish between profiling without individualized suspicion and using an
eye-witness racial identification, and exclude the latter from Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny.
Finally, in the Equal Protection context as well, judges distinguish between intentional
discrimination established by evidence of specific discriminatory acts from statistical evidence of
disparate treatment, and reject challenges that do not establish the former. The result is that
practically all constitutional challenges to racial profiling have either failed through one or more
of these technical legal distinctions13 or been settled out of court primarily for injunctive relief.14

8

The lead ing articles and boo ks includ e David A . Harris , Profiles in Injustice: Why Racial Profiling
Cannot Work (New York: The New Press 2002) [hereafter Harris 2002]; Gross and Barnes 2002; Alschuler 2002;
David Rudovsky, “Law Enforcement by Stereotypes and Serendipity: Racial Profiling and Stops and Searches
Without Cause,” 3 University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 298–3 66 (200 1) [hereafter Rudovsky
2001]; Gross and Livingston 2002; Tracey Maclin, “The Fourth Amendment On The Freeway,” 3 Rutgers Race &
The Law Review, 117 (2001) [hereafter M aclin 2001 ].
9
See, e.g., Harris 2002.
10
See, e.g., Alschuler 2002; Gross and Barnes 2002; Rudovsky 2001.
11
Gro ss and Barnes 2002 :106 ; see also Rud ovsky 200 1; M aclin 2001 :124 (arguing that “T he Fo urteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause is intended to prevent government officials from relying upon a person’s race
or ethnicity when allocating benefits or burdens”).
12
See Gross and Barnes 2002:102; Rudovsky 2001.
13
There is one notorious exception, which, naturally, has received o verwh elming law review co mmentary.
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The emerging debates are increasingly empirical, technical, engaged, and heated—which
is all very positive. But they suffer from one fatal flaw: no one in the debates has properly
identified in advance the narrow conditions under which racial profiling, as a form of criminal
profiling, would be an effective law enforcement technique that is narrowly tailored to the
traditional law enforcement interest of combating a profiled crime, here the transportation of
illicit drugs on the highways. The failure to properly identify when race can legitimately and
constitutionally be used in policing reflects in part the fact that for many people after September
11, 2001, there is no longer a clear-cut answer to the puzzle of race and policing. As William
Stuntz suggests, expressing the views of many after 9/11, “solving the profiling problem is
impossible.”15
This, however, cannot be right. The use of race in policing is not that different from the
use of race in other policy contexts—whether in higher education, employment, or even
restitution for slavery—that conditions cannot be stated for when race can legitimately and
constitutionally be considered in policing, particularly when the government’s interest in using
race relates to such as traditional compelling interest as the law enforcement goal of combating
crime. To the contrary, the specific conditions must be specified in advance, and can be
specified as follows: Racial profiling for purposes of police searches is a narrowly tailored
policing technique that promotes the traditional law enforcement interest in fighting crime if,
first, racial profiling reduces the amount of profiled crime while, second, maintaining or
increasing the efficient allocation of police resources, without, third, producing a ratchet effect

See New Jersey v. Soto. For comm entary, see Alschuler 2002; Gross and Barnes 2002:85–87; Harris 2002;
Rudovsky 2001; etc.
14
See Gross and Barnes 2002:88-89 (discussing several settlements, such as the ones in Maryland and New
Jersey); Brandon Garrett, “Remedying Racial Profiling,” 33 Columb. Hum . Rights L. Rev. 41, 75–81, 98–105 (2001)
(discussing several decree s). This is not to suggest, tho ugh, that the litigation has not had significant effec ts in
creating general awareness of the issue of racial profiling, in generating policy respo nses within police departments,
and in promoting agreements between police departments and anti-racial profiling organizations. An example of one
such agreem ent— between the St. Paul Po lice Dep artment and the St. Paul Chapter of the N AAC P— entered into as a
result of voluntary mediation is reproduced as an appendix to the report, “Racially Biased Policing: A Principled
Response,” written by Lorrie Fridell, Robert Lunney, Drew Diamond and Bruce K ubu of the Police Executive
Research Forum (W ashington, D.C.: Police Executive Research Forum 20 01). The “Racially Biased Policing”
report also details six key policy responses—including police department accountability and supervision, education
and training, an d minority community outreach— that are being implemented in a numb er of police d epartments. See
also “Final Report of the State Police Review Team ,” submitted by New Jersey Attorney General John J. Farmer, Jr.
and First Assistant Attorney General Paul H. Zoubek (July 2, 1999) (detailing list of recommendations for reforms of
the New Jersey State Po lice on the subject of racial profiling).
15
William Stuntz, “Policing After the Terror,” 111 Yale Law Journal 2137, 2163 (2002). Stuntz places
himself in the category of people who regard racial profiling as “occasionally tolerable,” id. at 217 9; however, Stuntz
does not elaborate in detail when racial profiling is proper, other than to suggest that “it all depends on the balance,
on the benefits to law enforcement from using race or ethnicity as a proxy and the harm to the group that must pay
[the racial] tax.” Id. at 2179. Overall, Stuntz writes that “racial and ethnic profiling is a fact of life that the legal
system probably cannot change.” Id at 2179. A s a result, rather than addressing the pro blem head on, Stuntz
suggests we implement changes in the regulation of police that will alleviate the problem—specifically, that we allow
group searches not ba sed o n individ ualized suspicion and regulate the mann er of searche s. These reforms, Stuntz
argues, will mitigate the pro blem of racial profiling.
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on the profiled population. A ratchet effect occurs when racial profiling produces a supervised
population that is disproportionate to the distribution of offending by racial group.16
The first condition—that racial profiling must minimize the profiled crime—is the core of
the government’s law enforcement interest in fighting crime: if racial profiling of minority
motorists causes white motorists to offend more and if this additional offending outweighs any
gains from the reduction of minority motorist offending, then there is no advantage to racial
profiling of minority motorists. There is no advantage to having an equal hit rate as between
racial groups. There is no advantage to greater efficiency in policing. If, in contrast, racial
profiling is effective at fighting the profiled crime, then, as between different policing techniques,
racial profiling is preferable only if it represents a more efficient allocation of resources. Hence
the second condition. As opposed to random highway searches, racial profiling would increase
the efficiency of policing if, for example, it produces higher overall rates of detection of drug
contraband, i.e. higher overall hit rates over the total motorist population. However, racial
profiling is only narrowly tailored to these law enforcement goals if the policing practice does not
create a ratchet effect on the profiled population—and this is the third condition. A policy of
searching all members of a racial group—or for that matter, of incarcerating all members of a
racial group—is likely going to satisfy the first requirement and significantly reduce the amount
of profiled crime, but would clearly produce a ratchet effect on the members of the racial group.
In order for the more effective and efficient policing policy to be acceptable, it must not have
disproportional collateral consequences on the profiled population. It must not produce a racial
imbalance in the supervised or carceral population that is disproportionate to the racial
breakdown of offenders. In other words, it must be narrowly tailored to the traditional law
enforcement goal of effectiveness and the social interest in efficiency.
Under these three narrow conditions, racial profiling would be a narrowly tailored,
effective, and efficient law enforcement technique that promotes the compelling governmental
interest in combating crime, here the highway transportation of illicit drugs, without producing a
ratchet effect on the profiled population. This is not to say that it would have no costs. Like all
other policies that use a category distinction—especially race—it would inflict costs on innocent
members of the profiled group. More minority motorists—innocent and guilty—would be
subjected to intrusive, unpleasant, and possibly humiliating searches on the side of the road. Nor
is this to say that the benefits of drug interdiction outweigh these substantial costs. It is of course
possible that the benefits of the War on Drugs are entirely overestimated or even are nonexistent. As a policy matter, scholars and politicians could debate whether or not the law
enforcement gains, if any, are worth the countervailing costs. But as a constitutional matter, if
the three conditions are satisfied, racial profiling of police searches would be narrowly tailored to
advance the traditional law enforcement interest in combating crime and would therefore survive
judicial scrutiny.

16

The con cept of a “ratchet effect” is defined and explained in detail in P art II.B .ii infra.
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There may well be other non-law enforcement interests that warrant using race in
policing. For instance, there may be a compelling interest in having a carceral population that
reflects more accurately the demographic distribution of the offending population. In fact, there
may be a compelling interest in having a prison or supervised population that reflects the
demographic distribution of the general population. If so, it may be necessary to profile white
motorists in order to balance the demographics of the prison population. It may be necessary to
employ affirmative action in policing. Again, this would have costs—increased searches of
innocent white motorists—and, as a policy matter, those costs may be equally troubling, but as a
constitutional matter, if the reverse racial profiling is narrowly tailored to the compelling interest
in reducing the minority representation in prison, then the policy would also survive judicial
scrutiny. Alternatively, there may be a compelling interest in combating crimes committed
against historically disadvantaged populations, such as African-Americans or Hispanics. If so,
here too it may be necessary to be race-conscious in policing. But with regard to the specific law
enforcement interest in fighting crime—here, interdicting the highway transportation of drug
contraband—race can only properly be used in policing if the three narrow conditions specified
above are satisfied.
Properly defining in advance these conditions greatly clarifies the racial profiling debates.
As a preliminary matter, it becomes clear that the new economic models and the debates over
“policing efficiency” are maximizing on the wrong thing: instead of maximizing the success rate
of searches, the police should seek, first and foremost, to maximize the negative effect on the
profiled crime and costs associated with police searches—in other words, to minimize the social
costs associated with the profiled crime and profiling technique. As a result, the new economic
models track the wrong statistic: rather than focusing on hit rates, the models should focus on the
overall amount of profiled crime and costs to society of the searches. Moreover, the models need
to address the additional question whether racial profiling produces a ratchet effect on the
profiled population.
A second major implication is that the new data do not contain enough information to
address these questions—neither the narrow question whether racial profiling maximizes the
success rate of searches, nor the larger questions whether it reduces the amount of profiled crime
or causes a ratchet effect. The three narrow conditions that would make racial profiling
acceptable are only going to be satisfied under very specific circumstances of comparative
elasticity of offending to policing and of comparative offending as between the two racial groups.
The new data, however, do not include this information. The data contain only two of at least
four necessary quantities of interest. The data include, first, the number and proportion of drivers
searched by race and, second, the success rate of searches by race. (There is also more detailed
information about types and amounts of drugs seized, location, type of searches, etc., which can
produce more refined but not fundamentally different analyses). The data, however, are entirely
silent with regard to the comparative elasticity of offending to policing and to the comparative
natural offending rates by racial group. They also lack information on the selective use of other
search criteria by race. Without this information, there is little that the data can say empirically
about the narrow efficiency of racial profiling or about the impact of racial profiling on the
profiled crime and the profiled population. For example, equal official hit rates may mask higher
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real hit rates for minority motorists if the police rely less on other search criteria for minority
motorists, or they could mask lower real hit rates for minority motorists if the police use
additional sub-search processes for minority motorists—both of which would be consistent with
racial bigotry. The official hit rates, it turns out, are extremely difficult to interpret.
When we correct for these deficiencies and make reasonably conservative assumptions
from other available evidence, it becomes clear that racial profiling probably does not satisfy all
three conditions. Minority motorists, in all likelihood, have slightly lower elasticity of offending
to policing than white motorists because of reduced employment opportunities, and have slightly
higher offending rates when drug trafficking is included. Under these conditions, racial profiling
on the highways may well increase the amount of profiled crime and costs associated with police
searches, resulting in numerically more white motorists offending because of a perceived sense
of immunity. In addition, racial profiling on the highways is likely to have a ratchet effect on the
profiled population, resulting in a greater disproportion of minority arrests or negative contacts
with the police over and above the higher offending rate. This is going to have significant
repercussions on African-American and Hispanic motorists. It will aggravate the disproportional
representation of minorities in the correctional population, more unevenly distribute criminal
records, supervision, and post-punitive collateral consequences, and significantly boost the public
perception that minorities are drug users, traffickers, and couriers.
The central problems with racial profiling on the highways, then, are the likely ratchet
effect on the profiled population and, possibly, an adverse long-term effect on the profiled crime
and costs of police searches. These are not really problems about racial profiling, but problems
about racial profiling. Or to put it another way, these are problems that might infect any profiling
scheme, whether based on race, or gender, or wealth, or class, or physical demeanor. Although
practically everyone in the criminal justice field endorses criminal profiling as a law enforcement
technique outside the racial profiling context, the fact is that criminal profiling only advances the
larger interest of crime reduction under very specific circumstances.
The ratchet effect is a problem about criminal profiling more generally. What the ratchet
does is violate a core principle of punishment theory, namely that anyone who is committing the
same crime should face the same likelihood of being caught, and that race, gender, social status,
class, wealth, or other irrelevant categories simply should not matter in that equation. When
profiling works—when it targets a higher offending population—it likely produces a ratchet
effect that violates this fundamental idea that similarly situated persons should be treated alike.
It distributes the costs of the penal system along troubling lines—race, gender, class, status,
wealth, etc.17 It runs against a basic ideal of our criminal justice system: that all people be
treated fairly and equally. The best way to achieve that goal is to avoid criminal profiling
17

There may well be certain profiles that distribute the costs along lines that we are somewhat indifferent
abo ut. So, for instance, we m ight not care ab out the distributional co nsequences of profiling alo ng the lines of outof-state tags or ren tal cars if these are, in fact, profiles that work (though it is often easy to find associations between
these seemingly innocent traits and traits that do b other us). But most of the profiles that we care abo ut and debate
involve those more sensitive traits, such as race, gender, physical attributes, wealth, class, etc.
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entirely and to police color-blind, or gender-blind, or class-blind: rather than profile the wealthy
for tax evasion, to select at random; rather than profile on race for automobile searches, to select
color-blind.
Naturally, race is what makes racial profiling on the highways so controversial and, at
least at the level of public rhetoric, so condemned. But it is important to rethink racial profiling
through the lens of criminal profiling—to reduce race to the role that it is purportedly playing in
racial profiling, namely a predictive factor; to treat race no differently than we would gender,
class, age, or any other profile that works; to take the focus away from race and place it on
criminal profiling more generally. Rethinking racial profiling through the lens of criminal
profiling actually sheds light on, and raises important questions about the larger issue of criminal
profiling.
The fact is, criminal profiling tends to accentuate the prejudices and biases that are built
into the penal code and into criminal law enforcement. This is, naturally, all for the good when
we come out on the winning side or when we punish the worse offenders—the serial pedophiles
for example. But it is problematic in the grey area of the criminal law, in the mass of cases that
engulf the criminal justice system—the drug users, the quality-of-life offenders, the tax cheats.
There, matters are less clear. The prejudices and biases of the penal law are more questionable.
There, in the mass of criminal cases, criminal profiling may have adverse effects on society by
aggravating the correlations between status and crime. What criminal profiling does, in effect, is
to leverage any structural tilt and exploit any associations between crimes and identifiable or
profilable traits. To magnify crime associations into carceral distortions. Racial profiling on the
highways is a good example of this, but it is by no means the only example. The same would
hold true for other forms of profiling, whether profiling the wealthy for tax evasion, single
mothers for welfare fraud, or even historians for plagiarism.
This article is an attempt at ground clearing. It seeks to clarify the empirical
controversies surrounding racial profiling and thereby to shed light on the policy and
constitutional law debates. The organization of the article is as follows. Part I reviews and
evaluates the recent economics literature on racial profiling, and argues that the new economic
models focus attention on the wrong question and track the wrong statistic. Part II reviews and
assesses the civil liberties and legal scholarship on racial profiling, and contends that their
response unwittingly embraces the logic of the economic models and perpetuates the problematic
focus on hit rates. Part III reviews and assesses the constitutional framework that judges have
constructed to resolve legal challenges to racial profiling and, based on the prior empirical
analysis, offers an alternative approach. Part IV sets forth the type of empirical evidence that
would be necessary to venture more informed speculation regarding the effects of racial profiling
on the highways. Based on reasonably conservative assumptions from other available evidence, it
concludes that racial profiling on the roads likely does not meet the three narrow conditions that
would satisfy the basic policy threshold or constitutional review. A conclusion raises critical
questions about the larger issue of criminal profiling.
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I. The Economics Literature
Drawing on Gary Becker’s work on tastes for discrimination, several economists are
developing econometric models of racial profiling in an effort to distinguish between efficiency
and racial animus in policing. The economic models rest on a few core assumptions. The first is
that police officers seek to maximize the success rate of automobile searches given the cost of
searching cars. The second is that the motorists who might be transporting drug contraband seek
to maximize the payoff of carrying contraband. If there is a negative payoff, they will not carry
drugs. The third is that racist police officers experience a lower cost for searching minority
motorists than for searching white motorists. The fourth is that minority motorists offend at
higher rates than white motorists.
Given these assumptions, the models predict that police officers will target minority
motorists for police searches in order to maximize their search hit rates. Searching minority
motorists disproportionately, however, will reduce the rate of minority offending: as the search
rate of minority motorists increases, the payoff of transporting drugs among minority motorists
decreases, and fewer minority motorists will carry drug contraband. Police officers will continue
to search minority motorists disproportionately until the point of equilibrium where minority and
white motorists offend at the same level.
At that point, it will be possible to distinguish between the efficient non-racist police
officer and the racist officer who has a taste for discrimination. The efficient, non-racist police
officer will no longer care about race and will try to maintain the distribution of searches so as to
maintain equal search success rates. In fact, maintaining that equilibrium will reflect the fact that
the police officer is efficient rather than racist. Maintaining that particular equilibrium will
maximize the likelihood that the next search will be successful: if the police, on the one hand,
were to search proportionally more minority motorists, they would be dipping into a pool of
motorists with a hit rate below the hit rate they could achieve by searching an additional white
motorist; on the other hand, if the police were to search proportionally more white motorists,
given elasticity here too, the hit rate of white motorists would fall below that of similarly situated
minority motorists, thus reducing overall efficiency.
Given a relatively fixed level of law enforcement resources, there is only one equilibrium
point that will maximize hit rates if the police officer is not racist, and it is the point at which the
hit rates are the same across racial lines. At that equilibrium, the efficient police officer is
engaged in maximally efficient searches. In contrast, the racist police officer will continue to
search more minority motorists because his cost of searching minority motorists is lower. In
other words, at the efficiency equilibrium, he will still be able to maximize his utility (search
success rate minus cost) by searching more minority motorists. Depending on how tasteful
discrimination is to this racist police officer, he will find his own point of equilibrium at some
distribution where the hit rates of minority motorists is below the hit rates of white motorists.
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The hit rate of searches, then, indicates whether the police officer is purely efficient and
non-racist or is bigoted. John Knowles, Nicola Persico and Petra Todd, some of the leading
economists working on racial profiling, explain:
The key implication of the model is that if a police officer has the same
cost of searching two subgroups of the population and if these two subgroups are
searched at equilibrium, then the returns from searching will be equal across the
subgroups. For example, suppose that searching one subgroup of motorists
yielded a higher return. Then police would always search these motorists, who
would in turn react by carrying contraband less often, until the returns to searching
are equalized across groups. If the returns to searching are equal across all
subgroups distinguishable by police, they must also be equal across aggregations
of these subgroups, which is what we can distinguish in the data. Thus equality of
the returns to searching can be tested without knowing all the characteristics
observed by the police.18
This economic model of racial profiling can be represented in a graph, making some basic
assumptions about offending and elasticity that will be discussed in greater detail in Part I.B
below.19 The graph—Graph 1.A.1 below—shows the relationship between the internal rate of
searches conducted within each racial group to the offending rate of the different racial groups.
At Time 1, the police are engaged in color-blind policing: assuming a certain level of searches,
the police are searching both groups at the same internal search rate of 10 percent. If minority
motorists represented 20 percent of the total motorists on the road, then the police would be
searching 20 percent minority motorists and 80 percent white motorists. Given that distribution
of searches by race, minority motorists are offending at a higher rate than white motorists—6
percent versus 4.5 percent—resulting in higher hit rates for minority motorist searches. This
reflects the assumption that minority motorists are offending at a higher rate than white
motorists.
Given the higher marginal hit rate for minority motorists, the police begin to search
minority motorists far more than their share of the motorist population: as the proportion of
searches targeting minority motorists increases, the offending rate of minority motorists
decreases. The police continue to marginally search minority motorists until Time 2 when the
offending rates for white and minority motorists are the same—5 percent. Now the police are
using race in the decision to search: the police are searching 20 percent of minority motorists on
the road and 7.5 percent of white motorists on the road, resulting in a hypothetical total
distribution of searches of, say, 60 percent minority and 40 percent white motorists. At that
distribution of searches, the offending rates are similar—and, one can infer, so are the hit rates.
At that distribution, the efficient police officer has no reason to change the racial distribution of

18

KPT 2001:206.
I take full responsibility for this graphic representation. The economists developing the models of racial
profiling have not attempted to translate their equations into graphs.
19
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searches: the officer has no incentive to search more minority motorists than the 60/40 total
distribution, which produce these different internal group search rates.
If the police officer is, in fact, searching more minority motorists and getting to Time 3,
where the offending rate of minority motorists is lower than that of white motorists—4.8 percent
versus 6 percent—then the officer must be racially bigoted. The only reason that the officer
would search more minority motorists than at the Time 2 equilibrium—i.e. would search, say, 70
percent minority motorists and 30 percent white motorists, instead of the Time 2 distribution of
60 percent minority and 40 white motorists—would be if the officer had a taste for
discrimination resulting in higher utility even though less minority motorists are offending.
The three hypothetical distributions of searches—20/80, 60/40, and 70/30—correspond to
three different sets of internal group rates of searches within the different racial groups. These
three scenarios also correspond to the three equilibrium points for the color-blind, efficient, and
racist police officer. The three scenarios are represented in the following graph, Graph I.A.1.
This graph makes many simplifying assumptions about the comparative elasticities among
different racial groups, about the comparative offending rates between racial groups, about the
selectiveness with which race is used in the searching process, and about several other
complicating matters. Part I.B and II.B infra discuss these and other matters. But this is a
simplifying preliminary graphic representation that captures the logic of the economic models
with a few basic assumptions:
*** Insert Graph I.A.1: An Economic Model of Racial Profiling ***
The basic assumptions reflected in the graph include, first, elasticity among both citizen
motorists and police officers. Motorists, whether minority or white, are assumed to reduce their
drug transportation on the road when the police increase the proportion of searches conducted on
members of their racial group. As Knowles and Hernández-Murillo explain, “The key
assumption in the analysis is that while motorists differ in their propensity to carry contraband,
those who face a high probability of being searched will tend to reduce their probability of
carrying contraband in the vehicle.”20 This is the assumption of elasticity of offending to
policing—more technically, of transporting drug contraband to police searches. In this article, I
will refer to this as “the elasticity of offending to policing” or sometimes by the shorthand
“elasticity.” Police officers as well are assumed to respond to the likelihood of successful
searches, targeting their searches at populations with higher hit rates.
Another key assumption reflected in the graph is that African-Americans have a higher
rate of transporting drug contraband, all other things equal. If it takes such disproportionate
searches of blacks and whites (for example, 63 percent versus 29 percent in Maryland) to achieve
comparable success rates for searches (34 percent versus 32 percent respectively in Maryland),

20

Hernánd ez-M urillo and K nowles 2003:3 ; see also KP T 2001 :212 (“Our model assumes that mo torists
respo nd to the pro bab ility of being searched”).
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this assumes that African-Americans would offend at a much higher rate than whites if they were
being stopped in proportion to their representation on the road. As Knowles, Persico and Todd
explain, “Our model implies that at equilibrium, both races should have the same probability of
carrying drugs, but one race may be searched more often than another. In fact, searching some
groups more often than others may be necessary to sustain equality in the proportions guilty
across groups.”21 This is the assumption of higher offending among African-Americans.
Another economist who is also developing models of racial profiling, Vani Borooah, similarly
assumes that minority offending is higher, holding policing constant. Borooah acknowledges
that “If the likelihood of being stopped was the same for blacks and whites, then the likelihood of
being arrested after a stop would be substantially higher for blacks.”22
A final key assumption reflected in the graph has to do with the way in which racism
manifests itself—namely, through the lower cost associated with searching minority motorists
among racist police officers. It is in this sense that the crux of the economic models is derived
from Gary Becker’s work on discrimination, specifically on the central insight that “tastes for
discrimination lead to lower profits for the discriminators.”23 By assuming that all police officers
seek to maximize the search success rate minus the cost of searching, and that racism enters the
picture by means of the cost of conducting a search, the economic models are able to factor out
of the analysis all the other traits that lead police officers to search motorists—such as, for
instance, tinted windows, bumper stickers, age, car model, etc. As discussed infra in Part I.B.ii,
this is both a strength and a weakness of the economic models.
One additional point. When the economists investigate data revealing disproportional
searches of minority motorists, their models do not attempt to explain away the
disproportionality by holding constant other search criteria. Instead, they essentially assume that
the disproportionality is intentional and attempt to test the data to explain whether the
disproportionality is due to statistical discrimination or racial bigotry. In this sense, the
economists’ approach differs significantly from the more traditional multiple-regression
approach of political scientists represented, for example, by the work of Mitchell Pickerill,
Clayton Mosher, Michael Gaffney, and Nicholas Lovrich at Washington State University. These
political scientists are focusing their research on identifying the other possible traits that may
account for police searches in order to determine whether the contribution of race vanishes when
other non-racial factors are held constant.24
In most cases, the economists’ approach seems more realistic given that the rates of
disproportionality are consistent and often so high. In Maryland, for instance, between January
1995 and January 1999, 63 percent of the persons stopped and searched by the state police along
Interstate I-95 were African-American, and 29 percent were white.25 In Missouri in 2001,

21
22
23
24
25

KPT 2001:227.
Borooah 20 01:3 5.
KP T 2 001 :208 ; see generally, Gary Becker, Accounting for Tastes (Harvard U niversity Press 1996).
Pickerill et al. 2003:11.
KPT 2001.
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African-American and Hispanics represented 74.8 percent of motorists stopped, while whites
represented only 31.5 percent.26 Other similar statistics have been rehearsed in the leading law
review articles and books. In Volusia County, Florida, on a stretch of I-95 in the mid- to late1980s, 70 percent of the persons stopped were minority motorists and 80 percent of the cars
searched were of minority motorists, even though minorities represented only 5 percent of
motorists.27 In Illinois in the early 1990s, under “Operation Valkyrie,” the state police searches
were comprised of approximately 30 percent Hispanic drivers even though Hispanics represented
only about 8 percent of the state population.28 In litigation in New Jersey, the state court credited
defense experts’ findings that suggested absolute disparities of 32.7 percent (46.2 percent of
stops were of blacks, 13.5 percent of drivers were black) and 22.1 percent (35.6 percent stops of
blacks, 13.5 percent black drivers) based on stops at different intervals of the New Jersey
Turnpike.29 In other contexts as well, the racial disproportionalities are often very high.30 Given
these data, the economic models focus attention on the right issue—not whether the
disproportionality can be explained away, but rather whether it reflects racial prejudice. This is
clearly the right approach. Let’s turn now to the specific contributions.

26

Hernández-Murillo and Knowles 2003:Table 1.
See generally Harris 2002:6 2–6 4; Rudovsky 20 01:3 00; R ussell 20 01:7 3;
28
See generally Harris 2002:6 4–6 6; Rudovsky 20 01:3 01; Peso Chavez v. Illinois State Police, 251 F.3d
th
612 (7 Cir. 2001) (reviewing the empirical evidence and rejecting the equal protection claim).
29
See State of New Jersey v. P edro Soto , 324 N.J. Super. 66, 734 A.2d 350 (N.J.Super. Ct. Law Div.
199 6). T he co urt cred its the defense expert’s findings at 361 ; the findings are reported at 3 53. See generally Harris
2002:53–60; Rudovsky 2001:299–300; Russell 2001:74–75. Civil liberties advocates also refer to Philadelphia,
where the ACLU analyzed police stops of motorists and pedestrians in several districts in the late 1990s, and found
significant disparities. See generally Rudovsky 200 1:301; Russell 2001:74–7 5. According to Rudovsky, “For a
one-week period in July, 1999, for car and pedestrian stops made in predominantly white police districts, the ratio of
African-Americans who were stopped was up to ten times higher than one would expect from population data”
Rudovsky 2001:301. Data from the Richmond, Virginia Police Department from 2000 reveals that the percentage of
autom obile stops that resulted in a search was most likely determined by lo cation in a blac k neighborhood. See
Matthew P etrocelli, Alex R . Piquero, M ichael R. Sm ith, “Conflict theory and racial profiling: An emp irical ana lysis
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The Economic Models of Racial Profiling
i.

Knowles, Persico and Todd (2001)

In Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches: Theory and Evidence, John Knowles, Nicola
Persico, and Petra Todd develop a model of police officer and citizen motorist behavior to test
whether recent empirical data concerning police searches of vehicles on Interstate 95 in Maryland
reflect efficient policing—what they refer to as “statistical discrimination”—or racial animus.
Their model of citizen and police behavior assumes that both parties respond rationally to
the different risks and likelihoods of finding drugs during a search. Among motorists who might
be transporting drugs, the decision whether to have drugs in the car is a function of (a) the
likelihood of being searched and the punishment or costs associated with being caught and (b)
the likelihood of not being searched and the value to them if they are not searched. If this gives
rise to a positive payoff, then a motorist who might be carrying drugs will choose to carry drugs.
With regard to police officers, the basic assumption is that officers search based on the likelihood
of finding contraband minus the cost of searching. Among non-prejudiced officers, the decision
to pull someone over for a search will depend entirely on the probability of finding contraband
since the costs are the same across races. Among prejudiced officers, the cost of searching
minority motorists will be lower, leading to a different equilibrium point. The ultimate
determination whether the police are racially prejudiced, then, turns on whether the hit rates are
lower for minority motorists. “[I]f police are prejudiced,” Knowles, Persico and Todd explain,
“the equilibrium returns to searching members of the group that is discriminated against will be
below average.”31
PKT apply their model to the Maryland data.32 The relevant data points from Maryland
are relatively basic. The police in Maryland disproportionately target African-Americans for
searches of their vehicles. Between January 1995 and January 1999, 63 percent of the persons
stopped and searched by the state police along Interstate I-95 were African-American and 29
percent were white (of a total 1,590 observations). The assumed proportion of African-American
drivers on the road was roughly 18 percent. In contrast, both groups have nearly equivalent
offending rates based on those searches. With regard to African Americans, 34 percent of the
searches turn up some evidence of drug carrying; with regard to whites, 32 percent of the
searches turn up some evidence of drugs.
Based on data concerning total seizures of drugs—i.e. seizures involving any quantity of
drugs—KPT conclude that there is no evidence of racial prejudice—no evidence that the police
officers are displaying a taste for discrimination. They write that “Although African-American
motorists are much more likely to be searched by police, the proportion of guilty motorists
31

KPT 2001:208.
There are a number of other studies that have explored Maryland data. These include Gross and Barnes
2002 (discussed infra); John Lamberth, Report on Maryland stops, American Civil Liberties Union Freedom
Network, http://aclu.org.court/lamberth.html (1996) (discussed in Russell 2001:71–72).
32
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among whites and African-Americans whose cars are searched is nearly identical (0.32 vs.
0.34)—a result that is consistent with the hypothesis of no racial prejudice.”33 In contrast, they
do find racial prejudice against Hispanics because the success rates of searches is far lower—11
percent. In other words, far more Hispanics are being stopped than would be necessary to get
them to offend less (assuming they had higher natural offending rates). “The lower guilty rates
for Hispanics are suggestive of prejudice against this group.”34
Based on data concerning seizures of large quantities of drugs, however, PKT find that
there is racial discrimination but that the prejudice works against whites. In this category, they
focus on “only motorists in possession of sufficient amounts of drugs to constitute a felony under
Maryland’s drug laws.”35 Their results here are that African-Americans are significantly more
likely to be found guilty than white motorists—0.13 versus 0.03. This, they suggest “would
imply that police behavior is biased against whites and Hispanics in favor of African
Americans.”36 The authors conclude:
In our data, vehicles of African-American motorists are searched much more
frequently than those of white motorists. However, the probability that a searched
driver is found carrying any amount of contraband is very similar across races.
Thus we cannot reject the hypothesis that the disparity in the probability of being
searched is due purely to statistical discrimination and not to racial prejudice.
When we look at the probability that a searched driver is carrying contraband in
excess of a high threshold, this probability is higher for African Americans.
Under our model, this would imply a bias against white motorists.37
ii.

Hernández-Murillo and Knowles (2003)

John Knowles and Rubén Hernández-Murillo, in an article entitled Racial Profiling or
Racist Policing?: Testing in Aggregated Data, apply the KPT model to aggregated Missouri data
and make findings consistent with racial prejudice rather than statistical discrimination. The data
set from Missouri consists of aggregated data by race and police force from an annual report
published by the State of Missouri, the “2001 Annual Report on Missouri Traffic Stops,”
mandated by the recently revised Traffic Regulation Laws.
The core data reveal the following. The proportion of each group stopped in Missouri is
31.5, 43.1, and 31.7 percent respectively for whites, African-Americans, and Hispanics. The
proportion of stops that lead to a search is 6.5, 11.4, and 12.9 percent respectively for whites,
African-Americans, and Hispanics. The hit rate for drugs is 19.7, 12.3, and 9.8 percent
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respectively. 38 Based on this aggregated data, Hernández-Murillo and Knowles conclude: “we
reject statistical discrimination as an explanation of the higher search rates of African-Americans
and Hispanic motorists in Missouri.”39 The reason is that searches of African-American and
Hispanic motorists “are less likely to be successful, with significantly lower probability of
turning up drugs or other contraband.”40 Based on their calculations, they find that 18 percent of
the excess search rate of African-Americans “would be eliminated” “if search rates were set so as
to equalize success rates across racial groups.”41
Because the data are aggregated and not individual observations, Hernández-Murillo and
Knowles are not able, strictly speaking, to hold other relevant variables—such as, for instance,
type of search—constant. The State of Missouri in fact argues in the report that the lower hit
rates for African-Americans and Hispanics are attributable to higher rates of arrest and
mandatory search, and there is no way for the researchers to rigorously account for different types
of searches.42 Hernández-Murillo and Knowles use sophisticated (non-parametric) statistical
methods in an effort to take account of this variable (given that they have the relative search
arrests/searches rate), and contend that this factor does not account for the racial differentials.
They conclude: “We found strong evidence in support of racial bias against African-American
motorists, even when controlling for sex and age.”43
iii.

Borooah (2001)

Vani Borooah, in his 2001 article Racial Bias in Police Stops and Searches: An Economic
Analysis, also develops a model of police behavior intended to distinguish between bigotry and
efficiency, or what he calls “business necessity.” As an empirical matter, Borooah uses data
from the British Home Office on stops and searches of citizens in ten police areas in England.
He finds that there are wide disparities in the proportion of the racial groups searched, but far less
disparities in the rates of success. “While in some Areas blacks were more likely than whites to
be arrested, after a stop, there were other Areas where the black arrest-rate was the same, or less
than, the white rate” (2001:23). He concludes from this—like Knowles, Persico and Todd
(2001) on the Maryland data for total searches—that there is statistical, but not racial
discrimination going on: “discrimination on grounds of business necessity.”44 Borooah writes:
The conclusion of this paper was that the implementation of police stops in
England, while undoubtedly discriminating against blacks, was largely free of
bigotry. This is not to deny that racism exists among the police forces in England;
but. . . it is more accurate to view the high stop rate for blacks as the consequence
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of the police in England targeting their resources to achieve the maximum effect
in terms of arrests.45
He concludes that “an assurance can be plausibly given for police stops and searches in England”
that the racial disparities in stops are “untainted by racism” and have contributed positively to the
efficiency of policing. 46
Borooah’s enthusiasm rests, in part, on his belief that “statistical discrimination [business
necessity], untainted by bigotry, is optimal from a policing perspective because it maximises the
number of arrests consequent upon a given number of persons stopped.”47 But he realizes that
there is a trade-off between efficiency and the appearance of fairness with regard to the stops, and
that the ultimate decision is a normative one. Borooah tries to be non-judgmental on questions of
fairness. He recognizes that societies may prefer to equalize the likelihood of being stopped and
searched, or may want to equalize the rate of success of searches. As he suggests, “the conflict
between the two types of equality arises because they represent different perspectives to the
welfare aspects of police stops.”48 The welfare gains of stops are associated with apprehending
offenders, the losses with searching innocent citizens.
Shanti Chakravarty, in a critique of Borooah (2001) entitled Economic Analysis of Police
Stops and Searches: A Critique, takes Borooah to task for assuming that there is elasticity of
crime to policing. Chakravarty argues that bigotry and business necessity may be commingled:
“the data used in the model may be contaminated with a mixture of the two effects. . . making it
advisable to exercise caution in accepting Borooah’s claim purely on the basis of the case he
develops in his paper.”49 He argues that the data may be contaminated because, if both groups
have the same likelihood of offending, the bigotry in the selection of persons to stop and search
is not wiped away by the similarity of the offending rates. He offers the hypothetical of two
groups with identical offending rates, and shows that stopping a disproportionate number of
minorities would be bigotry. He concludes: “Our purpose is to point out that he attempts to
differentiate between bigotry and business necessity using data that are not sufficient for the
purpose.”50
In reply, Borooah calls this is a “fairly obvious” point. The “whole point of my paper,”
he argues, is that under conditions of elasticity, the similar success rates show non-prejudice.
The data suggest that “Blacks have a greater mean probability of offending than Whites.”51
Because the rates of success are the same, the data show no bigotry. As a result, the argument
against racial profiling, Borooah explains, does not go to the effectiveness of policing, but to the
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Borooah 2001:36.
Borooah 2001:36.
Borooah 2001:19.
Borooah 2001:27.
Chakravarty 2002:598.
Chakravarty 2002:605.
Borooah 2002:607.
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costs of stopping more blacks. It is about “the consequences of policing in terms of harassing the
innocent and, as a corollary, in terms of the broader message that is issued to the Black
community at large.”52
B.

A Critique of the Economic Models of Racial Profiling

The problem with the economic models of racial profiling is that they do not properly
specify what counts as “success” for purposes of a highway drug interdiction program. The
models assume that a non-racist police officer seeks to maximize the rate of successful searches
that discover drug contraband. That, however, is simply the wrong objective. The proper goal
for the police is to minimize crime—in this case, to minimize the illicit transportation of drug
contraband on the highways. The proper goal, in effect, is to minimize the social costs associated
with the illicit transportation of drugs. And the fact is, under certain identifiable conditions,
minimizing the social costs of crime is at odds with maximizing search success rates. Under
certain conditions, statistical discrimination leads to higher overall social costs associated with
the profiled crime and the costs of searches. Under these conditions, racial profiling on the
highways is socially counterproductive and should be avoided. The use of racial profiling under
these circumstances would amount to a racist practice—whether intentionally or not—because it
would disproportionately target minority motorists while increasing the overall costs to society: it
would use a race classification without promoting a law enforcement interest.
i.

Rethinking Success

The economic models focus the definition of policing efficiency exclusively on
maximizing search success rates. Knowles, Persico and Todd, for instance, draw the line
between efficiency and racial bigotry in the following terms: “Police may use race as a criterion
in traffic stops because they are trying to maximize successful searches and race helps predict
criminality or because they prefer stopping one racial group over another.”53 The only other
factor that the authors take into account—other than the success rate of searches—is “the cost of
searching motorists” in terms of police time, effort, and taste for discrimination.54
What is absent from the models is the effect of racial profiling on the number of motorists
transporting illicit drugs.55 The long-term consequences on the amount of profiled crime are
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Borooah 2002:608.
KPT 2001:20 5 (emphasis added).
54
See KPT 2001:20 5–206 (“Our model assumes that the police maximize the number of successful
searches, net of the cost of searching motorists”)
55
Many other commentators who discuss policing efficiency make the sa me error and draw on a similarly
narro w definition of success. John Derbyshire , for instanc e, also fo cuses narrowly on the police officer trying to
maximize his arrests: “A policeman who concentrates a disproportionate amount of his limited time and resources
on young black men is going to uncover far more crimes— and therefore be far more successful in his career—than
one who b iases his attention to , say, middle-aged A sian wo men.” John De rbyshire , “In Defense of Racial Profiling,”
National Review 53(3), Fe bruary 19, 200 1, at *4– 5 (em phasis add ed); see also George Will op-ed in the Washington
Post dated April 19, 2001 ; Jackson T oby, Wall Street Journal op-ed in 19 99; see generally Gene Callahan and
53
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simply not factored into the economic models. This is problematic because the two
objectives—maximizing search success rates and minimizing crime—are, under certain
conditions, at odds with each other. If the police shift their allocation of resources away from
white motorists and toward minority motorists, the offending rate among minority motorists may
well decrease, but simultaneously the offending rate among white motorists may increase. The
problem is, of course, that by definition there are more white motorists. Depending on the
relationship between the comparative elasticity of offending to policing as between white and
minority motorists and the comparative offending rates, the total increase in white motorist
offending may or may not outweigh the total decrease in minority offending. It will all depend
on the different elasticities and offending rates. Given the possibility of lower rates of elasticity
for minority motorists, racial profiling may cause more persons to carry drug contraband on the
road in the long term—more criminal activity overall—by encouraging white motorists to offend.
Assuming fixed law enforcement resources, racial profiling will only reduce total crime if
the ratio of the minority to white motorist population is greater than the differential of the change
in offending by race. Whether this condition is satisfied or not, however, will depend entirely on
comparative elasticities and offending rates. Let me be more precise. In terms of notation, let
r 0 {M, W} denote the race of the motorists, either minority or white. Let Popr denote the
representation of each racial group in the total population. Let Or denote the offending rate of
each racial group. Let ) Or denote the absolute value of the change in the offending rate of the
racial group from Time 1 to Time 2.
Racial profiling will only be beneficial from a long-term crime-fighting perspective if
total crime at Time 1 (pre-racial profiling) is greater than total crime at Time 2 (with racial
profiling). This happens if:
PopM OM + PopW OW , [PopM ( OM ! ) OM)] + [PopW ( OW + ) OW)]

(1)

If we work through this equation long hand, we have:
PopM OM + PopW OW , PopM OM ! PopM ) OM + PopW OW + PopW ) OW

(2)

0 , PopW ) OW ! PopM ) OM

(3)

PopM ) OM , PopW ) OW

(4)

PopM
------------- ,
PopW

) OW

-----------) OM

W illiam Anderson , “The Roots of Racial Profiling,” Reason, August-September 2001, at *3 (available at
www.reason.com).

(5)
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From equation (5), racial profiling will only decrease overall crime if the ratio of the
minority to white motorist population—let’s call this “the population differential”—is greater
than the ratio of the absolute value of the change in white motorist offending to the absolute
value of the change in minority motorist offending—let’s call this “the differential of the change
in offending by race.”
If we assume that minority motorists represent approximately 20 percent of the motorists
on the road—in Maryland, for example, research reveals that African-American motorists
represent 17 to 18 percent of the motorists—we can substitute estimated values for the
population differential. What this suggests is that racial profiling is only effective as a long-term
crime fighting strategy if:
) OW
0.25 , -----------(6)
) OM
In other words, for racial profiling to work, it has to be the case that the change in the
overall offending rate of white motorists is more than four times smaller than the change in the
offending rate of minority motorists. Alternatively, the change in the offending rate of minority
motorists has to be more than four times greater than the change in the overall offending rate of
white motorists. If the minority representation is smaller than 20 percent, the required
differential in the change of offending has to be even greater. By the same token, if the minority
representation is larger, then the required differential in the change in offending need not be as
large. To put some numbers on this, if the minority population represents 12 percent of the total
population, then the change in the minority offending rate has to be at least 7.4 times greater than
the change in the offending rate of white motorists. If the minority population represents 28
percent of the total population, then the change in the minority offending rate has to be at least
2.6 times greater. The smaller the minority population, the larger the required differential on
change of offending rates.
Whether or not these conditions are satisfied will depend entirely on the relative elasticity
of offending to policing and relative offending rates of the two racial groups. If minority
motorists have the same elasticity of offending to policing than white motorists, then the
conditions are satisfied if we assume, with the economic models, that the offending rate of
minority motorists is greater than the offending rate of white motorists at Time 1 under
conditions of no racial profiling. As I demonstrate in a more technical Appendix, the reason is
that, by definition, if the elasticity is the same as between racial groups and there are resource
constraints, the change in offending of the two racial groups is going to be related to the
population differential. More technically, as shown in the Appendix, if elasticity is the same,
then the following will also be true:
) OW
----------) OM

=

OW
-----------4 OM

(7)
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If we substitute this into equation (6), then racial profiling will only reduce crime if the
offending rate of minority motorists (OM ) is greater than the offending rate of white motorists
(OW) under conditions of no racial profiling. The same is true if minority motorists have higher
elasticity of offending to policing than white motorists. See Appendix.
However, if minority motorists have lower elasticity than white motorists, then racial
profiling will only decrease the profiled crime if the offending rate differential at Time 1 is
greater than the difference in elasticity. Again, I demonstrate this in the more technical
Appendix. For more limited purposes here, though, let Er denote the elasticity of each racial
group. If EM is less than EW, we can denote the relationship in the following way:
x EM

= EW, where x > 1

(8)

If we assume that minority motorists have lower elasticity by a differential x, then, by
definition and substituting into equation (6), racial profiling will only decrease the profiled crime
if the following condition holds true:
(9)
> x OW
OM
In other words, if minority motorists have lower elasticity than white motorists, racial
profiling will only decrease the amount of profiled crime if minority motorists offending is
greater than white offending times the elasticity differential. If, for example, white motorist
elasticity is two times greater than minority motorist elasticity, then racial profiling will only
reduce crime if minority motorist offending is more than two times greater than white motorist
offending.
As a result, the key statistics for purposes of determining the effect of racial profiling on
the profiled crime are the elasticity and offending differentials. If minority motorists have lower
elasticity, racial profiling may well increase overall profiled crime. In other words, if minority
motorists have lower elasticity of offending to policing, racial profiling on the highways may not
advance the law enforcement interest in reducing the profiled crime. Under definable conditions,
racial profiling will be counterproductive to fighting crime. It will depend entirely on the
comparative elasticity of offending to policing and offending rates of the two racial groups.
The problem with the narrow definition of efficiency—maximizing search success
rates—is that it may effectively mask racial prejudice. If a police officer or police department
engages in disproportional searches of minority motorists in order to maximize the success rate
of searches and pays no attention to the consequences on long-term trends in the transportation of
drug contraband—or if we as modelers and policy makers focus on narrow efficiency—then the
police may endorse a scheme of racial profiling that may in fact promote more crime in the longterm. The police may promote, whether intentionally or unwittingly, a policy that discriminates
on the basis of race and increases overall crime. That would not be efficient. To the contrary, it
would in effect be racially prejudiced.
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What is most troubling is that there are good reasons to suspect that minority and white
motorists may have different elasticities of offending to policing and that the elasticity of
minority motorists may be less than that of white motorists. Elasticity is going to depend in large
part on the existence of legitimate work alternatives, as well as on different cultural scripts and
community norms. Economist Nicola Persico suggests that, as a theoretical matter, the elasticity
for African-Americans may be less than for whites because they may have fewer job
opportunities and therefore fewer alternatives to crime. As she explains, “the amount of criminal
activity—and hence also the elasticity of crime to policing—depends on the distribution of legal
earning opportunities.”56 This may affect the transportation of illicit drugs for personal use as
well as the substitutability of drug couriers. Under these conditions, the elasticity of minority
motorists would be less than that of white motorists, and racial profiling could increase rather
than decrease overall profiled crime.
A couple of additional observations. First, the analysis has assumed fixed law
enforcement resources. This is, after all, the most realistic, reasonable and conservative
assumption since the police budget is fixed by political processes that have little to do with hit
rates or effects on profiled crime. Nevertheless, even if we relax the assumption of resource
constraint, the same analysis would apply to the allocation of the additional police resources.
Under conditions of lower elasticity, maximizing search success rates may possibly increase
overall crime.
Second, it is important to emphasize that the problem with the economic models of racial
profiling is not that the economists overvalue efficiency.57 The problem is that they do not define
efficiency properly in the policing and criminal justice context. A proper model of police
behavior would assume that police departments and police officers seek first and foremost to
minimize the number of persons carrying drug contraband on the highway. If searches are the
most effective way to promote this objective—more effective, for instance, than advertisements
or public announcements, etc.—then, and only then, should the police seek to efficiently allocate
resources to maximize search success rates minus the cost of searching cars.
ii.

An Alternative Model

In order to properly model the police behavior from an econometric perspective, it would
be necessary to focus not on maximizing search success rates, but on minimizing the costs
associated with the profiled crime, including the social costs of the crime itself and of the
policing technique (i.e. of the searches themselves).58 Here, we need not assume fixed police
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Persico 2002 :147 4.
Most of the economists recognize fully that the goal of narrow efficiency may be offset by other social
ends. As K PT ackno wledge in the conc lusion to their 20 01 article, “Statistical discrimination, even if not due to
prejudice, may be considered unfair because innocent drivers experience different probabilities of being searched
depending on their race” (2001:228). Vani Borooah also recognizes that statistical discrimination “may be
reprehensible to society” and that “society may p refer its po lice to implement a ‘co lour-blind’ po licy” (20 01:1 9).
58
Special thanks to G ary Becker for helping m e think through this model.
57
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budgetary resources, because the analysis would be the same whether there are resource
constraints or not.59 What we would seek to minimize, then, are two terms. First, the costs to
society defined in terms of the profiled crime. For purposes of notation, let D denote the social
loss associated with one instance of the profiled crime, namely the transportation of illicit drugs
on the highway.60 Let Ir denote the rate at which motorists are being searched. Or (defined
earlier as the internal rate of offending for each group) is a function of Ir and so will be noted
accordingly. In more technical terms, then, the cost to society associated with the profiled crime
can be captured by the following expression:
D [ OM (IM ) PopM + OW (IW ) PopW ]

(10)

Second, we need to minimize the social costs associated with searching motor vehicles
for contraband. For purposes of notation, let Q denote the cost associated with one instance of a
police search.61 In more technical terms, the cost to society associated with the searches of
automobiles can be captured by the following expression:
Q [ IM PopM + IW PopW ]

(11)

In order to minimize the total costs to society, we would need to take the derivative of the
total cost function, denoted as Cr, which would be a function of Ir and would contain both
expressions (10) and (11). The total cost function can be expressed as follows:
CM (IM) + CW (IW) = D [ OM (IM ) PopM + OW (IW ) PopW ] + Q [ IM PopM + IW PopW ] (12)
Using partial differentiation to resolve separately for the two racial groups, if we were to
minimize the social costs, it would produce the following:
CNr (Ir) = D [ ONr (Ir ) Popr ] + Q Popr

(13)

If we solve for the case where cost is zero, we would obtain the following:

59

0 = D [ ONr (Ir ) Popr ] + Q Popr

(14)

! Q Popr = D [ ONr (Ir ) Popr ]

(15)

It does not matter, for p urpo ses of resolving the mo del, whether we assum e fixed or unlim ited resources.
I personally think it is more realistic to assume that there is a resource constraint on the number of searches the
police can conduct— i.e. that there are fixed law enforcement resources—and that the police need to minimize the
profiled crime holding constant the number of searches that the police can conduct. However, the result is the same
either way, and so I will avoid making an additional assum ption of fixed resources.
60
It is assumed here that the social cost is the same for all incidents, regardless of the type of drugs, the
quantity, or the race of the carrier. This is, naturally, a simplifying assumption given that the transportation of drugs
for personal use or for drug trafficking have very different costs for society as a whole.
61
Here too it is assumed that the social cost is the same for all searches, regardless of the type of car,
search, or the race o f the mo torist.
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! Q = D [ ONr (Ir ) ]

(16)

! [Q / D ] = ONr (Ir )

(17)

Since we are assuming that Q and D are the same for white and minority motorists—that
is, we are assuming non-racist police officers—minimizing total social costs produces the
following first order condition:
ONM (IM ) = ONW (IW )

(18)

Since ONr (Ir ) is the slope of Or at point Ir , or [) Or / ) Ir], we can rewrite this first-order
condition as follows:
) OM

------------) IM

) OW

=

-------------) IW

(19)

We can rewrite this as follows, multiplying both sides by 1:
) OM

--------) IM

IM
-------OM

OM
-------IM

) OW

=

--------) IW

IW
-------OW

OW
-------IW

(20)

Given the definition of elasticity and using Er to denote elasticity, the first-order condition
can be expressed as follows:

EM

OM
-------------- = EW
IM

OW
----------------IW

(21)

This first-order condition must be satisfied in order to minimize the total social costs
associated with the illicit transportation of drug contraband on the highways. Whether the
condition is satisfied will depend on the comparative elasticities, natural offending rates, and
search rates. It is possible to construct a three-by-three table to identify the conditions under
which the police should search different racial groups at different rates. The following table
summarizes the nine findings:
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Table I.B.1: Minimizing Total Social Costs
EM = EW

EM + EW

EM , EW

OM = OW

IM = IW
(No Racial Profiling)

IM + IW
(Profile Whites)

IM , IW
(Profile Minorities)

OM , OW

IM , IW
(Profile Minorities)

IM + IW [ OM / OW ]
(Not Clear)

OM + OW

IM + IW
(Profile Whites)

IM + IW
(Profile Whites)

IM , IW
(Profile Minorities)
IM , IW [ OM / OW ]
(Not Clear)

The two shaded cells represent situations where racial profiling may increase total social
costs. In the case where minority motorists have lower elasticity of offending to policing and
higher natural offending rates, and similarly where minority motorists have higher elasticity but
lower natural offending, racial profiling may increase overall social costs depending on the
relationship between the relative offending and search rates. Under identifiable circumstances,
then, racial profiling will result in overall higher costs to society in terms of the amount of
profiled crime and cost of searches. And this result does not even take into account the ratchet
effect discussed in Part II.B infra.
To put this another way, it is easy to come up with a counter-example to the argument
that the police should seek to equalize the hit rates as between white and minority motorists—in
other words, that minimizing the costs of drug carrying would imply equal hit rates as between
racial groups.62 If we assume equal elasticity of offending to policing as between white and
minority motorists and higher search rates for minority motorists, then this implies from equation
(21) that, at equilibrium, minimizing social costs will require higher offending rates for minority
motorists—not equal hit rates, rather higher hit rates. So if in Maryland, for example, minority
and white motorists have equal elasticity, the higher search rates for minority motorists would
imply that, in order to minimize total social costs, there should be greater hit rates among
minority motorists. The data showing higher search rates, but relatively equal hit rates in
Maryland translate into higher social costs. If we assume lower elasticity among minority
motorists in Maryland, it is also likely that the disproportional searches of minority motorists
does not minimize social costs. If minority motorist elasticity is lower, then social costs are
minimized if and only if the search rate of minority motorists is less than .34 / .32 or 1.0625
times the search rate of white motorists. If hypothetically the search rate of white motorists is 5
percent, then the search rate of minority motorists could not be more than 5.3125 percent. Given
that approximately 63 percent of searches are of minority motorists, it is likely that this condition
does not obtain.

62

Here too, I thank G ary Becker for wo rking thro ugh this argument.
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What is clear from this model is that minimizing the costs to society will entail a
distribution of searches between white and minority motorists that will depend on the relative
elasticities of offending to policing and on the relative natural offending rates.63 In other words,
the equilibrium point is not defined by the equality of hit rates, but instead depends on
elasticities and the relationship between offending and search rates. As a result, the focus of the
data collection should be on elasticities and offending rates, as well as search rates. And the
focus of the analysis will turn on the size and characteristics of the group of persons at the
margins who are most likely to be influenced one way or the other to carry illicit drugs on the
highway for personal or commercial purposes. In this sense, the analysis will call not only for
modeling skills and better data on overall elasticities and offending rates, but also for
sociological and ethnographic studies of the groups of individuals who are most likely to respond
to shifts in the allocation of policing resources.
The economic modelers may respond that they are merely trying to distinguish between
the racist and the success-maximizing line police officer. And, to be sure, some police officers
may measure success by the narrow metric of successful searches. This response, though, does
not square with basic assumptions of rationality or police behavior. The broader notion of
efficacy—associated with the long-term effects on the profiled crime—makes far more sense
from the perspective of police officers and police departments. Preventing crime is the mission
of the police, not maximizing hit rates. As we have seen throughout the country with the
adoption of COMPSTAT first in New York City and then in most other jurisdictions, the bottom
line for policing is crime rates. In fact, if the police focus exclusively on narrow efficiency, the
economic models are completely irrelevant to the contemporary criminological and policing
debates. A finding that the police conduct themselves in a narrowly efficient manner is
orthogonal to the larger question whether racial profiling is or is not racist. It may point to a
principal-agent problem in policing. But it does not resolve the key question of racial profiling.
If targeting minority motorists increases long-term offending on the highways or the overall costs
to society, then it is in effect racially prejudiced. It may be inadvertent and mistaken, but it is
effectively racist. In sum, the economic models set the wrong objective and, as a result, are
asking the wrong question and tracking the wrong statistic.
iii.

The Problem of Selectivity

Even setting this aside and adopting the narrow—and incorrect—definition of efficiency,
there is a second problem with the economic models of racial profiling: the models do not
properly address issues surrounding the selectiveness with which the police use race and other
search criteria for purposes of searching and sub-searching members of different racial groups.
As a result, the models place too much faith in their interpretation of hit rates—or, to say this
slightly differently, the official hit rates do not necessarily mean what the economists claim.

63

As noted earlier, it would be important to add another condition, namely that the police should minimize
the soc ial costs while at the same time ensuring no ratchet effect. I discuss the ratchet effec t in detail in P art II.B .ii
infra.
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There is good reason to believe that a police officer who is racist is going to use race
differently in the decision to search a minority motorist than in the decision to search a white
motorist. A racist police officer might decide, for instance, to search all available motorists when
it comes to African-American motorists on the one hand, but only young drivers driving latemodel cars with tinted windows and certain identifiable bumper stickers (marijuana leaf, Grateful
Dead, graffiti logo) when it comes to white motorists. In other words, the racist police officer
may use other search criteria more or less selectively depending on whether the motorist is white
or a minority. If the police are more or less selective when it comes to minority motorists, then
the equal official hit rates would mask different actual offending and hit rates among AfricanAmerican drivers. If so, the fact that there are equal official hit rates would not signal narrowly
efficient policing.
(a)

Selecting on Race

The fact is that the police do not profile on race alone. They also profile on car models,
vehicle attributes, rental cars, stickers, location, direction, motorist appearance, age, etc.64 The
police use these various attributes—as well as, possibly, race—to narrow down the pool of likely
suspects. We know that they are doing this successfully. The pool of motorists who are being
searched are carrying at high rates, far in excess of the population as a whole. In Maryland, for
instance, about 34 percent of African-American and 32 percent of white motorists searched are
carrying drugs.65 That is far higher than rates of personal drug use among surveyed adults,66and
far higher than success rates at nondiscretionary road blocks (about 4.7 percent in Indianapolis in
199867). It is also higher than success rates in Missouri (12.3 percent for African-Americans and
19.7 percent for white motorists68). By not stopping elderly motorists on their way to church or
the synagogue, the police can and are successfully narrowing down the pool of suspects. We see
here that criminal profiling probably “works”: it can increase the success rates of searches.
What we do not know, however, is whether and to what extent the police are engaging in
racial discrimination in the treatment of race as a selection criterion, and to what extent, if any,
that is helping make the profiling work. We do not know whether the police use more factors to
identify white suspects than African-American or Hispanic suspects. In other words, we do not
know whether they discriminate more with regard to white motorists than with regard to minority
motorists in their use of race as a determinant: we do not know whether and to what extent

64
KP T 2001 list these characteristics from a training manual of the Illinois State Police: “tinted windows,
cell phones, leased vehicles, religious paraphernalia used to divert suspicion, and attorney business cards” (KPT
200 1:20 4 n.2).
65
Knowles, Persico and Todd 2001.
66
See infra Part IV.A.i.(a).
67
See City of Indianapolis v. James Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000). The Indianapolis road block in 1998
involved random stops with no police discretion on the choice of cars or the policies to follow up stop. The car that
was selected w ould be stoppe d, the d river wo uld be asked to p roduce a license and registration, and a dog would
sniff the outside of the car. A search was to be conducted upon consent or based on a specified amount of
particularized susp icion. This technique netted drug possession in 4.7 perce nt of the total number o f stops.
68
See Hernández-Murillo and Knowles 2003:Table 1.
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African-American motorists are being stopped because of race alone, while white motorists are
being stopped because of a host of other characteristics. If the police are in fact searching any
available minority motorist and are being more selective for white motorists, then the official hit
rates compare apples and oranges. They compare all minority motorists on the one hand and a
class of high risk white motorists on the other. If this is true, then the actual offending rate for
all African-American motorists is probably higher than for all white motorists, despite the equal
official hit rates. The equal hit rates would be deceptive: they would not signal narrowly efficient
policing, but would instead mask a form of racism—selectively differential use of other search
criteria—that would escape detection. To make matters worse, we do not know the direction of
bias that would necessarily result if the police were using more characteristics for white motorists
than for minority motorists. It would depend entirely on how predictive the other characteristics
are and how they offset each other. It might be that several of the other characteristics actually
retard the success rate. For instance, the fact that an automobile is swerving may be a very strong
predictor of DUI, but a very poor predictor of—or perhaps inversely related to—the large-haul
drug courier.
More technically, the economic models focus exclusively on the overall hit rates by race.
That is, in part, their strength. As KPT contend, on their model the “equality of the returns to
searching can be tested without knowing all the characteristics observed by the police.”69 They
explain: “A key advantage of [our] test is that it is feasible even when the data include only a
subset of the variables used by the police in deciding whether to search a motorist. In fact, while
more variables allow for a more powerful test, the test that we propose can be carried out when
race is the only characteristic observed.”70 Given that there is no reliable data on those other
characteristics, this is indeed a strength of the KPT model. But it also presents a problem: it
makes the hit rates unreliable as a test for racism because it does not take account of other
characteristics when comparing hit rates.
The KPT model does include a variable for all the other characteristics that would lead
the police to search a suspect. KPT label that variable “c” which denotes all other traits that raise
suspicion to the police, and refer to race as “r”.71 Their model, however, does not hold c
constant. To the contrary, their model integrates c out of the final equation.
KPT begin, correctly, by asserting that the non-racist efficient police officer will be
indifferent with regard to the race of the next motorist searched when, for all c, guilt probabilities
are equal across all races. They express this in an equation which I reproduce below as equation
(22).72 For purposes of notation, G denotes that the search of the motorist comes up with drugs,
A denotes minority motorists, W denotes white motorists, t denotes the marginal cost of searching
a motorist, P*(G|c, A) denotes the equilibrium probability that a minority motorist (A) of type c is
guilty (G), and c, as we know, denotes all other traits that raise suspicion to the police.
69
70
71
72

KPT
KPT
KPT
KPT

2001:206.
2001:205.
2001:209.
2001:21 1 (KP T’s equation (4)).
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Their equation posits that, for all c, at the equilibrium, it must be the case that:
P*(G|c, A) = t = P*(G|c, W)

(22)

In other words, at equilibrium—i.e. at the point at which the non-racist police officer will
be indifferent about race—the hit rate will be the same for minority and white motorists holding
c constant, or, to put it slightly differently, taking into account c and solving the equation for all
c. This is correct given that KPT have defined that the non-racist police officer does not have a
different cost t for searching motorists of different races. Recall that racial prejudice is defined
as a taste for discrimination reflected in the fact that the cost of searching a minority motorist (tA)
is different from the cost of searching a white motorist (tW). Racial prejudice is defined as:
(tA) (tW)

(23)

In the next step of their model, KPT integrate out c. Based on equation (22) above, they
come up with the following test for racial prejudice—which they express in an equation that I
reproduce below as equation (24).73 In this equation, D represents “data on the frequency of guilt
by race conditional on being searched”74:
D(W) = t = D(A)

(24)

The problem is that “the frequency of guilt by race conditional on being searched” is not
different conceptually from the terms P*(G|c, A) or P*(G|c, W) from equation (22) above. The
latter terms were defined as, at equilibrium, “the probability that a motorist of type c, [A or W]
carries contraband.”75 This is conceptually the same thing as “the frequency of guilt by race
conditional on being searched.” In other words, the two equations are functionally equivalent.
The only difference is that KPT have extracted the c term from the second equation, equation
(24). The test for prejudice, then, is whether or not the frequency of guilt by race conditional on
being searched is the same or different—whether the hit rates are the same or
different—regardless of c. KPT have effectively eliminated any consideration of other
characteristics c from their test. But extracting c makes a difference. It is not a wash.
The important difference is that it is possible for hit rates to be the same ignoring c and
yet for guilt probabilities to be different holding c constant. It is possible where police officers
are racist, use other search criteria less selectively for minority motorists, and are not entirely
concerned about maximizing overall hit rates. In this sense, equation (22) is the right test for
prejudice, but equation (24) is missing the key variable of other characteristics c. Because the
hit rates that are classified by race do not hold c constant, the fact of equal hit rates could mean
very different hit rates holding a particular characteristic constant. It could be, for instance, that
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KPT 2001:21 2 (KP T’s equation (5)).
KPT 2001:212.
KPT 2001:210.
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if we hold constant the characteristic that the automobile is swerving—or any other
characteristic, such as late-model car, bumper sticker, etc.—the formerly equal hit rates are no
longer equal. And there is no necessary bias as to the direction of the difference. By failing to
hold c constant, the economic models do not account for the possibility that the police may use
other search criteria differently for different races—that the c’s associated with white motorists
may be more or less numerous than those associated with minority motorists. This problem of
selectivity distorts the interpretation of the hit rates.76
The economic modelers might respond that the assumption of efficiency solves all the
problems: if the police are actually being less selective with minority motorists and achieving
the same hit rates, then they would have to know that minorities are actually offending at
different rates than what is reflected in the parity of hit rates, and, if they are being perfectly
efficient, they will seize the marginal difference by searching more or less minority motorists.
This is, in a sense, what KPT mean when they write: “If the returns to searching are equal across
all subgroups distinguishable by police, they must also be equal across aggregations of these
subgroups, which is what we can distinguish in the data. Thus equality of the returns to
searching can be tested without knowing all the characteristics observed by the police.”77 In
effect, the economic models do away with the need to collect data on c by assuming that police
officers seek to maximize their success rates minus the cost of searching—by factoring racism
into the equation by means of the cost analysis rather than the motivation.
This is Gary Becker’s brilliant insight: to operationalize racism through the taste for
discrimination. And it may work remarkably well, especially as a way to capture unconscious
racism. The not-blatantly-racist police officer may not be fully aware of the differential costs of
searching different motorists. But the more conscious racist may simply operate on an entirely
different heuristic. It is possible—in fact, highly plausible—that the racism of the more blatantly
racist police officer will express itself not—or not only—through the differential cost of
searching motorists, but also through a more simplistic racist heuristic: “I’ll search any minority
motorist that I stop for speeding, and search any white ‘druggie’ motorist that I stop for speeding.
By white ‘druggie’ motorist, I mean young white male with fancy car and drug stickers or other
drug indicia.” If this is how the racist police officer operates, then the economic models cannot
distinguish between the racist and narrowly efficient police officer on the basis of hit rates,
because the hit rates do not have the meaning attributed to them by the economic models.
In essence, the economic modeler’s response assumes away the most interesting
question—namely how racism expresses itself. It places efficiency as a leading objective for all
police officers. Yet there is no good reason to assume that the blatantly racist police officer is
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This problem is mirrored by the model’s failure to hold c constant for purposes of the definition of
statistical disc rimination. KPT explain: “An alternative definition of statistical discrimina tion wo uld req uire that . . .
blacks are sea rched at different rates than whites with the sam e observ able ch aracteristics c. This definition is more
stringent than [our] definition 2. . . For our purposes, it is more convenient to use [our] definition 2.” KPT
200 1:21 0.
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KPT 2001:206.
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also maximally efficient in her racism. There is no reason to assume that she is seeking
maximally efficient racism. Racism and narrow efficiency may be mutually exclusive. If this is
true, then the equal hit rates do not reflect a narrow efficiency equilibrium. In fact, the police
officer possibly could search more minority motorists and improve the overall hit rates—which is
what the officer would do if she were perfectly efficient and knew that the other characteristics
were accurate predictors across race. Yet the racist police officer may continue to select
differentially on other search criteria out of racism. This is, possibly, the paradox of inefficient
racism. Her racism may be masked to us by the equal hit rates and masks to her the fact that she
could search more minorities. In any event, this form of racism would distort the interpretation
of hit rates.
(b)

Sub-Search Processes

One other related point. The police may also be engaging in more careful and deliberate
sub-searches of stopped motorists depending on their race—and this too may skew the
interpretation of hit rates. Samuel Gross and Katherine Barnes discuss this well in their analysis
of the Maryland data, which I discuss in the next Part.78 The police may be calling K-9 units
more often or engaging in more intrusive visual inspection, closer scrutiny of documents, or more
heavy-handed interrogation with certain categories of motorists. These sub-search techniques
may also affect hit rates in a statistically invisible way. And they are not accounted for in the
economic models of racial profiling. As KPT write:
[O]ur model abstracts from the issue of the thoroughness of searches.
Suppose that it were the case that police search African-American motorists more
thoroughly than whites, because of a lower “cost of thoroughness.” As a result,
searches of African Americans would not necessarily be more successful, because
of the equilibrium reaction of motorists. In fact, we may expect searches of
African Americans to be less successful since in equilibrium police equate the
(lower) cost of searching thoroughly to the expected benefit from searching.
Testing a model that takes into account thoroughness requires data on effort spent
searching. In the absence of such data, we leave this question for future
research.79
The differential application of sub-search processes, however, may also distort the
interpretation of hit rates.
(c)

Defining Racism

It is important to note, in both these contexts, the difficulty of identifying what counts as
“racist.” From one perspective, using more selection criteria (not just race, but also out-of-state
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KPT 2001:215.
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tags, fancy rims, etc.) and applying more sub-search techniques (K-9 sniffing, heavy-handed
interrogation, closer visual inspections, etc.) to one set of motorists is more fair toward that set of
motorists, because it decreases the number of innocent motorists in that category who are
subjected to full-scale searches. If we are more careful in this manner with white motorists,
fewer white motorists will be unnecessarily searched: this is better for white motorists as a
whole, and discriminatory against African-American and Hispanic motorists who are subjected to
comparatively more innocent unsuccessful searches. From another perspective, though, the subsearch techniques themselves are often intrusive, invasive, and, for ordinary motorists, may well
feel like full-blown searches. Being forced to stop and wait by the side of the road for a K-9 sniff
feels, to many people, like a search. On this view, the sub-search techniques count as searches,
and their disproportionate application appears racist against the beneficiary—against the group
subject to the practices. Moreover, the use of additional selection criteria and sub-search
techniques create a perception that the beneficiary group is more crime prone. If we are being
more careful with white motorists, their hit rates will be comparatively higher and they will
appear to be more prone to drug offenses—and vice versa. In other words, the use of additional
criteria has a symbolic effect that harms the beneficiary group: using more criteria on minority
motorists will paint them as drug offenders in the public imagination, which is racist. From this
second perspective, then, using more selection criteria and sub-search techniques is racist against
the beneficiary of the actions.
One gaping normative question then is whether to label a police officer (call him Martin)
who stops all African-American motorists because of their race alone, but who stops only white
motorists with out-of-town tags and late-model cars and subjects these white motorists to a K-9
sniff, as racist against African-American motorists (because he is less careful and causing more
unsuccessful searches of innocent minority motorists) or as racist against white motorists
(because he is subjecting white motorists to intrusive K-9 searches and jacking up their collective
hit rate, thus painting them as drug dealers).
The answer to this question may depend on political ideology. A liberal is more likely to
conclude that police officer Martin is racist against African-Americans for producing more
searches of innocent African-American motorists (but might also be more likely to conclude that
another police officer, say Mary, was being racist against minority motorists if she subjected
them to more K-9 searches, jacking up their hit rates and painting them as drug offenders). A
conservative is more likely to conclude that police officer Martin is racist against white motorists
because he is subjecting them to K-9 searches (but might also be more likely to conclude that
police officer Mary was being racist against white motorists if she was being more careful with
African-American motorists). In part, this has something to do with the symbolic dimension of
the sub-searches. A K-9 sniff of an African-American person is inextricably loaded with
meaning—especially the Civil Rights movement, Bull Connor and the Selma march. In part, it
has to do with the techniques themselves—heavy-handed interrogation is heavy-handed. In part,
it has to do with different racial sensitivities or, more exactly, different levels of sensitivity to
actions in different racial contexts. In all fairness, there is probably an element of truth to both
perspectives: the production of more unsuccessful searches of innocent motorists is a harm, and
so are the sub-search techniques like K-9 sniffs and interrogation. For purposes of clarity, in the
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ensuing discussion I will label police officer Martin as bigoted against minority (or white)
motorists, and police officer Mary as bigoted against white (or minority) motorists.
The bottom line, then, is that, when the hit rates are 34 percent for African-American
motorists and 32 percent for white motorists along Maryland I-95, we do not know if the police
have searched African-American motorists simply based on their race, and white motorists
because of five other suspicious traits. If that is the case, clearly, the African-American motorists
have actually far higher average hit rates than the average white motorist. The actual
comparative hit rate for African-American motorists is much higher than the official statistic.
Lower or equal official hit rates would mask much higher real offending rates.
The only way to address this issue is to get the relevant data—offending or hit
rates—holding c constant and holding constant sub-search processes. That would be difficult, but
not impossible. It would require asking the police officer to report all grounds of suspicion and
to report all sub-search processes administered. It would then be possible to hold c constant in
the offending and hit rates. Political scientists at Washington State University—Mitchell
Pickerill, Clayton Mosher, Michael Gaffney, and Nicholas Lovrich—are attempting to do this,
but for slightly different purposes. Their research, which involves a more traditional multipleregression approach, seeks to identify all factors that may contribute to searches in order to
determine whether any of those factors neutralize the role of race.80 “From a rigorous scientific
research perspective,” they write, “any valid approach to testing for disproportionality must
attempt to capture many (if not all) of the major factors leading up to and underlying individual
contacts between citizens and police. This process of elimination should include both general
contextual information (patrol patterns, the demographics of drivers on that roadway, and such
other considerations as suspect alerts) and incident-specific information such as the time of day,
the location, the officer, and the subject of the stop or other police contact.”81
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Their data consist of every stop made by a W ashington State Patrol officer from M arch 2002 through
October 2002, which am ounts to 677 ,514 cases (Pickerill 2003:1 7). O f those, 23,39 3 (or 3.5 p ercen t) resulted in
searches. T heir findings are preliminary, but what they also find is that race plays an impo rtant role in the incidents
of searches by the Washington State Police. “The major finding that must be acknowledged up front is that we see
disparities in search rates among different races. Even when we control for other factors that influence whether or
not searches are conducted after motorists are contacted by the WSP , we find that race still has an impact on the
likelihood of a search” (Pickerill et al. 2003:26). Specifically, Native Americans are searched at much higher rates
than whites, African-Americans and Hispanics are searched at moderately higher rates than whites, and Asians are
searched at slightly lower rates than whites. Whereas 3 percent of white motorists who were stopped were searched,
the search rates were 15 pe rcent, 7.6 percent, 6.7 percent, and 2.5 percent resp ectively for Native Americans,
African-Am ericans, Hisp anics, an d Asians (P ickerill 2003 :21). Although Pickerill et al. d o not develop an eco nom ic
mod el of racial profiling focused on hit rates, the y do nevertheless report the hit rates fro m the d ata. They find that,
overall, white m otorists are the most likely to be found with contraband. The disparities are greater with rega rd to
discretionary se arche s— not surprisingly. A dding both types o f searches, it turns out that the hit rates are 24.7
percent for whites, 18.8 percent for African-Americans, 21.5 percent for Native Americans, 16.7 for Hispanics, and
12.2 percent for Asians (Pickerill 2003:34 T able 4).
81
Pickerill et al. 2003:10.
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In their research, Pickerill et al. find that some of these other factors affect the racial
disparities. The strongest predictor of a search is the seriousness of the violation associated with
the stop. The influence of race is mitigated by other variables, including the age of the driver,
geographical location, time of day, and the seriousness of the violation triggering the traffic stop.
Most important, they find that the disparities in searches do not vary much between searches that
are nondiscretionary (which they define as searches incident to arrest, “impound searches,” and
“warrant searches”) and those that are discretionary (which they define as K9 searches, consent
searches, and pat down searches).82 Their primary purpose is to test whether the consistently
disproportional searches of minority motorists are an artifact of some other non-racial factor—in
other words, whether the race correlations would vanish if some other variable were held
constant.83 Nevertheless, it would be possible to use their data to examine hit rates holding c
constant.
In the final analysis, the economic models of racial profiling are inadequate. The models,
in essence, maximize the wrong thing: instead of maximizing hit rates, the models should
maximize the crime-fighting punch of the searches. The models incorrectly assume that it is
efficient and non-racist for the police to maximize the success rate of searches. As a result, the
models adopt an incorrect definition of efficiency and focus on the wrong statistic.
II. The Civil Liberties Literature
Civil liberties advocates and legal scholars are also scrutinizing the same new data. For
the most part, these scholars point to evidence of similar drug consumption across racial groups,
and assert that the equal or lower hit rates reflect nothing more than equal or lower offending
rates. They conclude from this that the disproportional searches of minority motorists are racially
discriminatory and do not reflect policing efficiency. In effect, these scholars refer to the same
empirical evidence, rely on the same key statistic—hit rates—assume similar offending and no
elasticity, and claim racial discrimination. As it should be clear from Part I, however, the focus
on hit rates is misplaced. Let’s start, though, by exploring the specific contributions.
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Pickerill 2003:18. They infer from this that “this is one indicator that while there may be racial
disparities in search rates, those disparities do not appear to be the result of intentional discrimination by the
officers” (Pickerill 2003:1 8; see also id. at 25).
83
As they explain, “While virtually every extant study of such data indicate that racial profiling may be
occurring, it is important to stress that these studies do not provide proof that biased policing exists. W ithout
appropriate ‘denominator’ data keyed to specific racial and ethnic populations, and without the addition of
appro priate contextual information concerning traffic stops to multivariate analyses, it is not possible to distinguish
biased policing from entirely appropriate, but demographically disproportionate, enforcement outcomes with respect
to racial and ethnic charac teristics.” P ickerill et al. 2 003 :11 (e mph asis in original).
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The Civil Liberties Model of Racial Profiling
i.

Harris (2002)

In Profiles in Injustice: Why Racial Profiling Cannot Work (2002), David Harris reviews
extensively the data on police searches and argues against racial profiling on several grounds.
His primary argument, though, is that it simply does not work.84 Harris argues that the new data
“offer an irrefutable statistical argument against the practice.”85 Harris writes:
Despite the widespread belief that racial profiling, reprehensible though it may be,
is an effective and efficient way of catching criminals—a “rational” approach to
law enforcement—newly collected information about “hit rates” gives the lie to
this assumption: the numbers just don’t add up. Data emerging from studies done
over the last few years demonstrate conclusively that hit rates—the rates at which
police actually find contraband on people they stop—run contrary to long-held
“commonsense” beliefs about the effectiveness of racial profiling. The rate at
which officers uncover contraband in stops and searches is not higher for blacks
than for whites, as most people believe. Contrary to what the “rational” law
enforcement justification for racial profiling would predict, the hit rate for drugs
and weapons in police searches of African Americans is the same as or lower
than the rate for whites. Comparing Latinos and whites yields even more
surprising results. Police catch criminals among Latinos at far lower rates than
among whites. These results hold true in studies done in New York, Maryland,
New Jersey, and other places.86
Harris also emphasizes that the benefits in terms of drug interdiction are negligible. He
points to the fact that, “while it is true that automobile stops sometimes result in large seizures of
drugs, this rarely happens. In fact, police usually find nothing at all; when they do find drugs, it
is almost always very small amounts. The quantities discovered seldom exceed enough for
personal use and often amount to even less—so-called trace amounts that can be detected but not
used. . . .”87
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Harris correctly points out that racial profiling is a form of criminal profiling, that its supporters believe
that it is an efficient and rational law enforcement technique because of offending differentials, and that it flourishes
where the po lice use high-discretion m ethod s. “If racial profiling is what direc ts police suspicion at minorities, it is
high-discretion police tactics that put the se suspicions into actio n, turning profiles into po lice investigations,” Ha rris
explains. “These high-discretion methods allow police to detain, question, and search people who have exhibited no
concrete evidence of wrongdoing. . .” (Harris 2002:11– 12).
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Harris 2002:13.
86
Harris 2002:1 3. See also id . at 79–84; David Harris, “The Reality of Racial Disparity in Criminal
Justice: The Significance of Data Collection,” 66 Law & Contemporary Problems 71, 8 1–8 2 (2003 ).
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Harris 2002:1 4; see also 84–87.
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From this, Harris concludes that racial profiling “simply does not work as a law
enforcement tactic.”88 It does not help identify likely drug suspects and it does not result in
significant drug interdiction. “[T]he evidence on hit rates could hardly be more striking,” Harris
explains. “All reveal the same thing: racial profiling doesn’t help police catch criminals.”89
There is, in his words, “no real payoff.”90
Sympathetic critics of David Harris have pointed out that his argument misses a step. As
Samuel Gross writes, “hit rates alone do not provide enough information to distinguish
discrimination from evenhanded treatment of groups with different behavior patterns.”91 In order
to distinguish, it is essential to know the comparative offending rates of the different racial
groups. Al Alschuler similarly comments, “The data are also consistent. . . with the possibility
that random stops would have yielded identical ‘hit rates.’ In short, these data say nothing at all
about the empirical success or failure of racial profiling.”92
In all fairness to David Harris, Harris does infer from the new data that the basic
assumption of higher minority offending is mistaken. Harris does infer from the empirical data
that minority motorists have equal or lower offending rates. This step in his argument may not
be articulated as well as it could be, but it is there. Harris writes, for instance, that: “All of this
exposes the rational law enforcement argument as, at best, the product of a set of mistaken
assumptions. If blacks and Latinos who are stopped as a result of racial profiling are no more
likely or are even less likely to be in possession of drugs or other contraband than whites, it
simply doesn’t make sense to enforce the law in this way.”93 It should be clear from the notion of
a mistaken assumption that Harris is in effect inferring from the evidence that minority motorists
do have equal or lower offending rates. In this respect, Harris’ argument is not very different
than the position advocated by Samuel Gross and Al Alschuler—which I discuss in detail
below.94 Harris’ argument, in sum, is that there is no offending differential and therefore that
racial profiling will not work as a law enforcement tactic.
ii.

Rudovsky (2001)

David Rudovsky, in Law Enforcement by Stereotypes and Serendipity: Racial Profiling
and Stops and Searches Without Cause (2001), argues against racial profiling primarily on the
ground that there is no good evidence that minority motorists offend at higher rates than white
motorists. Rudovsky reviews evidence regarding the relative offending rates in the context of
88
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Harris 2002:84.
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Gross and Barnes 2002:44.
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Alschuler 2002:215 n.216.
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Harris 2002:14, emphasis added.
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Samuel Gross concludes that, based on available survey data, the offending rates are probably similar
and therefore that the search differentials do reflect racial anim us. Gross and B arnes 200 2:44 –47 . Similarly,
Alschuler notes that “Little evidence suggests that blacks and Latinos com mit drug crimes at higher rates than whites,
and whethe r racial p rofiling has even a rational basis is d isputed .” Alshuler 20 02:2 15; see also n.216.
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both use and sale of illicit drugs, and concludes that there is no evidence to support the claim of
differential offending. “The substantial racial disparities that have been documented in stop,
frisk, and search practices cannot be fully explained or rationalized by crime patterns, police
deployment, or police tactics,” Rudovsky concludes.95 In effect, Rudovsky challenges the central
assumptions of the economic models, namely that there is higher offending among minority
motorists and elasticity. As a result, Rudovsky rejects the claims of narrow policing efficiency:
“arguments of efficiency and rational discrimination flounder on empirical, constitutional, and
moral principles.”96
Rudovsky specifically addresses the KPT study (an earlier draft version from February
2000) and argues that the study “is questionable on both methodological and legal grounds.”97
He critiques the KPT study on three grounds. He argues first that there is no reason to assume
elasticity: “as a statistical matter, the study assumes that the extremely small number of searches
(compared to the motoring population and to the number of motorists actually stopped) was
sufficient to deter African-American drivers from transporting drugs (there are no data to show
the rate of transportation pre-racial profiling).”98 This translates into a challenge to the
assumption of elasticity. Second, Rudovsky challenges the validity of the underlying data: “The
study also assumes that the police are accurately reporting searches where nothing is recovered
even though there is evidence to suggest the contrary.”99 This anticipates the more sustained
critique of the reliability of the data and falsification or omission of data by Samuel Gross and
Katherine Barnes discussed later. Third, Rudovsky offers a strictly legal challenge: “as a matter
of constitutional law, the study proceeds on the theory that the police intentionally targeted
African-American drivers for disproportionate stops and searches.”100 This, Rudovsky argues, is
unconstitutional. Rudovsky’s third point is somewhat orthogonal to the empirical debate and the
economic model of racial profiling—and specifically the KPT study—since the empirical work
does not address the constitutional issues. In addition, as noted above, Rudovsky reviews
extensively evidence of offending rates and concludes there is no good evidence of a disparity by
race.
In sum, Rudovsky challenges two key assumptions of the economic models—the
assumptions regarding offending and elasticity—and the reliability of the data. These are both
important contributions to the debate. The reliability of the data is, of course, central to drawing
any inferences; and the assumptions of offending and elasticity are central to the economic
models. Without them, the models simply cannot distinguish between efficiency and prejudice
based on hit rates.
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Alschuler (2002)

In Racial Profiling and the Constitution (2002), Albert Alschuler addresses primarily the
constitutional dimensions of the debate and does not rest his constitutional analysis on the new
empirical data. Nevertheless, he does make several comments about the empirical landscape that
deserve attention.
At one point in his discussion of racial profiling, Alschuler notes that “In many
jurisdictions in which the police stop blacks more frequently than whites they discover evidence
of crime substantially less often when they stop blacks. In these jurisdictions, the police
apparently overpredict on the basis of race.”101 By using the term “overpredict,” Alschuler is
implicitly assuming elasticity and higher offending rates among minority motorists. The term
“overpredict” suggests that the police would be predicting accurately if they used race less. It
suggests that race is predictive of criminality—in other words, that minority motorists offend at
higher rates than white motorists and that there is elasticity.102 In this passage, Alschuler seems
to be endorsing the economic model of racial profiling.

101

Alschu ler 20 02:2 15.
Alschuler drops a footnote (note 216 on page 215 ), elaborating on his comment and makes the following
three empirical observations. The first is entirely correct, though it rehearses the central question in the racial
profiling deb ates:
W hen, as in the Maryland highway study Harris mentions, the "hit rates" for blacks and
whites are identical, these rates do not indicate a failure of racial profiling. They are consistent
with the possibility that the police achieved the highest attainable rate of success by using a
formula that included race as one indicator of criminality. One would in fact expect identical rates
of succ ess if racial profiling were w orking perfectly. The da ta are also consistent, ho wever, with
the possibility that random stops would have yielded identical "hit rates." In short, these data say
nothing at all about the emp irical succ ess or failure of racial pro filing.
This states the principal controversy at the heart of the current debate over racial profiling—the debate between
economists and civil liberties advocates over whether the evidence of racial profiling reflects statistical
discrim ination o r racial b igotry.
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Alschuler’s second claim is less correct. Alschuler writes:
In all of the other studies [David] Harris mentions, the "hit rate" for minorities was
significantly lower than the rate for whites. These studies do indicate that the police overpredicted
on the basis of race and that their racial profiles were inaccurate. . . Establishing that the police
overpredicted on the basis of race is important. It does not establish, however, that race lacks any
predictive power or, in Harris's words, that "racial profiling cannot work."
Again, lower hit rates do not necessarily mean that the police “overpredict” on the basis of race. It could mean that
they pre dict entirely incorrectly or that they are pre dicting e ntirely correctly, but that their selection of white
moto rists is increasing the o fficial hit rate for white motorists.
The third claim is co rrect:
Race cannot have any predictive power—and racial profiling on the highway cannot
work—if rates of drug possession and drug dealing do not differ by race. Contrary to common
stereotypes and as best we can tell, whites do commit all sorts of drug offenses at roughly the same
rates as blacks and Latinos.
If all motorists hav e the sam e offending ra tes, then race do es not a goo d predicto r of offending.
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However, in the same paragraph, Alschuler also takes a slightly different position. He
writes: “Little evidence suggests that blacks and Latinos commit drug crimes at higher rates than
whites, and whether racial profiling has even a rational basis is disputed.”103 For this argument,
Alschuler relies primarily on the survey data about drug consumption and other evidence of drug
trafficking compiled by Rudovsky 2001.104 Here, Alschuler’s position is similar to that of Harris
and Rudovsky: he suggests that there is probably no offending differential and therefore no
reason to disproportionally stop minority motorists.105
iv.

Gross & Barnes (2002)

Samuel Gross and Katherine Barnes reexamine the data from Maryland in their article,
Road Work: Racial Profiling and Drug Interdiction on the Highway (2002). The data they use is
from the same source as the KPT 2001 study. For all intents and purposes, their empirical
findings regarding the data are very similar. Their conclusions, however, are very different.
Their data cover stops and searches conducted by the Maryland State Police on Interstate
Highway 95 from 1995 through mid-2000—a total of 8,027 searches—with break downs for
location, direction of travel, types of searches, quantities and type of drugs discovered, among
other variables. These data reveal that 40 percent of motorists searched by the MSP were
African-American and 4.4 percent were Hispanic.106 On the specific corridor of I-95 that has
been singled out in the racial profiling litigation, 60 percent of the persons searched were
African-American and 6 percent were Hispanic.107 The data did not include the number of
persons stopped but not searched.108 According to reliable evidence, blacks motorists represent
about 17 percent of drivers and 17.5 percent of traffic violators.109
With regard to a more narrow corridor of I-95 from the Baltimore City limit to the
Delaware border, there are more specific data about stops and searches between May 1997 and
April 2000. African-Americans represented 27.8 percent of the motorists stopped and 51.3
percent of the motorists searched. Hispanics represented 1.3 percent of the motorists stopped and
6 percent of the motorists searched.110 In effect, black drivers “were almost twice as likely to be
stopped as white drivers; and more than five times as likely to be searched.”111
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Alschu ler 20 02:2 15; see also 215 n.216..
Alschuler 215–216 n.216.
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Clearly, Alschuler is being either internally inconsistent—if there is no evidence of different offending
rates then the police cannot overpredict on the basis of race— or trying to have it both ways—there are no different
offending rates and the police overpredict as well. The fact is, either there are no differentials, in which case the
police do not overpredict, they predict entirely incorrectly; or there are differentials, in which case they are
overpredicting. B ut both statements cannot b oth be right.
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The hit rates are the following: across the entire state, 37.4, 30.6 and 11.9 percent
respectively for whites, blacks, and Hispanics; on the I-95 corridor, 40.3, 37.8 and 15.8 percent
respectively for whites, blacks, and Hispanics.112 Gross and Barnes break down the data by drug,
location, type of search (consent search versus probable cause, with ground given for request,
such as Grateful Dead stickers or nervousness). They find, for example, that “Cocaine and crack
were found most often in cars with black drivers; heroin and ‘other’ drugs in cars driven by
whites.”113
Gross and Barnes begin by casting doubt on the validity and reliability of the data. They
argue that the data have been collected by the state police and are therefore likely to be tainted
and misleading. The data, they suggest, are probably “distorted.”114 They write:
The Maryland State Police did not volunteer to keep these records; that
requirement was forced upon them. They knew that the information they
collected would be used to judge and to criticize them, and they had every
incentive to try to improve the picture. In other states officers in similar
circumstances have been caught falsifying information about searches that were
recorded. We don’t know if that happened in Maryland, but even if it did, that
sort of fabrication is not the main problem. The easy, safe way to bias records is
simply to skip some cases altogether. Under-reporting is inevitable in any effort
of this sort; usually it’s caused by common laziness or forgetfulness. But cops,
like everyone else, are least likely to omit the cases that make themselves look
good. There is substantial evidence that this happened with the MSP data set, but
we do not know to what extent.115
Despite concerns about the data, Gross and Barnes reach two firm conclusions that, they
claim, are not vulnerable to police distortions. The first is that the Maryland state police do
engage in racial profiling, in the sense that they use race as a factor in deciding to stop and search
motorists. The MSP “stopped and searched cars with black and Hispanic drivers much more
often than cars with white drivers.”116 The disproportional stops of black and Hispanic motorists,
they argue, is unlikely to be the product of randomness. Their second conclusion is, in their own
words, more speculative. They argue from the data that the reason the police engage in this type
of racial profiling is because they are trying to intercept large quantities of drugs. “Racial
profiling,” they suggest, “seems to increase the probability of finding large hauls of drugs,”117
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Gross and B arnes 2002:8. The evidence co nsists primarily of documents produced in discovery in the
litigation ag ainst the M aryland State P olice, showing that a regional comm ander ord ered his officers to file reports
on dozens of searches where the paperwork was missing but contraband had been found; as well as evidence of
minority moto rists who had b een searche d but who d id not appear in the MSP datab ase. See id. at 32. There is other
anecdotal evidence from other jurisdictions, especially from the litigation in Illinois in the Chavez case and in New
Jersey. See id. at 30–34.
116
Gro ss and Barnes 2002 :8.
117
Gro ss and Barnes 2002 :8.
113

B E R NA R D E. H ARCOURT : R E T H IN K IN G R ACIAL P ROFILING

41

because “among black and Hispanic drivers a larger minority of the searches uncovered
substantial quantities of illegal drugs.”118 This, Gross and Barnes suggest, is the underlying
motivation behind racial profiling.
On the question whether the disproportional searches reflect statistical discrimination or
racial prejudice, Gross and Barnes conclude that the practices of the Maryland state police reflect
a taste for discrimination. As they say, “the disproportionate searching of black and Hispanic
drivers was not a byproduct of a race-neutral effort by the Maryland State Police to maximize
their hit rate.”119 The reason, they argue, is that there is every reason to believe that blacks and
white offend at the same rate. Here, they couch their argument as an argument against David
Cole and David Harris. According to Gross and Barnes, the typical civil libertarian critique of
racial profiling is too simple, or as they write, “is appealing, but incomplete.”120 “Critics of the
Maryland State Police argue that the roughly equal hit rates for blacks and whites demonstrate
that the troopers discriminate against black drivers.”121 But the raw fact of equal hit rates does
not demonstrate racial animus, Gross and Barnes declare. “[H]it rates alone do not provide
enough information to distinguish discrimination from evenhanded treatment of groups with
different behavior patterns.”122 In order to distinguish, it is necessary to know offending rates.
Based on the best evidence, Gross and Barnes conclude that natural offending rates are
probably similar, and therefore that the differentials do reflect racial animus. “According to the
1999 National Household Survey on Drug Abuse, 6.6% of white Americans 12 years of age or
older report that they have used an illicit drug in the previous month, compared to 7.7% of blacks
and 6.8 % of Hispanics. There are no comparable data on drug dealers, but customers swamp
sellers in any consumer market, and the market for illegal drugs is no exception.”123 Of course,
this says nothing about dealing, trafficking, and distribution. It is however relevant because, as
they point out, “the great majority of the drug offenders arrested by the MSP were users rather
than dealers.”124 “Statewide, 84% of those found with drugs were carrying only trace or
personal-use amounts, and 68% were found with trace or personal-use quantities of marijuana
only.”125
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Gro ss and Barnes 2002 :9. Another explanation that has b een o ffered is tha t the police are interested in
seizing drug moneys, through asset forfeitures. According to Callahan and Anderson, “Collectivley, local police
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(Callahan and Anderson 200 1:*9).
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Their conclusion: “the vast over representation of blacks among those searched cannot be
explained as a byproduct of an MSP plan to maximize their hit rate.”126 Here, Gross and Barnes
couch their position as a critique of KPT 2001. Gross and Barnes criticize KPT for wrongly
assuming that there are different offending rates for whites and blacks. KPT’s model, Gross and
Barnes write, “implies that blacks possess drugs on the highway far more often than whites,
which is hard to square with what we know about drug use by race.”127 Gross and Barnes do not,
however, address the question of elasticities. They suggest that the assumption of elasticity is
“debatable,”128 but do not discuss how the assumption of elasticity would affect their argument,
what evidence there is for elasticity, and whether they need to contest the assumption for
purposes of their argument. Gross and Barnes also argue that the KPT model is simply
implausible: “Why would the MSP want to maximize the number of drug busts, however small,
rather than the number of dealers they arrest or the quantities of drugs they seize? And if they
did want that, why wouldn’t they shift more heavily from consent searches (with a 22% hit rate)
to probable cause searches (with a 53% hit rate)?”129
So how did the MSP get to similar hit rates even though they were pulling over so many
more blacks? According to Gross and Barnes, by using more sub-search techniques on black
motorists. Having a dog sniff the outside of a car does not qualify as a search. Asking for
consent and detaining someone while a K-9 unit arrives also does not qualify as a search.130
Other techniques include interrogation and comparisons to drug-courier profiles.131 These are the
type of sub-searches that can be administered in a racially discriminatory manner and yet may
soften the impact of the purported race differences in searches. Gross and Barnes argue:
A more plausible explanation is that more black drivers than white drivers were
subjected to extensive “pre-search” investigations that allowed the state troopers
to limit their searches, in all racial categories, to cars that were comparatively
likely to contain illegal drugs. That sort of pre-search screening would explain
both the high number of black motorists found with drugs (given comparable rates
of drug use for blacks and whites) and the high hit rate for all searches.132
Ultimately, what accounts for the racial profiling, Gross and Barnes speculate, is that
blacks were more likely to be in possession of large hauls of drugs. Overall, “84% of the big
dealers arrested on I-95 north of Baltimore were black.”133 This is what the police are after,
Gross and Barnes speculate. This is why they are pulling over so many more minority motorists.
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In addition, the authors also find that the police discriminate against Hispanics by all accounts.
Hispanics had much lower hit rates, reflecting a taste for discrimination.134
In sum, Gross and Barnes focus our attention on the fact that so many of the successful
searches merely reveal personal or trace amounts of drugs. By combining this observation with
the evidence that drug use is relatively similar across races—a point that Rudovsky and other
scholars, such as Tracey Maclin,135 emphasized in earlier work—Gross and Barnes raise serious
questions about racial profiling on the highway. These are, in effect, the central arguments that
have made racial profiling on the highway such a “easy case,” as Samuel Gross suggests in other
writings with co-author Debra Livingston.136 This “easy case” argument emphasizes the high
costs137 and the small benefits138 of racial profiling.
B.

A Critique of the Civil Liberties Literature

While making important contributions, civil liberties scholars nevertheless make several
critical errors. First, they take at face value the narrow definition of efficiency proposed by the
economists and fail to challenge how that definition of efficiency relates to the larger goal of
fighting crime. Second, while Gross and Barnes are sensitive to sub-search processes, they seem
to ignore the larger issue of the selective use of other search criteria in the decision to search.
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Gross and Barnes 2002:47.
Tracey Maclin similarly argues in his 2001 article, titled “The Fourth Amendment on the Freeway,” that
“the empirical evidence that has surfaced does not necessarily support the notion that minority motorists are more
likely to be transporting drugs in their cars.” Maclin 2001:123. Maclin observes, relying on the Maryland data, that
“officers find illegal dru gs in the cars of b lack motorists at the sam e rate the y find drugs in the cars of white
motorists.” Id.
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Gro ss and Livingsto n 2002:1 431 .
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They include, first and foremost, the costs imposed on innocent African-American motorists. Alschuler
places this cost—“the extent to which a racial classification burdens the innocent members of one race more than the
innocent members of another”—at the top of his list (Alschuler 2002:264). David Harris as well places this personal
cost ab ove all others. The se pra ctices, H arris writes, have a “pro found impact on innocent peo ple.” (H arris
2002:94). Another cost is the harm to the relationship between the African-American community and the police. As
Harris writes, “Racial profiling also damages the relationship between police departments and the communities they
serve. . . . [P]rofiling, which treats all citizens of particular racial and ethnic groups as potential criminals, can do
nothing but alienate these same citizens from their police. It breaks down the trust that must be at the heart of any
true pa rtnership, and it threatens to defeat community po licing’s best efforts to fight crime a nd disorder” (H arris
2002:12 ). Another cost involves the reputational harm to the profiled group— what Al Alschuler refers to as “the
social meaning of the racial classification employed by the police” (Alschuler 2002:26 5). And then of course, there
is the cost to society as a whole— to the legitimacy of the criminal justice system and the legal system more
generally. “Beyond te costs to the individuals, racial profiling and other racially biased methods of law enforcement
corrode the basic legitima cy of the e ntire Am erican system o f justice, from po licing to the courts to the law itself”
(Ha rris 2002:1 17).
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There may well be few benefits. Highway searches are intended to stop the flow of illicit drugs, and that
often gets low marks across the political spectrum. As John Derbyshire suggests, “Many on the political Right feel
that the war on drugs is at best misguided, at worst a moral and constitutional disaster” (2001:*6). Had it not been
for the fac t that the rac ial profiling issue erupted in the context of highway drug interdiction, it is unlikely tha t it
would have received so much popular and political opposition. (September 11th certainly changed that).
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Third, they fail to focus on the possible ratchet effect which would disqualify racial profiling as a
narrowly tailored policing strategy.
As a result, and somewhat ironically, civil liberties advocates embrace too willingly the
logic of the economic models of racial profiling. To be sure, they reject the two key
assumptions—higher offending of minority motorists and elasticity of offending to policing—but
they endorse the theory. And more important—and most problematically—they maintain the
focus on hit rates. The lower hit rates for Hispanic motorists, they argue, proves that there is
racial discrimination against Hispanics. The equal hit rates for African-American motorists, they
argue, corroborates the fact that drug consumption is equal among races and therefore
establishes racial discrimination.139 The civil libertarians have, in effect, bought into the
economic models of crime but flipped the assumptions.
i.

The Difficulty of Interpreting Hit Rates

The problem is, hit rates are simply the wrong statistic. It is necessary, instead, to focus
on whether racial profiling has positive or negative long-term effects on the transportation of
drug contraband and whether it causes a ratchet effect. But even putting this aside, the fact is that
hit rates are far more difficult to interpret than these authors suggest given that we know little
about the selectiveness with which other search criteria are used or, for that matter, about
elasticities and offending rates. The new data from across the country do not contain any
evidence concerning these key quantities of interest, and barring that, it is practically impossible
to reliably interpret the hit rates. So even if we were interested only in narrow efficiency, the fact
of lower, equal, or higher hit rates tells us very little. In each case, there are multiple possible
interpretations.
A set of three two-by-three matrices help elucidate the different possible interpretations of
hit rates from the emerging data. All of the matrices assume that there are disproportional
searches of minority motorists.140 Each of the three matrices address a different relationship
between hit rates—equal, lower, or higher for minority motorists—given different basic
assumptions about elasticity and offending. The six different assumptions (elastic/inelastic and
lower/equal/higher offending) can be visualized in the following graphs, Graph II.B.i:
*** Insert Graph II.B.i ***
The following three matrices set forth the simplest and most likely explanation for the
given hit rates, and then infer whether the interpretation is consistent with racism or narrow
efficiency.141 The first matrix involves situations where minority motorists are being
139

See, e.g., Gross and Barnes 2002:47.
As a result, there is a lack of symmetry with regard to the three matrices. Symmetry would require
creating the three matrices for dispropo rtionate searches of white mo torists.
141
Given that all of the matrices assu me that there are disproportional searc hes of minority motorists, it is
possible to argue in each cell that the dispropo rtionality reflects racial prejudice simply b ecause it considers race in
140
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disproportionately searched, but their hit rates are equal to those of white motorists. There are
six possible interpretations depending on the other quantities of interest. The six possible
scenarios are as follows:
Table II.B.i.1: Equal Hit Rates

. . . and
minority
motorists
have higher
natural
offending
rates than
white
motorists. . .

If offending is elastic to policing. . .

If offending is inelastic to policing. . .

this may mean that the minority real
offending rate has decreased because of
the disproportionate searches, which is
reflected in the similar hit rates.

this may mean the police are being more
discriminate in their searches of white
motorists (applying more successful
profiling factors and sub-search
techniques), increasing the overall white
hit rates.

Here [Graph (1)] it is narrowly efficient
to police minority motorists at higher
rates, because it is reducing their
offending and creating an equilibrium.
There is efficiency, equilibrium, and no
racial bigotry.

Here [Graph (2)] it is bigoted against
minorities (or whites, depending on how
you see it) because of the more careful
searches of whites, combined with
bigotry against white motorists from a
narrow efficiency perspective because
they should not be searched at all since
minorities have constant higher
offending rates.

the administratio n of crim inal justice to the detriment of minority mo torists. So me comm entators argue that any
recourse to race in these circumstances—i.e. regardless of relative offending or elasticities—is morally and
politically offensive. This is an argument for color-blind policing practice, and it comes in two different forms
depending on political ideology. Randall Kennedy, for instance, argues against racial profiling on the ground that
race should not be taken into consideration in discretionary preventative policing. Randall Kennedy, “Racial
Profiling Usually Isn’t Racist. It Can Help Stop Crime. And It Should Be Abolished,” The New Rep ublic,
September 13, 1999. Kennedy assumes, for purposes of his argument, that African-Americans have higher natural
offending rates, and that racial profiling is not only efficient policing but reduces the amoun t of crime. Desp ite this,
Kennedy opposes racial profiling: “individuals should be judged by public authority on the basis of their own
conduct and not on the basis—no t even partly on the basis—of racial generalization. Race-dependent policing
retards the development and spread of such thinking; indeed, it encourages the opposite tendency.” (Kennedy
1999:*3, *5) David Harris also makes the argument, suggesting that “It is clearly unconscionable to treat an
individual as a criminal suspect simply because a small number of individuals from the same racial or ethnic group
are criminals” (Harris 2002:1 2). T his argument requires no emp irical findings whatsoever. It is pure ly
deo ntological, and invo lves no cost-benefit analysis, utilitarian weighing, or em pirical evidence. I distinguish this
abso lutists argum ent from the mo re specific argument that it is impro per to dispropo rtionately search minority
moto rists where they are not o ffending at higher rates— where there is no efficiency argument. This specific
argum ent I will include in the cells. However, because the m ore absolutist argum ent applies to every cell, I will put a
place holder here and not make the argum ent in each cell.
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. . . and
minority
motorists
have the same
natural
offending
rates as white
motorists. . .

this may mean either that the police are
being more discriminate in their
searches of minority motorists (applying
more successful profiling factors or subsearch techniques), resulting in more
successful minority searches, and/or
less discriminate in their searches of
white motorists, resulting in lower
success rates for whites.
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this may mean that the equal hit rates
reflect the equal real offending rates.
Here [Graph (4)] there is no narrow
efficiency reason to search minorities
disproportionately, and therefore the
police are acting in a bigoted manner
against minority motorists when they
stop them disproportionately.

Here [Graph (3)] the police are acting in
a bigoted manner against white (or
minority) motorists by not being as
careful in the search selection process;
but at the same time, the police are
acting in a bigoted way against
minorities because, given the equal
offending rates, there is no narrow
efficiency reason to search minorities
disproportionately.
. . . and
minority
motorists
have lower
natural
offending
rates than
white
motorists. . .

this may mean either that the police are
being more discriminate in their
searches of minority motorists (applying
more successful profiling factors or subsearch techniques), resulting in more
successful minority searches, and/or
less discriminate in their searches of
white motorists, resulting in lower
success rates for whites.

this may mean either that the police are
being more discriminate in their
searches of minority motorists (applying
more successful profiling factors or subsearch techniques), resulting in more
successful minority searches, and/or
less discriminate in their searches of
white motorists, resulting in lower
success rates for whites.

Here [Graph (5)] the police are acting in
a bigoted manner against white (or
minority) motorists; but at the same
time, the police are acting in a bigoted
way against minorities because, given
the lower offending rates, there is no
efficiency reason to search minorities
disproportionately.

Here [Graph (6)] the police are acting in
a bigoted manner against white (or
minority) motorists by being less careful
toward white motorists; but at the same
time, the police are acting in a bigoted
way against minorities because, given
the equal offending rates, there is no
narrow efficiency reason to search
minorities disproportionately.

The second matrix corresponds to the situation where minority motorists are being
disproportionally searched, but their hit rates are lower than those of white motorists. Again
there are six possible interpretations depending on the other two quantities of interest (elasticity
and offending). The six possible scenarios are as follows:
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Table II.B.i.2:Lower Hit Rates among Minorities

. . . and minority
motorists have
higher natural
offending rates
than white
motorists. . .

. . . and minority
motorists have the
same natural
offending rates as
white motorists. . .

If offending is elastic to policing. . .

If offending is inelastic to policing. . .

this may mean that minority real
offending has decreased too much
because of the disproportionate
searches, which is reflected in the
lower hit rates.

this may mean that the police are being
much more discriminate in their
searches of white motorists (applying
more successful profiling factors and
more sub-search techniques), resulting
in more successful searches of white
motorists

Here [Graph (1)] the police have
exceeded the equilibrium and are
now engaging in bigotry against
minority motorists. The police are
demonstrating a taste for
discrimination against minorities.

this may mean that the lower hit rates
for minority motorists reflects the
reduced real offending rates of
minorities caused by the elasticity.
Here [Graph (3)] there is no narrow
efficiency reason to police minorities
disproportionately, and therefore the
police are exhibiting bigotry against
minorities.

. . . and minority
motorists have
lower natural
offending rates
than white
motorists. . .

this may mean that the lower
minority hit rate reflects the lower
minority offending rate and the
reduced real offending from
elasticity.
Here [Graph (5)] there is no narrow
efficiency reason to police minorities
disproportionately, and therefore the
police are exhibiting bigotry against
minorities.

Here [Graph (2)] the police are
demonstrating bigotry against
minorities (or whites) because of the
more careful searches of whites,
combined with bigotry against white
motorists from a narrow efficiency
perspective because they should not be
searched at all since the minority
motorists have constant higher
offending rates.
this may mean either (1) that the police
are being more discriminate in their
searches of white motorists or (2) less
discriminate in their searches of
minority motorists, assuming they are
using other successful predictive traits.
Here [Graph (4)] there is no narrow
efficiency reason to search more
minorities, and the police are also
demonstrating bigotry against minority
(or white) motorists.
this may mean that the lower minority
hit rate reflects the lower minority
offending rate.
Here [Graph (6)] there is no narrow
efficiency reason to search minorities
more, and therefore the police are
exhibiting bigotry against minorities by
disproportionately searching them.
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Finally, the third matrix corresponds to the situation where minority motorists are being
disproportionally searched, but their hit rates are higher than those of white motorists. Again
there are different possible interpretations depending elasticity and offending rates. The six
possible scenarios are as follows:
Table II.B.i.3:Higher Hit Rates among Minorities
If offending is elastic to policing. . .

If offending is inelastic to policing. . .

. . . and
minority
motorists have
higher natural
offending rates
than white
motorists. . .

this may mean that minority real
offending rates have not come down
enough to reach the equilibrium and
that the police could efficiently
search more minority motorists.

this may mean that the higher minority hit
rates reflect the higher offending among
minority motorists.

. . . and
minority
motorists have
the same
natural
offending rates
as white
motorists. . .

this may mean either that the police
are being much more discriminate in
their searches of minority motorists
(applying more successful profiling
factors or sub-search techniques),
resulting in more successful minority
searches, and/or much less
discriminate in their searches of
white motorists, resulting in lower
success rates for whites.

Here [Graph (1)], while it is efficient
to search more minority motorists,
the disproportionality is not sufficient
to bring minority offending down to
the same level as white offending,
which is bigoted against white
motorists.

Here [Graph (3)] the police are acting
in a bigoted manner against white (or
minority) motorists; but at the same
time, the police are acting in a
bigoted way against minorities
because, given the equal offending
rates, there is no efficiency reason to
search minorities disproportionately.

Here [Graph (2)] it is narrowly efficient
to search only minority motorists because
they are offending at constant higher
rates. In fact, it is bigoted against white
motorists from a narrow efficiency
perspective to not search only minority
motorists.

this may mean that the police are either
being more careful in their searches of
minority motorists, resulting in higher hit
rates for minorities, and/or less careful in
their searches of white motorists,
resulting in lower hit rates for white
motorists.
Here [Graph (4)] there is no efficiency
reason for the disproportionate searches,
so the police are acting in a bigoted
manner against minority motorists; but at
the same time, the police are also bigoted
against white (or minority) motorists in
the selection and sub-searching process.
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. . . and
minority
motorists have
lower natural
offending rates
than white
motorists. . .

this may mean either that the police
are being much more discriminate in
their searches of minority motorists
(applying more successful profiling
factors or sub-search techniques),
resulting in more successful minority
searches, and/or much less
discriminate in their searches of
white motorists, resulting in lower
success rates for whites.
Here [Graph (5)] the police are acting
in a bigoted manner against white (or
minority) motorists; but at the same
time, the police are acting in a
bigoted way against minorities
because, given the lower offending
rates of minorities, there is no
efficiency reason to search minorities
disproportionately.
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this may mean either that the police are
being much more discriminate in their
searches of minority motorists (applying
more successful profiling factors or subsearch techniques), resulting in more
successful minority searches, and/or
much less discriminate in their searches
of white motorists, resulting in lower
success rates for whites.
Here [Graph (6)] the police are acting in
a bigoted manner against white (or
minority) motorists by being so much less
careful about which white motorist they
search; but at the same time, the police
are acting in a bigoted way against
minorities because, given the lower
offending rates, there is no efficiency
reason to search minorities
disproportionately.

Clearly, we need to know more about selectivity, elasticity and offending before we can
use the new data to test whether the police are being narrowly efficient or racist. There are no
solid interpretive rules that can be inferred from these tables. A summary of the tables reflects
this well:
Summary of Table II.B.i.1: Equal Hit Rates
Elastic

Inelastic

Higher minority
offending

Narrowly efficient

Bigoted against minorities (or
whites) and against whites.

Same offending

Bigoted against whites (or
minorities) and against minorities.

Bigoted against minority
motorists

Lower minority
offending

Bigoted against whites (or
minorities) and against minorities

Bigoted against whites (or
minorities) and against
minorities
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Summary of Table II.B.i.2: Lower Hit Rates
Elastic

Inelastic

Higher minority
offending

Bigoted against minorities

Bigoted against minorities (or whites)
and against whites.

Same offending

Bigoted against minorities

Bigoted against minorities (or whites)

Lower minority
offending

Bigoted against minorities

Bigoted against minorities

Summary of Table II.B.i.3: Higher Hit Rates
Elastic

Inelastic

Higher offending

Bigoted against whites

Bigoted against white
motorists.

Same offending

Bigoted against whites (or
minority) and against minorities

Bigoted against minority
motorists and against white( or
minority) motorists

Lower minority
offending

Bigoted against whites (or
minority) and against minorities

Bigoted against whites (or
minorities) and against
minority motorists

Given that the data include no information about offending or elasticity, and given the
uncertainty regarding how the police are comparatively treating race and other search criteria as a
factor in selection and in sub-search processes, it is extremely difficult to interpret the data on hit
rates. Equal hit rates could mean narrow efficiency, but it could also signal racial discrimination
against minorities or against whites.
The clincher is, the problem of selectivity renders it impossible to know how the official
hit rates really compare. Even assuming elasticity and higher offending among minority
motorists—even assuming sub-graph (1) in Graph II.B.i—the official hit rates do not hold c
constant. As a result, if the data are showing disproportionate searches of minority motorists but
equal hit rates, it could very well be that the equality in the hit rate is an artifact of being more or
less selective with minority motorist stops or using more or less sub-searches of minority
motorists. The real hit rate for minority motorists may be higher or lower than the official hit
rate because of greater or lesser selectivity or sub-searching. As a result, the equal official hit
rates might mask actually lower or higher hit rates among minorities which, under assumptions
of elasticity and higher offending among minorities, translates into racial prejudice rather than
narrow efficiency. And the masking effect applies across the board: official lower hit rates could
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also mask actual equal hit rates if the police are engaging in different selectivity of searches. In
other words, lower hit rates do not necessarily mean racial prejudice: they could reflect narrow
policing efficiency (equal real hit rates) plus selectivity.
This seriously undermines our ability to make accurate inferences from the emerging data
on hit rates. If we assume that the police are being racist, then they probably are searching blacks
less discriminately. This will surely mask differences in offending rates, if there are any. Thus,
lower hit rates among minorities could still be consistent with higher offending rates among
minorities and, from a narrow efficiency perspective, would still militate in favor of racial
profiling. The fact that we are seeing lower hit rates among minorities does not mean that the
police are being inefficient. It could simply reflect other mechanisms that are effectively
masking the narrow policing efficiency of racial profiling. Under this scenario, racial profiling
would not be problematic from a narrowly efficiency perspective (even though the different
selectivities would).
ii.

The Ratchet Effect

The civil liberties scholars also fail to focus on the likely ratchet effect associated with
racial profiling. A ratchet effect occurs when profiling produces a supervised population that is
disproportionate to the distribution of offending by racial group. To give an example: if
minority motorists represent 20 percent of motorists on the road, but 30 percent of the offenders
(persons carrying drug contraband on the highway), then minority motorists are offending at a
higher proportion than their representation in the general motorist population. If the police
achieve equal hit rates by deploying 60 percent of their searches on minority motorists, then
minority motorists will represent 60 percent of the population with negative police contacts
resulting, in all likelihood, in some form of correctional relationship, whether a ticket, a fine, an
arrest, probation revocation, supervision, or incarceration. The difference between minority
motorists representing 30 percent of the offenders and 60 percent of the correctional population
represents a ratchet that has significant negative effects on the minority population, including the
creation of criminal records, potential loss of employment, and the creation of criminal stigma
associated with being a minority.
The existence of a ratchet effect turns on subtle variations in elasticity and offending. In
order to grasp these effects, it makes sense to begin by graphing a basic model of racial profiling.
Let us assume, first, that the elasticity of offending to policing is measured in terms of the
distribution of total searches conducted by race. So on the x-axis, instead of having the internal
group search rate (the rate of searches within each racial group), the graph plots instead the total
distribution of searches as between white and minority motorists. Second, let us assume that
elasticity is relatively constant and is the same for both racial groups. Third, let’s assume that
minority offending is consistently higher than white offending. Based on these assumptions, a
simple model of racial profiling can be represented by the following graph, Graph II.B.ii.1.
*** Insert Graph II.B.ii.1: Basic Assumptions ***
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By way of interpretation, if the police are engaging in race-neutral policing and are taking
a random sample of the total motorist population (assume a distribution of 20 percent minority
and 80 percent white motorists), then the police will search approximately 20 percent minority
and 80 percent white motorists. The police searches will reflect offending rates of approximately
7.5 percent for minority and 3 percent for majority motorists (Time 1). If the police engage in
racial profiling in a narrowly efficient manner, they will search additional minority motorists
until the hit rates are the same. Based on this graph, they will need to search 60 percent minority
and 40 percent white motorists, in which case they will achieve equal hit rates related to equal
offending rates of approximately 4.5 percent.
This simple model reflects the likelihood of a significant ratchet effect. Even if minority
motorists are committing more offenses than their representation in the general
population—which they are under these assumptions—but far less than 50 percent of the
offenses—which is likely since they are only 20 percent of the population—the police would
nevertheless need to search minority drivers more than 50 percent of the time in order to achieve
the goal of narrowly efficient racial profiling. The only way to achieve equal hit rates under
these conditions is to search minority motorists more than white motorists disproportionally to
their offensing. Regardless of the level of higher offending—whether it is 25, 35, or 45 percent
minority—the profiling equilibrium will require even greater disproportionate searches.
The difference between the offending differential on the one hand and the search
differential necessary to achieve parity of hit rates on the other hand is precisely a ratchet effect.
Based on the assumptions in Graph II.B.ii.1, if minorities comprise 20 percent of the motorists on
the road, but 30 percent of the offenders on the road, a natural sample of offending would result
in an apprehended population that is about 30 percent minority. However, in order to achieve
similar hit rates—similar offending—by means of elasticity, the police would actually have to
increase the proportion of apprehended minority motorists to 60 percent. The result is that the
supervised population will be 60 percent minority even though the offending population may
only be 30 percent minority.
This difference—the difference between 30 and 60
percent—creates a ratchet: in order to maximize search success rates through racial profiling, the
police subjects a disproportionate number of minority offenders to corrections.
The only way to avoid a ratchet effect is if white offending is less elastic than minority
offending and the offending curves intersect each other at some point smaller than 50
percent—or, in other words, if minority offending is highly elastic as opposed to white offending
with an intersection below the 50 percent mark. What this assumes, though, is that minority
offending is not always higher than white offending—which represents a non-trivial assumption
for anyone who is assuming higher offending among minority motorists. The model based on
these assumptions is represented in Graph II..B.ii.2 that follows:
*** Insert Graph II.B.ii.2: Assumptions Necessary to Avoid a Ratchet Effect ***

B E R NA R D E. H ARCOURT : R E T H IN K IN G R ACIAL P ROFILING

53

On these narrow assumptions, it would be possible for the offending differential to be
reflected perfectly by the policing differential. It would be possible, for instance, for minority
motorists, who represent 20 percent of the population, to represent 40 percent of offenders under
conditions of random sampling, and for the police to search 40 percent minority motorists in
order to achieve similar hit rates. If that were the case, there would be no ratchet effect: 40
percent of the offending population would be minority motorists, and 40 percent of the
population with negative police contacts (arrests or other negative contact) would also be
minority motorists. The police would have increased the overall efficiency of the searches and
the total number of successful searches, yet they would not have created a ratchet effect on the
carceral population.
It is important to note, though, that it would not be possible to achieve similar hit rates
without a ratchet effect if the point of intersection were at a point greater than 50 percent, as
demonstrated in Graph II.B.ii.3 following. If the point of intersection is to the right of the 50
percent mark, then there is simply no way for the police to achieve equal hit rates.
*** Insert Graph II.B.ii.3: Different Elasticity and Offending, But No Equal Hit Rates ***
The bottom line is that there is likely a ratchet effect under the more common
assumptions concerning offending and elasticity. In the model presented here, a ratchet is only
avoided if there is lower elasticity for white motorists and the point of intersection is at less than
50 percent. These are not trivial assumptions: if minority motorists offend at higher rates than
white motorists, there is no apparent reason why that would be the case less than 50 percent of
the time. In other words, the assumption of higher offending would seem to go hand in hand
with assuming higher offending more than 50 percent of the time. Moreover, although the
elasticity as between racial groups may be different, there is little reason to believe that white
motorists would have lower elasticity.
Racial profiling on the highways, then, probably produces a ratchet effect on the profiled
population. The full effect is probably masked by the more discriminatory selection and subsearches of whites which wipes out some of the effect on hit rates. This ratchet effect may not be
reflected in the hit rates that we are observing in the new data, but that is probably because the
police are being more selective in their use of other search criteria for white motorists. However,
it is probably reflected in the arrest and conviction rates and in our prison population. The
bottom line is that the only way to guarantee a carceral population that mirrors the offending
population is to not engage in any profiling at all, but to police color-blind.
A ratchet effect has great costs to society. A ratchet produces a disproportionate
distribution of criminal records and criminal justice contacts that has numerous secondary
implications on employment, education, families, and communities. Disproportional criminal
supervision and incarceration reduces work opportunities, break-down families and communities,
and disrupt education. It creates an exaggerated general perception in the public imagination and
among police officers that blacks are criminals—a conception of “black criminality,” as Dorothy
Roberts suggests, that has significantly collateral consequences for African-American
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communities.142 This, in turn, further undermines the ability of African-Americans to get jobs or
pursue educational opportunities. It has a delegitimizing effect on the criminal justice system
that may effectively encourage disaffected youths to commit crime. It may also produce a lack of
trust of the police that may hamper law enforcement efforts, as minority community members
become less willing to report crime, to testify at trial, and to convict defendants at trial.143 And, to
make matters worse, there is a feed-back mechanism that only aggravates these tendencies.
Given the paucity of reliable information on natural offending rates, the police may rely on their
own prior arrest and supervision statistics in deciding how to allocate resources, thereby
reinforcing the ratchet. As Attorney General Peter Verniero of New Jersey explains, “To a large
extent, these statistics have been used to grease the wheels of a vicious cycle—a self-fulfilling
prophecy where law enforcement agencies rely on arrest data that they themselves generated as a
result of the discretionary allocation of resources and targeted drug enforcement efforts.”144 This,
in turn, refuels the imbalance in the prison population and the growing correlation between race
and prior criminal. A ratchet effect based on race is, in this sense, deeply corrosive to race
relations and harmful to the economic and social advancement of minority communities.
In the final analysis, the civil liberties advocates err in embracing the logic of the
economic models of racial profiling and the focus on hit rates. The hit rate is simply the wrong
statistic. The proper question to ask, at the empirical level, is not whether racial profiling
maximizes the success rate of searches, but whether it reduces the profiled crime—namely the
illicit transportation of drug contraband on the highways—without creating a ratchet.
III. The Constitutional Literature
This is also the key question for purposes of constitutional analysis since it ties most
directly into the traditional law enforcement interest in combating crime. Unfortunately, the
courts and many commentators fail to address the question directly. Instead, they deploy a set of
four technical legal distinctions that insulate them from the hard question of race in policing.
The trouble with the emerging jurisprudence is that none of the four distinctions are tenable.
Let’s take them frame by frame.
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The Constitutional Model of Racial Profiling
i.

The Fourth versus the Fourteenth Amendment

The Supreme Court’s decision in Whren v. United States145 set the stage for the first two
legal distinctions. In Whren, the police used a minor traffic violation as a pretext to stop and
investigate two motorists in a car. The police were suspicious of two young men, who were
sitting in a Pathfinder with temporary plates, because they were stopped for a lengthier than usual
amount of time—more than 20 seconds—at a stop sign and the driver was apparently looking
down into the lap of his companion. The police were patrolling a high-drug area and they
suspected a drug transaction. The two men, who were African-American, challenged the
pretextual stop as unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, and argued that permitted such
practices would enable the police to stop motorists based on race—an impermissible factor, they
argued. The Supreme Court rejected their argument. The Fourth Amendment, the court
declared, does not concern itself with the subjective intentions of the police officer, including
their possible reliance on race, so long as there is reasonable suspicion or probable cause to
justify the seizure—in this case, the traffic violation. Race claims should be addressed to the
Equal Protection clause, not the Fourth Amendment, the court declared. “We of course agree
with petitioners that the Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on
considerations such as race. But the constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally
discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment.”146
The court’s ruling in Whren sent two signals: first, Fourth Amendment analysis differs in
kind from Equal Protection analysis and claims of racial bias should be addressed to the latter,
not the former. Second, and more indirectly, in the Fourth Amendment context race can
legitimately be considered as a factor in the determination to stop an individual so long as there is
separate independent reasonable suspicion necessary for a temporary stop and limited search.
This doctrinal framework of separating Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment analysis has guided
lawyers in presenting racial profiling claims and lower courts in assessing these claims. As a
result, most legal discussions of racial profiling address both claims separately.
Most constitutional scholars have criticized this practice and argued that notions of equal
protection should infuse our interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.147 Carol Steiker argues in
her essay Second Thoughts About First Principles, that “the deeply rooted problem of racially
discriminatory treatment of black citizens by the police constitute the kind of circumstances that
call for new constructions of the Fourth Amendment. . .”148 Anthony Thompson argues in his
article Stopping the Usual Suspects that the Supreme Court “took a wrong turn” in writing race
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out of the Fourth Amendment.149 Steiker, Thompson, and others have called for reexamination
of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence informed by historical and institutional considerations of
race relations. As Alschuler observes, “[b]oth before and after Whren, a flood of apparently
unanimous commentary has opposed this bifurcation of the two constitutional provisions.”150
The unanimous commentary reaches the right result, though for slightly different reasons.
The principal reason to reject bifurcation is that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment analyses
rest on a similar factual starting point, namely whether race predicts criminality. Although the
doctrinal analyses obviously are different—reasonable suspicion in one case, narrowly tailored to
a compelling governmental interest in the other—they both trigger a threshold factual
determination whether race is a valid predictor of the profiled crime. If there is a strong
correlation between race and the profiled crime, then race may raise legitimate suspicion and may
also represent a means to satisfy the government’s interest in combating crime. The analyses
then turn on the degree of predictive power as compared to other factors that would satisfy the
constitutional tests, as well as, for purposes of the Equal Protection analysis, whether the police
technique is narrowly tailored to the law enforcement interest. To be sure, race triggers strict
scrutiny rather than rational basis review under Fourteenth Amendment analysis—a higher
standard of review. But for purposes of thinking through the analysis, race is no different than
other crime prediction factors such as gender, age, education, family history, prior criminality,
etc. It functions in the same was for purposes of criminological prediction and, thus, for
purposes of reasonable suspicion or fighting crime. If race is not a good predictor of criminality,
then race clearly does not raise articulable or other suspicion and, at the same time, does not
promote the governmental interest in fighting crime.151 It is effectively useless under both
doctrinal analyses.
Valid prediction is the triggering mechanism for both doctrinal analyses. If there is a
strong correlation between race and the profiled crime, then race is likely going to raise
articulable suspicion and its use in policing, if narrowly tailored, will likely satisfy the law
enforcement interest in combating crime. In both cases, the key determination will turn on the
degree of predictive capability vis-a-vis other factors that traditionally satisfy the tests. This
initial inquiry turns on similar social scientific evidence regarding prediction. The two analyses
are linked because it is precisely the legitimate suspicion that would provide the state’s interest in
using race in policing.
Tracey Meares and I make a similar point outside the race context with regard to the
predictive factor of fleeing from the police in our Foreword to the 2000 Supreme Court Review
of the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, entitled Transparent Adjudication and Social
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Science Research in Constitutional Criminal Procedure.152 We discuss there the Supreme
Court’s decision in Illinois v. Wardlow,153 where the court addressed the constitutionality of a
police officer’s stop of a suspect based on the fact that the suspect had fled upon seeing several
police cruisers patrolling an area known for heavy narcotics trafficking. A majority of the court
decided that flight from an identified police officer constituted reasonable suspicion—and
therefore that the stop was constitutional—based on a common sense judgment that fleeing from
the police was inherently suspicious. Tracey Meares and I argue that, rather than relying on
common sense intuitions, the majority should instead have explored empirical data on prediction.
“If we knew that crime was indeed afoot in the vast majority of cases in which police stopped
individuals on the street after such individuals had run away from them,” we reasoned, “then we
would likely be much less concerned about the intrusion on individual liberty that takes place
during the stop. We would conclude that this category of information is a good reason ex ante
for police action, not only because the category of information seems to reliably indicate guilt of
crime, but also because the particular criterion satisfied by the category of information—how
reliably the information indicates that crime is afoot—is a legitimate explanation for police
action.”154
In the Warlow case, data from New York City suggested that this particular
factor—fleeing from the police—was not a good predictor of criminality. A report issued by
Elliott Spitzer, the Attorney General of New York, collected information on a sample of stops
based on facts that, as reported by the police, clearly met the constitutional standard of reasonable
suspicion, as well as on stops based on facts that courts have decided clearly would not constitute
reasonable suspicion.155 With respect to the Wardlow factor, the data suggested that “[s]tops
reported as undertaken because the suspect fled the scene result in a very high stop-to-arrest
ratio—a ratio of 26:1. This ratio is quite close to that of stops based on factors generally
understood to fail to satisfy reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment. Note that even
when flight in a high crime area is considered, the ratio between stops and arrests lowers, but it
does not lower by much. It stands at 20.3:1.”156 These data, Meares and I argued, supported the
dissenters’ view in Wardlow that flight was not an adequate predictor of criminal activity. We
argued that the court should have explored this or other data in order to get a better sense of the
predictive power of the factor allegedly raising suspicion. Our point was not that data would
resolve the legal question—there is inevitably a normative question as to how predictive factors
must be to meet the constitutional standard—but that data would allow the court to compare this
factor to others that have passed constitutional review.
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The same analysis should apply to race as a predictive factor. In order to address the
Fourth Amendment question, a court should determine whether there is any evidence that race is
a predictive factor, and, if so, to what degree. Only if it passes this test might it be a reasonable
ground for suspicion, and therefore possibly promote a governmental interest—so long as the use
of race is narrowly tailored to that interest. Both analyses—the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments—are predicated on this initial question. As a result, it makes no sense to decouple
the two analyses.
ii.

The Fourth Amendment: Race as Sole or Partial Factor

The Supreme Court’s decision in Whren—along with several earlier border patrol cases
from the mid-1970s157—also set the stage for the second legal distinction, namely the distinction
between using race exclusively as the basis of suspicion or using race as one factor among other
factors that establish justifiable cause. The court in Whren essentially condoned using race under
the Fourth Amendment as long as there is independent justification for the search—in essence, as
long as there are other factors that provide just cause. The net effect of Whren is to disregard the
race issue under the Fourth Amendment because it is exceedingly rare that any police officer will
confess to stopping a suspect based on race alone. In most cases, race is considered as one
among numerous other factors and, thus, can be ignored under Whren so long as there are
independent grounds for suspicion.
Although the lower courts are split on this, several important decisions—decisions that
have received a lot of commentary—hold the line. United States v. Arthur T. Weaver is one such
case, discussed by most of the commentators.158 In Weaver, a DEA agent used a drug courier
profile to engage a stop and frisk encounter with a passenger deplaning at the Kansas City
airport.159 One of the factors that the agent relied on was race: the suspect was an AfricanAmerican man, and the DEA agent was on the look-out especially for “young roughly dressed
black males from street gangs in Los Angeles.”160 Weaver challenged his seizure on the ground
that the police did not have reasonable suspicion for the encounter.
The Eighth Circuit rejected the Fourth Amendment challenge, finding that the non-racial
factors gave the police articulable suspicion. In a dissenting opinion, Chief Judge Arnold raised
the issue of race, and argued that, although race might be relevant, there is no evidence that race
is a predictor of drug offenses. Arnold cautioned against using race, writing that it “simply
reinforces the kind of stereotyping that lies behind drug-courier profiles. When public officials
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begin to regard large groups of citizens as presumptively criminal, this country is in a perilous
situation indeed.”161 In footnote, the majority responded:
We agree with the dissent that large groups of our citizens should not be
regarded by law enforcement officers as presumptively criminal based upon their
race. We would not hesitate to hold that a solely race-based suspicion of drug
courier status would not pass constitutional muster. Accordingly, had [DEA
agent] Hicks relied solely upon the fact of Weaver’s race as a basis for his
suspicions, we would have a different case before us. As it is, however, facts are
not to be ignored simply because they may be unpleasant—and the unpleasant fact
in this case is that Hicks had knowledge, based upon his own experience and upon
the intelligence reports he had received from the Los Angeles authorities, that
young male members of black Los Angeles gangs were flooding the Kansas City
area with cocaine. To that extent, then, race, when coupled with the other factors
Hicks relied upon, was a factor in the decision to approach and ultimately detain
Weaver. We wish it were otherwise, but we take the facts as they are presented to
us, not as we would like them to be.162
Ultimately, the majority delicately side-steps the issue of race. The majority finds
reasonable suspicion on the basis of other non-racial factors—without mentioning the race
issue—in a later portion of the decision declaring the articulable grounds for suspicion.163
Many courts have done the same thing, and relied on non-racial factors either to find or
not find reasonable suspicion.164 As Gross and Barnes explain, “In most cases lower courts
dispose of such claims, one way or the other, on evidentiary grounds.”165 There are, of course,
other decisions from federal courts that have gone the other way and struck down the use of race
under circumstances where race was one among several other factors used to stop or search a
suspect.166 State courts are also split on this question.167 But the growing tendency is for courts
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to wrangle over the question and to send a clear signal that they do not want to deal with the race
issue under the Fourth Amendment.168
At the end of the day, there remains a loose legal distinction between using race
exclusively and using race as one among other factors. The first use of race is practically
unanimously condemned. In fact, if the police in Whren had argued that the legitimacy of the
search rested entirely on the race of the two motorists, there is little doubt that the court would
have struck down the search. The second use of race is more controversial, but can generally be
avoided by focusing on the other factors that raise suspicion. As Richard Banks observes, “The
consensus view seems to be that race may be considered as one of many factors, but may not be
the only factor in an officer’s decision to stop an individual.”169
Both of these outcomes, however, are wrong. The first—exclusive use of race is
impermissible—simply ignores or is willfully blind to the possibility that, under some rare or
unique circumstances, race may be such a strong predictor of criminality that it raises justifiable
suspicion. If race alone predicts a form of criminality to the satisfaction of a Fourth Amendment
level of suspicion, there is no reason not to rely on it as a predictive factor. Race should not be
excluded per se from consideration simply because it is race, but should be evaluated like other
predictive factors.
Few, if any commentators take this position even though it is theoretically correct. As
David Rudovsky suggests, “Virtually everybody agrees that it is impermissible to stop and search
someone solely on the basis of race.”170 Moreover Fourth Amendment law, as enshrined in City
of Indianapolis v. Edmonds,171 requires individualized suspicion in the case of searches where the
168
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American judges are ambivalent and divided about the use of race as a basis for individualized
suspicion under the Fourth Amendment. Lower court cases go both ways—some approve stops
and searches based in part on race, some disapprove— but increasingly the tone is negative. There
are comparatively few cases on point, and they will probably be fewer yet in the future since the
general message from the courts to the police seems pretty clear: “We don’t want to hear that you
relied on race.”
Gross and Barnes 2002:99.
169
R. Richard Banks, “Race-Based Suspe ct Selection and Colorblind Equal Protection Doctrine and
Discourse,” 48 UCLA L. Rev. 107 5, 10 87 n.47 (2 001 ); see also Gro ss and Barnes 2002 :94 (suggesting that there is
“a general view that the race of a suspect may constitutionally be considered as one factor among others in deciding
who to stop or search, but that race may not be the sole basis for such a decisio n.”
170
Rudovsky 2002:306.
171
City of Indianapolis v. James Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 n.1 (2000) (striking down the Indianap olis
roadblock and declaring that “we are particularly reluctant to recognize exceptions to the general rule of
individualized suspicion where governmental authorities primarily pursue their general crime control ends.” Id. at
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primary purpose of the police intervention is to advance a general interest in crime control. The
few commentators who advocate lifting the ban on group searches—such as William Stuntz for
example172—take pains to emphasize that “groups” do not include “racial groups.” As Stuntz
emphasizes, for purposes of his argument, “groups are defined by time and place, not by
demographic category”173: a group seizure includes “the temporary seizure of all cars passing
through a given intersection on a given afternoon,” but not the “seizure of all young men of
Middle Eastern origin.”174
The unanimous commentary and the Edmonds rule are, however, incoherent. They
depend on a false distinction between probabilistic analysis by group trait versus probabilistic
analysis by individual suspicion. In both cases, the police are making an odds calculation. For
purposes of the Fourth Amendment—a constitutional provision grounded on a reasonableness
standard that depends on a probabilistic analysis—there should be no difference between the two.
The permissibility of a group search—including a group search of a racial or ethnic
group—should depend on the predictive power of the group trait, in the same way that the
permissibility of individualized suspicion depends on the predictive power of the individualized
traits. If race predicts criminality to the degree that satisfies general Fourth Amendment
standards, then there should be no constitutional barrier. The fact that there is no constitutional
barrier does not necessarily make it a wise or socially beneficial policing policy. That is another
matter. The boundaries of constitutional law do not necessary overlap those of wise public
policy.
The second outcome—partial use of race can be ignored if other factors justify the
search—is equally wrong.175 If race is used as part of a profile, then a court adjudicating the
Fourth Amendment question should inquire whether race contributed in any way to the predictive
capacity of the profile, regardless of whether the other profiled traits satisfy constitutional
standards. Anthony Thompson, one of the few commentators who advocates a similar position,
sets out how a reviewing court could do this: “a court would begin by providing guidelines
regarding the types of situations in which race could be a factor in suspicion. Then, the court
would be expected to scrutinize the officer’s motivations to determine if the circumstances in a
given case warranted this reliance on race.”176. Whether or not the courts set up guidelines, the

43).
172
See, e.g,, Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 Yale L. J. at 2164–2 165 (arguing that the
Edmonds norm against group searches is “perverse”).
173
Id. at 214 1 n.9.
174
Id. at 2141 n.9.
175
Here, several legal comm entators have criticized the outcom e, but for different reasons. See, e.g.,
Alschuler 2002:175–179; Kennedy 1997:148–149. Randall Kennedy, for instance, has argued that partial
consideration of ra ce sho uld be con sidered the same as exclusive consideration o f race given that race, eve n when it
is claimed to be used partially, really overtakes all other considerations. As a result, Kennedy object to any reliance
on race in the decisio n to stop or search susp ects. See Kenned y 199 9. This, however, goes too far. As I argue in
text, race is possibly a predictive factor, among others, and there should be no per se bar to its use if there is
evidence that it is predictive of crime.
176
Thomson, “Stopping the Usual Suspects,” 74 NYU L. Rev. at 1005.
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focus should be on whether there is any evidence that race actually plays a predictive role that
either includes or excludes persons of a racial group. If race does contribute and the overall
profile satisfies the constitutional standard—i.e. the degree of suspicion necessary—then there is
no Fourth Amendment problem using race as part of the profile. If it did not contribute, then
there is a Fourth Amendment problem using race as part of the profile regardless of whether the
overall profile satisfies the constitutional standard. We could then debate whether to impose the
remedy of suppression or another remedy. But the fact that there should be a Fourth Amendment
violation and remedy for race though not for other improper traits—such as, for instance,
height—has to do with the constitutional scrutiny given to race as a protected category. Up until
that point, race should not be considered differently than any other predictive trait in analyzing
whether or not it contributed to the predictive power of the profile.
iii.

Equal Protection: Excluding Witness Identifications

The third legal technicality draws a distinction between using race for purposes of highdiscretion policing where there is no individualized suspicion about the particular suspect (e.g.,
stops and frisks, consent searches, etc.) versus using race for purposes of solving a crime where
there is an eye-witness identification based on race. The first is generally associated with racial
profiling: stopping someone on the road because they are minority and minority motorists are
assumed to offend at higher rates. The second is what we generally associate with detective
work: getting an identification from a witness and tracking down suspects who match that
description.
Most courts hold that the latter—i.e. relying on an eye-witness racial
identification—is not “using race.” Often, the reason is that relying on an identification is a raceneutral policy: the content may be race-specific, but the policy itself is race neutral.177
Curiously, many constitutional commentators endorse this distinction. In fact, as Richard
Banks correctly observes, “Even the harshest scholarly critics of racial profiling endorse police
use of suspect descriptions.”178 Samuel Gross and Debra Livingston write, for instance, that “[i]t
is not racial profiling for an officer to question, stop, search, arrest, or otherwise investigate a
person because his race or ethnicity matches information about a perpetrator of a specific crime
that the officer is investigating. That use of race. . . does not entail a global judgment about a
racial or ethnic group as a whole.”179 David Rudovsky similarly defines racial profiling so as to
exclude witness identification cases—“except where police are acting on a racial description of
the perpetrator of a crime.”180 And many commentators do not place the same type of limits on
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See, e.g., On eon ta.
R. Richard Banks, “Race-Based S uspect Selection and Colorblind Equal Protection Doctrine and
Discourse,” 48 UCLA L. Rev. 1075, 10 78 (200 1).
179
Gross and Livingston 2002:1415. Similarly, Samuel Gross and Katherine Barnes write that “it is not
racial profiling for an officer to stop, question, search or arrest a person because his race matches the description of
the perpetrator of a specific crime that has been reported.” Gross and B arnes 2002:3 n.9 (citing to the
On eon ta case). They note that “racial profiling is impossible once the police are looking for a particular person—the
victim’s partner, the woman in the surveillance video, Osama bin Laden. . .” Gross and Barnes 2002:3.
180
Rudovsky 2001:299 n.27
178
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eye-witness racial identifications. So, for instance, Rudovsky observes: “Certainly police can
consider race where a physical description is provided, but absent that factor, or other selflimiting factors, race cannot be considered in the decision to stop, detain, or search.”181 It is fair
to say, with Richard Banks, that the “consensus view of legal scholars casts. . . race-based
suspect descriptions as innocuous and unquestionably legitimate.”182
As Banks and others recognize, the leading case discussed for this proposition is Ricky
Brown v. City of Oneonta.183 In that case, a victim identified a burglar as a young black male;
according to the reported decision, the description included a knife wound to the hand, which
was allegedly inflicted during a struggle with the victim.184 In an effort to solve the reported
crime, the police interrogated every black male student at the local college and conducted a
sweep of the town “stopping and questioning non-white persons on the streets and inspecting
their hands for cuts.”185 The African-American population in Oneonta was in the neighborhood
of 300 people, with another 150 black college students at the state university. Several black
residents of Oneonta sued the police claiming violations of their civil rights. The court and the
attorneys, naturally, addressed the Fourth Amendment and Equal Protection clause arguments
separately. 186 With regard to the Equal Protection claim, the Second Circuit ruled that the police
had not purposely classified by race or engaged in intentional discrimination based on race when
it questioned black residents and students. Instead, the police had relied on a race-neutral
technique focusing its attention on persons who matched the eye-witness identification. The
policy itself—namely “to investigate crimes by interviewing the victim, getting a description of
the assailant, and seeking out persons who matched that description”187—was race-neutral on its
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See e.g. Rud ovsky 200 1:32 8; see also id. at 308 n.79 (“Race is an appropriate factor in stops where the
police have been provided with a description of a criminal suspect”). Rudovsky 2001 does give a more refined
analysis o f On eon ta at 348: where the race identification becom es the primary or predominant factor, then Rudovsky
suggests strict scrutiny should apply; however, the application seems to turn on the form of the investigation, rather
than on the pro bability analysis and three con ditions discussed in this essay. Sheri Lynn Johnson similarly writes:
“The use of race to identify a particular perpetrator, for example, does not disadvantage any racial group and thus
does not require strict scrutiny. Although the suspect’s race is noted and weighed in the decision to detain, no
generalizations about the characteristics, behavior, or appropriate treatment of the racial group are employed.”
Sheri Lynn Johnson, “Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect,” 93 Yale L. J. 214, 242 –243 (1 983).
182
Banks 20 01:1 083 . See generally Banks 200 1:1083– 1085 (co mpiling list of authoritative legal scholars
who endo rse the use of race-ba ses susp ect descriptions); see also Alschuler 20 02. T he distinction is also
incorporated in the June 2003 U.S. Department of Justice Guidance Regarding the Use of Race by Federal law
Enforcement Agencies which prohibits racial profiling in traditional federal law enforcement activities. See
Guidance at 2 (“ex cept that officers may rely on rac e and ethnicity in a specific suspect desc ription”).
183
221 F.3d 3 29 (2 nd Cir. 1999).
184
Id. at 334 . Purp orted ly based on this info rmatio n, the po lice acc osted suspects in ord er to look at the ir
hands. According to some media accounts, however, the victim never made any statement about the knife wound.
185
Id. at 334.
186
W ith regard to the Fourth Amendm ent claim, the Second C ircuit held that “a description of race and
gender alone will rarely provide reasonable suspicion justifying a police search or seizure.” Id. at 334. The court
rema nded the case to the federal District Court to allow certain plaintiffs who had been seized to pursue their claim
under a Fourth Amendment theory. As I argue infra, the court’s treatm ent of the Fourth Am endment claim is entirely
correct, and in acco rdance with m y argum ent.
187
Id. at 337.
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face, the court declared. And even though the policy as applied here had a disparate impact on
blacks, there was no showing of intent to discriminate: “Without additional evidence of
discriminatory animus, the disparate impact of an investigation such as the one in this case is
insufficient to sustain an equal protection claim.”188
This distinction as well makes no sense. In this regard, the minority position advocated
by a few commentators—Richard Banks189 and Al Alschuler190 especially—get it right. When
the police are working from an eye-witness identification, they are using probabilities in exactly
the same way as when they are relying on race correlations with crime. Ironically, they may be
working off less reliable information. Eye-witness identification is notoriously unreliable.191
But the eye-witness identification is a probabilistic determination just like statistical
discrimination. Whether or not race may be considered does not depend on eye-witness versus
statistical correlations, but on whether there is reliable evidence that race matters and whether it
narrows down sufficiently the suspect pool. In most cases, eye-witness racial identification will
likely satisfy this standard. As Richard Banks correctly observes, the fact that race-based suspect
identification should be subject to equal protection review does not mean that they should be
prohibited.192 Nevertheless, courts should analyze the degree to which eye-witness racial
identifications are reliable under different circumstances, and, naturally, should distinguish
between intra- and cross-racial identifications given that they are differently reliable. Courts
could then explore whether the racial category narrows down the pool of suspects sufficiently.
Surely, there are going to be situations were race (either in whole or in part) is a valid predictor
and, if properly incorporated in the criminal profile and used properly, can be expected to
sufficiently narrow the pool of suspects. Under these conditions, the state will likely have a
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Id. at 338.
Richard Banks argues that the categorical distinction is wrong: “Suspect description reliance is not
racially innocuous and, under equal protection doctrine, it should be treated as a racial classification.” Banks
2001:1080. Banks relies in part on the “functional similarities” between racial profiles and race-based suspect
identifications, po inting out that both categories feed into each other. Id. at 1096 . Howe ver, Banks does no t go so
far as to argue, as I do here, tha t the two are identical in the sense that they are both probab ilistic determ inations.
The statement “I think he was X” is a statement of probabilities of the same type as “X persons commit crime
statistically mo re often.”
190
Alschuler also argues that the categorical distinction is wrong. Alschuler writes that the Oneonta police
relied expressly on race: the On eon ta case involved an “express racial classification. When an o fficer, relying on a
witness description, restricts the liberty of black me n in green coa ts and not the liberty of white men in green coats,
this officer differentiates by race. Of course the officer’s conduct may nevertheless be legitimate. Identifying a
racial classification begins, not ends, the inquiry. . .” Alschuler 2002:183. Moreover, as Alschuler suggests, all eyewitness racial identifications turn in to racial profiling: “the victim’s front-end particularity becomes the police
officer’s d emo graphic generality at the p oint of arrest or detention.” A lschuler 200 2:20 0. Alschuler’s argument,
however, should be made in these slightly stronger terms.
191
See, generally, Elizabeth L oftus.
192
Banks 2001:1081 (“I do not argue that suspect description reliance should be prohibited, as a matter of
either policy or constitutional doctrine.”). Elsewhere in the article, Banks suggests, based on probabilities, that
subje cting rac e based suspect identificatio ns to strict scrutiny would likely b e fatal, see id. at 1117. Under the
analysis I propose, however, it would all depend on the prob abilistic analysis of the effect on the profiled crime and
on the ratchet effect, rather than on the probabilistic analysis of prior Supreme C ourt decision s.
189
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compelling governmental interest to use race as a factor in identifying suspects.
otherwise.
iv.

65

But not

Equal Protection: Inferring Intent

The Supreme Court’s decisions in McCleskey v. Kemp193 and United States v.
Armstrong194—which extend the Washington v. Davis195 requirement of intent to the criminal
justice sphere—set up the final major legal distinction in the racial profiling context, namely the
requirement that a successful constitutional challenge rest on evidence of intentional
discrimination rather than on inference from unexplained disparate treatment.196
Many commentators have criticized the actual intent requirement in the racial profiling
context—as well as in other criminal justice contexts.197 Al Alschuler, for instance, suggests that
courts should substitute social meaning for intent: “Targeting only black street gangs or only
black drug dealers, for example, clearly conveys the message that blacks are more to be feared
than whites. The Equal Protection Clause should require the government to justify its delivery of
this message.”198 Though appealing in certain respects, the turn to social meaning may not
necessarily clarify or simplify this area of the law. The social meaning of governmental action is
often in the eye of the beholder.
Samuel Gross and Katherine Barnes, in their discussion of the notorious New Jersey case
New Jersey v. Soto, suggest a more promising solution. In the Soto case, the lower court in New
Jersey, relying in part on New Jersey precedent, carved an exception to the McCleskey
requirement on the grounds that there are fewer variables contained in the decision to stop and
search—fewer factors that the police use—than there are in the decision to sentence someone to
death. The fact that there are fewer variables narrows and simplifies the claim of racial
discrimination and therefore, the court suggested, statistical evidence may be sufficient to prove
intentional discrimination in the racial profiling context.199 Similarly, there are fewer decision
makers involved in the decision to search than there are in the decision to sentence to death. In
the first case, the decision makers are all police officers, generally from the same patrol unit; in
the second, they include prosecutors, grand jurors, petit jurors, judges, and defense attorneys.
Although, as Gross and Barnes observe, the New Jersey court did not rely on this second
distinction, it is important. In fact, it may be even more important than the first.

193
481 U.S. 279 (1987) (finding no Equal Protection violation because no showing of intentional
discrimination where petitioner produced evidence that murderers of white victims are 4.3 times more likely to be
sentenced to death than murd erers o f black victims)..
194
517 U.S. 456 (1996) (requiring evidence on a selective prosecution challenge based on race of
discriminatory effect and purpose).
195
426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that the Equal Protection clau se bars only intentiona l discrimination).
196
See generally Rudovsky 2001:324–329.
197
See, e.g., Rudovsky 200 1; Alschuler 2002; Gross and Ba rnes 2002; include as well critical commentary
on McCleskey and Armstrong.
198
Alschuler 2002:212.
199
See New Jersey v. Soto; Gross and Barnes 2002:85–87.
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The fact is, racial profiling on the highways as a potential form of discrimination is more
analogous to the Batson v. Kentucky jurisprudence surrounding the prosecutor’s use of
peremptory challenges than it is to the McCleskey v. Kemp jurisprudence addressing the larger
problem of racial discrimination infecting the death penalty or the criminal justice system more
generally. In both racial profiling and the Batson context, the decision maker is one or more
members of a discrete law enforcement agency—whether a state patrol unit or a district
attorney’s office. The decision to search and the decision to peremptorily strike a juror are based
on a limited set of factors that identify suspects or biased jurors—bumper stickers and car models
on the one hand, defense sympathies and orientations on the other. Moreover, the decision
makers have the ability—and should have the opportunity—to explain exactly why they decided
to search or strike an African-American or Hispanic person.
For these reasons, the racial profiling analysis under an Equal Protection challenge should
follow the three-step model of Batson. This would not eliminate the intent requirement or
reverse Washington v. Davis and thirty years of jurisprudence. Instead, it would merely extend
the Batson method of inferring intent to the racial profiling context. Under a Batson-type
approach, statistical discrepancies in the race of persons searched would satisfy the first prong of
the analysis and set forth a prima facie case. This accords with the economic model of racial
profiling, which essentially assumes that the disproportional searches of minority motorists are
not accidental. Once the statistical burden has been satisfied, the police unit would then be
required either to offer race-neutral reasons for the disparities—i.e. to offer other factors which,
when held constant, eliminate the racial correlation with searches—or to present evidence that
race is a statistically significant predictor of crime and that racial profiling satisfies the limited
conditions that make it constitutionally acceptable—namely, that it maximizes search success
without creating a ratchet effect and combats long-term crime.200 If the state satisfies its burden,
then the challenging party should have the opportunity to rebut the state’s evidence.
The McCleskey requirement of proof of actual intent fails to recognize—as most
observers do, and as the economic model of racial profiling correctly assumes—that the police
are intentionally using race if they knowingly dedicate 60 percent of their searches to AfricanAmerican motorists. The question should be whether or not the police have a constitutionally
satisfactory reason for using race—for the disproportionality. Requiring proof of actual
intentional discrimination by a police officer on the challenging party places the burden on the
wrong party. If the police are going to engage in discrimination by searching a disproportionate
number of minority motorists, then they should have the burden of proving that this will promote
a compelling state interest. Barring that proof, the disproportional searches are intentionally
discriminatory and should be held to violate the Equal Protection clause.
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Here the analysis diverges somewhat from Batson given tha t no co urt has held that the state co uld satisfy
its burden of p roof at the second stage by dem onstrating that minority jurors are statistically more d efense-oriented.
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An Alternative Proposal
i.

The Fourth Amendment

If there is an offending differential between races, then membership in a racial group
increases the probability of being an offender. It represents, therefore, an element of articulable
suspicion. Does it amount to “reasonable suspicion” for purposes of a Terry stop or “probable
cause” for purposes of a full-blown seizure? In most cases, race alone may not, and in this
limited sense, the Second Circuit in Oneonta is right.201 But it all depends on how predictive it
is. Race would justify a stop or seizure if either (1) it alone is so predictive that it reaches the
level of prediction that satisfies the standard of reasonable suspicion or probable cause, or (2) it
alone is predictive and, along with other factors, it contributes to a level of prediction that
satisfies the standard of reasonable suspicion or probable cause. The key is to calculate any
relevant offending differentials in order to measure how prediction based on race compares to the
predictive power of other factors that pass Fourth Amendment scrutiny. If there is no offending
differential and race is not predictive of the type of crime under investigation, then clearly
membership in a racial group should not be included in reasonable suspicion or probable cause.
It should not be included as the sole reason, nor should it be included as one among a set of
factors. Under either circumstance, the Fourth Amendment would be violated by its inclusion in
the decision to search a suspect.
Take the Oneonta example. Let’s assume that the description of the perpetrator in that
case was that he was a young black male.202 The African-American population in Oneonta was
in the neighborhood of 300 people, with another 150 black college students at the state
university. If we assume that a quarter of the residents and half of the college students are young
black men—about 150 total—then the odds of any one young black male being the perpetrator
are 1 in 150. Clearly that is not the type of odds that a court would associate with reasonable
suspicion.203 As a result, it would be improper from a Fourth Amendment perspective to
temporarily stop in order to question—or for that matter to more intrusively seize and
arrest—young African-American men based on the witness identification. The police simply do
not have enough narrowing identifying characteristics to begin fingering individuals on the basis
of race. That does not mean that the police cannot continue to develop intelligence through
informants and other operations; in fact, the police should continue to investigate in reasonable
ways, including for instance checking hospital emergency rooms and trying to locate other
witnesses. What it does mean, though, is that there simply is not enough information at that
point to begin suspecting individuals of the crime.204

Brow n v. City of O neon ta, New York, 221 F.3d 32 9 (2 nd Cir 1999).
The fact of the cut on the hand is in dispute. See media ac counts.
203
See Meares-Harcourt 200 0.
204
In this regard, Alschuler is right. He writes: “When a police department employs a racial classification
found in a fortune cookie, its means are not adapted to this end. When, in an effort to find one burglar, the police
question hundreds of suspects on the basis o f a description consisting of rac e, age, and gender alone , they are b arely
a step from the fortune cookie. A claim that [the] police sweep in On eon ta was “narrowly tailored” to advance a
201
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Equal Protection

If race does not correlate with the specific crime under investigation and is therefore not a
reliable predictor of crime that raises justifiable cause for investigation—in other words, if the
use of race does not satisfies Fourth Amendment scrutiny—then the use of race by the police
does not promote the traditional law enforcement interest of fighting crime. If it advances no
predictive interest, the use of race cannot possibly serve the governmental interest of combating
crime.205
If, on the other hand, race is a reliable predictor of the profiled crime, then further
constitutional analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment is in order. Fighting crime—actually
reducing crime—would qualify as a compelling state interest.206 The key question, for purposes
of equal protection, is whether the use of race is narrowly tailored to serve this compelling
government interest of crime fighting, given that the intentional use of race as a factor in policing
would trigger strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection clause.207 As discussed earlier, the use of
race in policing should satisfy this heightened standard of review if it does not create a ratchet
effect on the profiled population. The requirement of narrow tailoring would preclude policing
techniques that have unacceptable collateral consequences on the profiled population.

compelling governmental interest could not survive the laugh test.” Alschuler 2002:184.
205
Note that the use of race could promote other governmental interests, such as diversity of the prison
pop ulation o r an interest in pro portionality in the prison populatio n. It could be that the state deve lops an interest in
having the prison population reflect the demographic distribution of the general population or of the offending
pop ulation. If so , and the re are no offending differentials, then the police might use race to proportionally distribu te
police con tacts.
206
Though there is some question as to whether fighting crime would qualify as a compelling governmental
interest, I ha ve no doubt that post-University of Michigan it most proba bly would. Richard Banks argues that it
probab ly does not: “T he recognition of ordinary law enfo rcem ent ob jectives as compe lling wou ld rep resent a
departure from settled doctrine.” Banks 2001:1119. Banks argues that “The Court has never described ordinary law
enforcement objectives as compelling, having on at least one occasion specifically declined to do so.” Id. at 111 9.
Banks is referring to Un ited States v. M artinez-Fu erte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976), which involved the interdiction of
illegal imm igrants fro m M exico . See also Sheri Lynn Johnson, “race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect,” 93 Yale
L. J. 214 , 247 (1983) (“Th e law en forcement interests at stake in detention dec isions ca nnot m eet Korem atsu’s
‘pressing public necessity’ standard or its modenr equivalent, the ‘compelling state interest’ requirement”). In
contrast, Al Alschuler argues that fighting more traditional crimes, like burglary, would amount to a compelling
interest and that the same sho uld be extended to d rug crimes: “Finding and pro secuting burglars surely qualifies as a
com pelling state interest, and although not everyone agrees that the interest in prosecuting drug offenders is
com pelling, appropriate deference to the judgments of legislatures and other respected authorities prec ludes courts
from denying that it is.” Alschuler 2002:18 3–184 . Alschuler relies on Un ited States v. S alern o, 481 U.S. 739
(1987), the case involving preventative detention, wh ere the court stated in d icta that “the government’s interest in
preventing crime by arrestees is both legitimate and compelling.” Id. at 183 n.82. Alschuler concludes from this that
“Te xtbook eq ual pro tection analysis therefore suggests that when the police emplo y racial classification in
investigating crime, the critical question is simply whether this classification is ‘narrowly tailored’ to advancing the
gove rnment’s crime-fighting goal.” Alschuler 2 002 :184 . Alschuler has the better o f the argument.
207
Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995); University of Michigan affirmative action
cases; see also Alschuler 20 02:1 77; R udovsky 20 01:3 22;
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Under this proposal, the Equal Protection analysis would logistically follow the three-step
model used in the Batson v. Kentucky context. With regard to the first prong, proof of
statistically disproportional searches of minority motorists would constitute a prima facie case
and shift the burden of proof onto the government. At this second stage, the government would
be required either to offer a race-neutral reason for the disparities, such as, for instance, the
existence of other factors that eliminate the racial correlation, or to present evidence that race is a
reliable predictor of crime and that racial profiling satisfies the three limited conditions. As in
the Batson context, the denial of racial motivation would not be enough to defeat the prima facie
evidence of statistical discrimination. If the government is able to sustain its burden, then the
challenging party may attempt to rebut the showing. The challenging party may try to prove that
other factors that explain away the disparities are not legitimate; or that there is in fact a likely
ratchet effect on the profiled population and therefore that the policy is not narrowly tailored to
the compelling governmental interest of fighting the profiled crime; or that there are negative
long-term consequences on the amount of profiled crime; or that the profiled crime is not
important enough to justify the racial policing.
The premise of this approach, naturally, is that the consideration of race in
policing—whether it is used as the only factor or as part of a profile—should trigger strict
scrutiny.208 This is how race differs from other predictive factors: it receives heightened scrutiny
in contrast to non-protected categories, but it is not treated differently from the perspective of
prediction. The proposed analysis accepts the “compelling state interest” framework, and
therefore turns the inquiry on whether the police strategy is narrowly tailored to the governmental
interest of fighting crime—which, in turn, depends on whether the three narrow conditions are
satisfied. This approach draws a sharp distinction between what is constitutionally permitted and
what is, ultimately, the most optimal social policy. It may very well be the case that racial
profiling satisfies the three narrow conditions and therefore passes constitutional scrutiny, and
yet is a terrible idea for society.
This proposed approach contrasts with much of the critical commentary which either
implicitly rejects the “narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest” framework in the context
of racial profiling or argues that racial profiling could not possibly meet this standard—in other
words, that racial profiling is per se a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Gross and
Barnes, for instance, argue that the consideration of race—solely or in part—plainly violates the
Equal Protection clause. They argue that “it is plainly unconstitutional to use race as a criterion
for choosing who to stop or search.”209 They analogize to the death penalty: “No American court
would ever uphold a death sentence under the equal protection clause if the prosecutor admits
that she asked for the death penalty in part because of the defendant’s race, regardless of any nonracial factors that entered into that decision. . . . McCleskey, however troublesome, merely made
it difficult to prove discrimination in capital charging; it did not reach the absurd conclusion that
equal protection is satisfied as long as a black defendant is not plucked at random from the
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population and executed solely because of his race.”210 Gross and Barnes suggest that the same is
true in the racial profiling context. Thus, they argue, “A government decision to take action
against a person because of her race is almost impossible to justify.”211 Gross and Barnes also
suggest that there is simply no compelling interest given that the drug interdiction programs on
the highway are so ineffectual.212
David Rudovsky similarly argues that intentionally using race in the decision to search is
a per se violation of Equal Protection. Like Gross and Barnes after him, Rudovsky argues: “it
would be unconstitutional for the state to enact criminal laws that provide for harsher prison
terms for African-Americans convicted of the same drug offenses as whites, even in the face of
an econometric model that would suggest that this differentiation would ultimately reduce the
disproportionate drug violations by African-Americans as a class. The same must be true for an
official policy that targets African-Americans for a highly disproportionate rate of stops and
searches based solely on their race and the alleged criminal propensities of very small numbers of
African-Americans.”213 Rudovsky also argues that there are so few successful searches that the
state’s interests are outweighed by the harms: “given the fact that, on a relative scale, so few
persons among the millions of drivers who use these transportation facilities each day are
engaged in illegal drug activity—black or white—and so few stops or searches result in seizures
of contraband, it is hard to justify the stops of large numbers of innocent blacks to enable the
police to make the occasional seizure.”214
David Harris also suggests that racial profiling per se violates equal protection. Harris
writes that “Enforcing the law on the basis of racial and ethnic calculations therefore also offends
the Constitution. All American are guaranteed ‘the equal protection of the law’; there are few
values closer to the core of our political culture. Enforcing the law in a racially or ethnically
biased way violates this central principle.”215 Similarly, Tracey Maclin argues that the Equal
Protection clause dictates a “no use of race” policy concerning police searches of automobiles:
“Put simply, a motorist’s race, ethnicity or national origin should be an irrelevant factor when an
officer decides how to use his or her discretionary power.”216
Though appealing, these arguments are exaggerated. In the first place, racial profiling
presents a very different situation than those hypothesized by Rudovsky or Gross and Barnes.
The analogy to sentencing someone to death or to greater actual punishment does not hold. All
considerations of race are going to be injurious to some members of a racial group. Affirmative
action in higher education, for example, will injure some white applicants who will not be
afforded the opportunity to attend the university of their choice or receive the benefits of the
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diversity at that university. This represents an injury that is the by-product of taking race into
account.217 It does not mean, however, that there is no countervailing compelling interest or that
a policy will never be narrowly tailored to that interest. The nature of the compelling interest and
the analysis of narrow tailoring will depend on the amount of harm produced: sentencing
someone to death or to harsher punishment would certainly violate the requirement that the
policy be narrowly tailored to the law enforcement interest; searching more motorists may not,
especially if there is no ratchet effect. Under certain limited conditions, racial profiling may be
an effective tool to fight the profiled crime. If those narrow conditions are satisfied, then the
problem with racial profiling is not that there is no compelling interest, that it is not necessary for
a compelling interest, or that it is not narrowly tailored to that compelling interest. The problem
is that it may exacerbate social distinctions that should not be made in the first place. In other
words, the problem is neither constitutional nor criminological, it is social theoretic. Under the
narrow three conditions, the reason to oppose racial profiling is not because it does not work or
because it is unconstitutional, but because it is bad social policy. I address this issue in the
Conclusion, Part V infra.
Al Alschuler advances a more nuanced argument, but one that also is ultimately
unpersuasive. Alschuler argues that “the demand for a ‘compelling governmental interest’ in all
cases of racial classification is misguided. This standard requires too little justification for some
racial classifications and too much for others.”218 As a result, Alschuler proposes that courts
strengthen the standard in some cases with additional considerations, and relax it in others.
Courts should relax the standard in cases of “unobtrusive investigations”: “For example,
following an anonymous threat to avenge Vicki Weaver by bombing a specified federal building
on the anniversary of Ruby Ridge, law enforcement officers near the building should be allowed
to watch whites more closely than blacks. Recognizing the legitimacy of taking race into account
in some investigations might indeed have a ‘spill-over’ effect, but this effect would not be
regrettable.”219 Courts should strengthen the standard in other cases. Here, the example is the
young black male in Pothole, a hypothetical inner-city neighborhood, where there is reliable
social science evidence establishing that an absolute majority of the young black men are
carrying concealed knives, and that white youths are committing this crime at a considerably
lower rate.220 Alschuler suggests in the Pothole hypothetical that the constitutional standard
should be strengthened. The stops of young black men, Alschuler contends, would not violate
the Fourth Amendment standard since the odds are better than 50 percent, nor the Equal
Protection clause since the stops are tightly fitted to the compelling interest of removing weapons
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from the streets. Yet, Alschuler argues, we should demand more. “Concern for distributive
justice should not vanish altogether whenever an interest labeled ‘compelling’ and a suitable
means-end fit appear.”221 So, Alschuler concludes, “[p]roclaiming the government’s interest in
fighting crime ‘compelling’ should not validate every crime-fighting measure likely to prove
effective.”222
The problem is, how should a court decide when to relax or strengthen the constitutional
scrutiny? Is it based on particular racial sensitivities? The Ruby Ridge hypothetical, for
example, is provocative because it selects on whiteness in the context of a morally offensive
crime, namely domestic terrorist activities that likely will result in the death of innocent babies
and children in federal day care centers. But it involves a tightness of fit between race and
offense that makes it unique. Randy Weaver—Vicki Weaver’s husband and the target of the
F.B.I. operation—was a white supremacist. Though there may be some—here, I am
speculating—there is surely not an abundance of African American white supremacists.
Accordingly, it is fair to assume, the probability is high—very high—that an operation to avenge
Vicki Weaver would be carried out by white persons. There is a significant difference between
this Ruby Ridge hypothetical and the Oneonta case. Whereas in Oneonta, there was a fear of a
possible eye-witness misidentification or, possibly, of racial fabrication (à la Charles Stuart and
Susan Smith), in the Ruby Ridge hypothetical there is a far greater tightness of fit with race. In
effect, there are significantly different probabilities associated with the racial classification. It is
more sure that the potential offender in the Ruby Ridge hypothetical—if there is one—is going to
be white. There is less room for prejudice infecting the eye-witness identification. So there is
every reason to believe that the use of race here is more likely to satisfy the narrow conditions
that make racial profiling acceptable.223
As for the Pothole hypothetical, if it is indeed true that more than 50 percent of black
male youths are carrying concealed knives but that white male youths are carrying far less, then
race is a significant predictor of knife carrying among young men holding constant youth and
gender. If we, as a society, believe that knife carrying is a serious crime, and the three narrow
conditions are satisfied—i.e. there is no ratchet effect—then using race may be narrowly tailored
to a compelling governmental interest. Whether or not there is an equal protection problem may
depend on the long-term consequences of profiling on weapons possession: how will it affect
white youth carrying and will that outweigh the gains achieved in lower minority carrying? But if
the three conditions are satisfied, there should be no constitutional objection.
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This is precisely the line that separates constitutional adjudication from social theory.
The use of race in Pothole, if it satisfies all three conditions, may be narrowly tailored to
combating crime—and therefore constitutional—and yet a terrible idea. From a social and
political perspective, it may be completely destructive. In fact, from a social theoretic
perspective, the traditional law enforcement interest in combating crime itself may be entirely
suspect. Racial profiling—and criminal profiling more generally—may serve only to aggravate
the problem. I discuss this in Part V. But so long as the courts accept, for constitutional analysis,
that the traditional law enforcement interest in fighting crime is a compelling governmental
interest, then there is no constitutional problem with racial profiling if the three narrow
conditions obtain. This is the distinction between constitutional review and social theory.
In sum, the use of race in policing may be a constitutionally acceptable—though not
necessarily socially desirable—practice under the three narrow conditions just discussed. If the
police are disproportionally searching minority motorists, then the police must bear the burden of
establishing that racial profiling advances these interests. The simple fact is that race is a
protected category and using race requires an evidentiary showing. It requires that the
government shoulder a responsibility. In order to satisfy its burden, the police would need to
offer reliable measures of certain key quantities of interest—comparative elasticity, offending,
and selectivity—and reliable proof concerning the three narrow conditions. Given that no state
or federal agency has yet attempted to explain or successfully explained the disproportional
searches of African-American and Hispanic motorists in the jurisdictions where the new data
reveal disparities, a reviewing court should find the statistical evidence of racial profiling on the
highways to be sufficient evidence of unconstitutional police practices.
IV. Assessing the Effects of Racial Profiling
The key questions, then, for purposes of both the empirical and constitutional analyses,
revolve around the three narrow conditions. They are, to repeat, (1) whether racial profiling
likely reduces the amount of profiled crime, (2) while maintaining or increasing the efficient
allocation of police resources, (3) without producing a ratchet effect on the profiled population.
Clearly, the new data on police searches from across the country do not provide reliable
observations on the key quantities of interest necessary to resolve whether the three conditions
obtain, specifically the comparative elasticities and natural offending rates within different racial
groups. As a result, the new data need to be supplemented with other available evidence, further
research, and additional data collection. Nevertheless, we can begin to make reasonable
conjectures based on the best available evidence and conservative assumptions about elasticities
and offending rates. Let’s begin by exploring issues of elasticity.
A.

The Elasticity of Offending to Policing

The elasticity of offending to policing is the product of at least two major mechanisms:
the first is deterrence. Some motorists may decide not to carry drugs on their person or in their
cars when they are on the road out of fear of being searched. The second is incapacitation. In the
case of highway searches, incapacitation is most likely a cherry-picking phenomenon. If the
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police select motorists based on multiple factors (race, late-model car, tinted windows, marijuana
stickers, swerving vehicle, etc.), the hit rate will be high. As the police expands its searches to
search more motorists, it will likely relax the number of other factors that it uses. As the pool of
motorists expands, the hit rate will fall precisely due to the reduced selectivity. The lower
offending is not the product of a rational response by motorists, but a cherry-picking effect.
The cherry-picking effect, however, is likely to be negligible. The data from the
Indianapolis road-block searches—which netted drug possession in 4.7 percent of the total
number of stops224—suggest that there is unlikely to be much incapacitation. The police in
Washington State, for instance, are only searching 3.5 percent of the cars that they stop on the
highway, for a total of only 23,393 searches for the period March 2002 through October
2002225—which is, one can only assume, infinitesimal as compared to the number of motorists on
the Washington state highways during the period. As a result, most of the elasticity, if any, will
relate to rational choice deterrence.
The deterrence effect is difficult to measure. Most research on deterrence has been
conducted in areas where there is likely an incapacitation effect, and has been unable to properly
distinguish deterrence from incapacitation. This problem has plagued research on deterrence for
a long time. The National Academy of Sciences had a panel look into the question in 1978—the
Panel on Research on Deterrent and Incapacitative Effects headed by Al Blumstein, Jacqueline
Cohen and Daniel Nagin—and the results were inconclusive.226 The panel reviewed all available
studies and found that “because the potential sources of error in the estimates of the deterrent
effect of these sanctions are so basic and the results sufficiently divergent, no sound, empirically
based conclusions can be drawn about the existence of the effect, and certainly not about its
magnitude”227 Little progress has been made since then. As economist Steve Levitt wrote in
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1998, “few of the[] empirical studies [regarding deterrence of adults] have any power to
distinguish deterrence from incapacitation and therefore provide only an indirect test of the
economic model of crime.”228
At the more specific level, there is a paucity of studies specifically addressing the
elasticity of drug consumption to price or policing. As Peter Reuter and Mark Kleiman observe
in Crime and Justice: An Annual Review of Research, price elasticities have not been empirically
estimated for marijuana, cocaine, or heroin.229 As a result, the literature is all over the place on
elasticities. Stephen Schulhofer, for example, writes that “available estimates nearly all find
modest to substantial inelasticity in the overall demand for heroin and cocaine, especially in the
short run;”230 yet, the study that Schulhofer refers to—the Reuter and Kleiman review of
literature—assumes that “the aggregate demand for heroin may have quite a high elasticity.”231
Reuter and Kleiman argue that it is fair to assume that “the elasticity of demand is moderately
high for heroin, a little lower for cocaine, and quite low for marijuana.”232 This may explain why
there is, in their words, an “apparent lack of response of cocaine and marijuana consumption to
the increased federal enforcement effort.”233 According to another study published in
1972—cited by Schulhofer—the demand for marijuana among full-time college students at
UCLA is relatively elastic, in the order of a 1.5 percent consumption decrease per one percent
price increase.234 Schulhofer suggests, however, that “some estimates find that marijuana
demand—largely derived from non-addict, recreational users—is also inelastic, possibly because
marijuana expenditures, even at currently inflated prices, remain a small part of the user’s
income.”235 Given the lack of research in this area, it is hard to come to firm conclusions.
Another difficulty that plagues the area has to do with the relative or comparative
elasticities as between different racial groups. Do minority and white motorists have similar or
different elasticities of offending to policing? There are reasons to suspect that they may be
different. As noted earlier, elasticity is going to depend on the existence of legitimate work
alternatives and there may be cause to believe that minority motorists as a group have lower job
opportunities.236 Another issue relates to the perception among minority motorists of the police
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and the criminal justice system. Tom Tyler’s research on legitimacy and obedience to the law237
suggests that disproportional searches of minority motorists may take a toll on minorities’
perception of the overall fairness of the system, which might in turn lead to more rather than less
offending. If minorities believe that they are going to be harassed by the police or supervised
regardless of what they do, minority motorists may lose faith in the system and ultimately
become less law abiding. As Tracey Meares explains, “legitimacy matters more to compliance
[with the law] than instrumental factors, such as sanctions imposed by authorities on individuals
who fail to follow the law or private rules.”238 Jim Leitzel expresses this same insight:
When all young black males are thought to be and treated as criminals, a lawabiding black male cannot easily overcome this perception through his own
virtuous behavior. Being thought a scoundrel in any event, the reward to virtue
falls. The perception of criminality that is inherent in race-based policing
prevents well behaving minority youths from distinguishing themselves from
those who are criminals, reducing the incentive to be law-abiding. 239
Overall, these perceptions among minority motorists could potentially result in an upward
slopping offending curve at the tail end for minority motorists and, again, different rates of
elasticity as between racial groups.
The bottom line, on the issue of comparative elasticities, is that there is simply no good
evidence one way or the other. As Nicola Persico observes, there is practically no literature on
the relative elasticity of different groups. “To our knowledge this literature [on the effect of
penalties on the crime rate] does not address the different elasticity of different racial groups to
crime. An exception is Bar-Ilan and Sacerdote (2001), who find that as the fine is increased for
running a red light in Israel, the total decrease in tickets is much larger for Jews than for nonJews” (Persico 2002:1476). On the U.S. domestic side, there are no empirical studies. Here, the
paucity of existing research seriously hampers any effort to model racial profiling.
If forced to speculate, the most reasonable and conservative assumption would be
relatively low elasticity across the board, with slightly lower elasticity for minority motorists.
Given that most of the successful searches for drug contraband on the highway involve quantities
of marijuana that reflect at most personal use—68 percent in Maryland, for example240—and that
the elasticity of marijuana is either low or average, it seems fair to assume conservatively that
overall elasticities are relatively low. As noted earlier, there are reasons to suspect that African-

237

See generally, To m R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (1990); To m R. Tyler, “Trust and D emo cratic
Governance,” in Trust and Governance, Valerie Braithwaite and M argaret Levi eds. (New Y ork: Russell Sage
Foundation 19 98); To m r. T yler and Yue n J. Huo, Trust and the Rule of Law (2001); E. Allan Lind and Tom R.
Tyler, The Social Pscychology of Procedural Justice (1988).
238
Tracey L. Meares, “Norms, Legitimacy and Law Enforcement,” 79 Oregon Law R eview 391, 400
(2000)
239
Jim Leitzel, “Race and Policing,” Soc iety 38, 40 (M arch/April 2001).
240
Gro ss and Barnes 2002 :52.

B E R NA R D E. H ARCOURT : R E T H IN K IN G R ACIAL P ROFILING

77

American motorists may have lower elasticity than white motorists. African-Americans may
have fewer job opportunities or other market alternatives, and as a result may have less of a
choice about engaging in illegal activity. 241 There is no reliable evidence on the question, but a
fair inference is that there is probably lower elasticity for minority motorists.
B.

The Offending Rate

There are several possible ways of defining the term “offending rate,” and it is crucial to
distinguish between them and label them properly. First, the offending rate could refer to the rate
of actual offending in the different racial groups given the present allocation of police resources.
I will refer to this definition as the “real offending rate.” This first definition does not look at
discovered offending—i.e. offending that has been discovered by the police through a successful
search—but rather at actual offending —i.e. the actual number of people who are carrying drug
contraband in their cars. And it measures actual offending at the present time, given the existing
distribution of police searches as between racial groups. This first definition of offending rate is
calculated by dividing the total number of members of a racial group on the road who are
carrying contraband by the total number of persons of that racial group on the road. This is a
quantity of interest for which we do not have a good measure. It is, as a result, hard to determine
since it measures a phenomenon that is not even being randomly sampled.
Second, the offending rate could refer to the actual rate of offending in a racial group
when the police are sampling randomly—i.e. when the police are engaged in color-blind policing
and are not searching minority motorists disproportionately. I will refer to this second definition
as the “natural offending rate.” Now, it is not entirely natural, because it will depend on the
amount of searches that the police are conducting. But I call it natural in the sense that, as
between racial groups, there is no effect of racial profiling. This definition of offending rate can
only be measured under conditions of random sampling. It can only be computed when the
police are searching motorists in proportion to their representation in the motorist population. It
is equally, if not more hard to measure. But it represents the only proper way to obtain a metric
that can be used to compare offending among different racial groups.
Under assumptions of elasticity, the “real offending rate” will fluctuate with policing.
The “real offending rate,” by definition, will be the same as the “natural offending rate” when the
police engage in random searches. If the police stop and search more minority motorists, then
the “real offending rate” will be smaller than the “natural offending rate” for minority
motorists—again, assuming elasticity. The only proper way to compare offending of minority
and white motorists under conditions of elasticity is to compare their “natural offending rates.”
Under assumptions of low or no elasticity, the “real offending rate” hardly or does not vary with
policing. In this sense, it is going to equal the “natural offending rate,” no matter how
disproportionate the policing. It is going to be the same regardless of how much policing we
focus on minority motorists.
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In all of this, naturally, the offending rate must be distinguished from the “hit rate”—the
rate of successful searches. The two are related since the offending rate feeds the search success
rates. However, the hit rate is generally going to be much higher than the offending rate because
the police are excluding certain motorists from their searches—for instance, a grandmother
driving to church on Sunday morning.
With these definitions in mind, the question is: what does it mean, exactly, to assume that
minority motorists offend at a higher rate than white motorists? Does it mean that they have
higher real offending rates or natural offending rates? Also, does it mean that at all points along
the distribution there is higher real or natural offending? In other words, do the offending rates
intersect one another, or are they always at distance from each other?
As a preliminary matter, when someone says that “minority motorists have higher
offending rates,” it must be the case that they are talking about higher natural offending rates.
Certainly, this is true of economists. The whole idea behind the economic models is that
disproportional searches of minority motorists will, as a result of elasticity, bring down their real
offending rate to the same level as that of white motorists. When the hit rates are equal, the real
offending rates should be equal as well. Yet even when the real rates of offending are the same,
the assumption is that minority motorists have higher natural rates of offending. This is precisely
what Vani Borooah means when he writes that “if the likelihood of being stopped was the same
for blacks and whites, then the likelihood of being arrested after a stop would be substantially
higher for blacks.”242 In other words, if the police are stopping color-blind, then minority
motorists would have a higher natural offending rate. This seems like the proper way to think
about “higher offending.” At least, it is the proper way to think about the assumption of higher
offending among minority motorists, and it is the only proper way to compare offending rates.
There is, however, no clear answer to the next question—whether the offending rates
intersect at some point. When someone says that “minority motorists have higher offending
rates,” it simply is not clear whether they mean “at each and every comparative degree of
searching” or “for the most part.” In other words, the natural offending rates could possibly
intersect at higher rates of searches. In effect, the natural offending rates could look like either of
the following two graphs—or any permutation of these graphs—Graphs IV.B.i.1 and IV.B.i.2.
*** Insert Graph IV.B.i.1: Consistently Higher Offending among African-America Motorists***
*** Insert Graph IV.B.i.2: Mostly Higher Offending among African-American Motorists ***
These two graphs reflect different elasticities of offending to policing as between
members of different racial groups, and they affect whether the natural offending rates are
consistently or mostly greater for minority motorists. This in turn will have important
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implications on whether racial profiling reduces the amount of profiled crime and whether it
produces a ratchet effect on the profiled population.
In order to estimate natural offending rates, it is important to distinguish between
different types of violators—the two main categories being persons carrying drugs for personal
use and drug traffickers. It may also be necessary to explore offending rates by drug given that
there may be significant racial differences depending on the specific type of drug being seized on
the roads. The place to begin, then, is by estimating natural carrying rates for personal
consumption by drug. Here, we can turn to data on personal consumption rates, including
various self-report surveys of students and adults, such as the Monitoring the Future Project, the
Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance System, and the National Household Survey on Drug Abuse,
public health data on drug abuse hospitalizations, and, very carefully, some criminal justice data.
One caveat. The goal, naturally, is to measure natural offending rates. The concern is
whether there already exists today, in the public imagination, a shared belief that the police
engage in generalized racial profiling in law enforcement matters. Some survey data suggest a
generalized perception among the public that drug laws are enforced more systematically and
severely against members of minority groups, especially African-Americans and Hispanics. In a
Gallup Poll conducted in late 1999, 59 percent of total respondents indicated that they believed
that racial profiling by police officers is “widespread.”243 This perception is even more pervasive
among African-American respondents: 77 percent believe the practice is widespread.244
Moreover, among African-American respondents more generally, 42 percent have felt that they
were “stopped by the police just because of [their] race or ethnic background.”245
If there is a generalized perception of racial profiling, then the existing data on drug use
and other crimes would already reflect possible elasticity, if any, resulting from racial profiling,
and in this sense, would reflect real as opposed to natural offending rates. Recall the precise
definitions of these terms: natural offending rates are the rates of offending holding policing
constant, in other words policing color-blind; real offending rates reflect offending under real
conditions of racial profiling. The only way to have comparable offending rates, naturally, is to
use natural offending rates. If profiling is already incorporated in the existing offending rates,
however, then the natural offending rates are not really comparable: they may already reflect
some elasticity. This problem is particularly acute since there are few if any possibilities of
natural experiments. It may be necessary, as a result, to discount existing drug use offending
rates to take account of public perceptions of policing. How this survey data affects offending
rates, naturally, depends on whether and to what extent offending is elastic to policing.
Assuming elasticity, though, the survey data would suggest that the existing offending rates for

243

Geo rge G allup, Jr. and Alec G allup, The Gallup Poll Monthly, no. 411 (Princeton NJ: The Gallup Poll,
Decemb er 1999), p. 23 (adap ted in the 1999 Sourceboo k of Criminal Justice Statistics, Table 2.33) (racial profiling
is simply defined as “some police officers stop motorists of certain racial or ethnic groups because the officers
believe that these groups are more likely than others to commit certain types of crimes”).
244
Id.
245
Id. at pp.1 8, 19 (adapted in 199 9 So urceb ook at Ta ble 2.32).
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members of minority groups may actually reflect slightly higher natural offending based on a
deterrence model, or slightly lower natural offending based on a legitimacy model.
(1)

Carrying Drug Contraband for Personal Drug Use
i.

Self-Report Studies

The Monitoring the Future Project (“MFP”) is a cohort self-report study of high school
seniors that is conducted by the University of Michigan’s Institute for Social Research. The
survey data has been collected since 1975 based on a sample of 120 to 146 public and private
high schools intended to be representative of the entire United States high school population.
Since 1991, the survey has been extended to include 8th and 10th graders, and includes racial and
ethnic comparisons. The MFP data reveal that, for almost all drugs, African-American students
report lower use than their white and Hispanic cohorts. This is true for high school seniors, as
well as for 8th and 10th graders, suggesting that the effect is not due to different drop-out rates as
between users and non-users. By 12th grade, white students have the highest lifetime, annual and
30-day reported use of marijuana, inhalants, hallucinogens, LSD, heroin, amphetamines,
methamphetamines, sedatives, tranquilizers, and steroids in relation to their African-American
and Hispanic counterparts. White 12th graders also report higher lifetime, annual and 30-day use
of cocaine, including crack cocaine, than their African-American counterparts.246 The following
table reflects the 2002 MFP data for total drug use (which is a combination of 2002 and 2001
cohort responses):
Table IV.B.ii.1:

MFP Data for 2002: Any Illicit Drug

Grade
Lifetime:
White
Black
Hispanic
Annual:
White
Black
Hispanic
30-Day:
White
Black
Hispanic

246

8th

Any Illicit Drug
10th

12th

24
24.7
34.7

45.1
41.5
48.2

55.2
45.1
53

18.3
15.1
24.8

37.6
28.5
36.2

43.6
30.4
39

10.6
9.1
15.3

22.9
16.2
21.4

27.2
18.2
23.4

L. D. Johnston, P.M. O’M alley, and J.G. Bachm an (2003) Monitoring the Future National Survey
Results on Drug Use, 1975–2002. Volum e I: Secon dary Sch ool S tudents. NIH Publication No. 03-5375. Bethesda,
MD: N ational Institute on Drug Ab use.
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The Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance System (YRBS) is a national survey of high
school students (grades 9 through 12) conducted by the Center for Disease Control which tracks
high risk behavior for purposes of studying youth mortality rates. The study includes reported
lifetime (having ever tried) and current (used once or more in the last 30 days) use of several
drugs, including marijuana, cocaine, inhalants, heroin, methamphetamine, and IV drug use. For
2001, white high school students, in contrast to African-American students, report higher use in
all available categories. Hispanic students report higher use than white or African-American
students of cocaine and lifetime IV drug use.247 The following table reflects the 2001 YRBS
data, including the percentage of students reporting a given behavior and a 95 percent confidence
interval:
Table IV.B.ii.2: YRBS Data for 2001248
Race
White
Black
Hispanic

Race
White
Black
Hispanic

Lifetime
Marijuana Use
42.8
(±2.2)
40.2
(±5.8)
44.7
(±2.3)
Lifetime
Inhalant
Use
16.3
(±2.2)
5.8
(±0.9)
15.2
(±1.8)

Current
Marijuana Use
24.2
(±2.0)
21.8
(±4.1)
24.6
(±1.6)

Current
Inhalant
Use
4.9
( ±1.1)
2.6
(±0.7)
5.5
(±1.1)

Lifetime
Heroin
Use
3.3
(±0.5)
1.7
(±0.6)
3.1
(±0.6)

Lifetime
Cocaine Use
9.9
(±1.4)
2.1
(±0.7)
14.9 (±3.0)
Lifetime
Methamphetamine Use
11.4
(±2.1)
2.1
(±0.6)
9.1
(±1.9)

Current
Cocaine Use
4.2
(±0.9)
1.3
(±0.5)
7.1
(±1.5)
Lifetime
IV Drug
Use
2.4
(±0.5)
1.6
(±0.7)
2.5
(±0.7)

The National Household Survey on Drug Abuse (“NHSDA”) is issued by the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services
Administration. The survey has been conducted since 1991 and samples household residents and
persons in noninstitutionalized group quarters over the age of 12 (excluding only homeless
persons who do not use shelters, active military personnel, and residents of institutional group
quarters, such as jails and hospitals). The survey is often cited by the DEA and ONDCP. The
NHSDA data place drug use by minorities at approximately the same level or lower than by
whites, although usage varies by drug. For 2001, overall 30 day drug use stood at 7.2, 7.4 and
6.4 percent for whites, African-Americans and Hispanics, respectively.249 The following table
summarizes yearly data regarding the major drugs for the period 1997–2001:
247

Center for D isease C ontro l and P revention (2002 ). Surveillance Summaries, J une 28, 2002. M MWR
200 2:51 (No . SS-4).
248
SO UR CE : adap ted from Center for Disease Contro l and P revention. Surveillance Summaries, June 28,
2002. M MW R 200 2: 51 (No. SS-4).
249
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services
Administratio n, Detailed Tables from the 2001, 2000, 1999, 1998, 1997 National Household Surveys on Drug
Abu se. Available at http://www.samhsa.gov/oas/NHSDA tabs [August 1, 2003].
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Table IV.B.ii.3:

Lifetime
% White
% Black
% Hispanic
Annual
% White
% Black
% Hispanic
past 30 days
% Wwhite
% Black
% Hispanic

Lifetime
% White
% Black
% Hispanic
Annual
% White
% Black
% Hispanic
past 30 days
% White
% Black
% Hispanic
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NHSDA Data for 2001250

1997

Any Illicit Drug
1998 1999 2000

2001

1997

Marijuana
1998 1999 2000

2001

38.17
31.14
25.9

38.17
33.16
26.56

42
37.7
31.2

41.5
35.5
29.9

44.5
38.6
31.9

35.55
28.53
22.33

35.51
30.25
23.16

37.1
32.1
25.3

37
30.8
24.2

40.1
33.1
25.6

11.28
12.12
9.87

10.43
12.99
10.51

11.4
13.2
11

11.2
10.9
10.1

12.9
12.2
11.9

9.09
9.9
7.46

8.45
10.61
8.19

8.7
10
7.7

8.6
8.6
6.6

9.8
9.4
7.3

6.41
7.48
5.86

6.09
8.23
6.12

6.2
7.5
6.1

6.4
6.4
5.3

7.2
7.4
6.4

5.17
6.1
4.04

4.98
6.57
4.47

4.7
5.9
4.2

4.9
5.2
3.6

5.6
5.6
4.2

1997

1998

Cocaine
1999 2000

2001

1997

1998

Crack
1999

2000

2001

11.84
6.48
7.33

11.44
8.45
8.86

12.5
9.5
9.2

12.4
7.4
8.8

13.5
8.5
10.8

1.87
3.11
1.58

1.77
4.2
1.86

—
—
—

—
—
—

—
—
—

1.89
2.43
2.01

1.7
1.87
2.26

1.7
1.5
2.3

1.5
1.3
1.7

1.9
1.5
2.4

0.56
1.41
0.39

0.29
1.31
0.7

—
—
—

—
—
—

—
—
—

0.59
1.36
0.82

0.69
1.26
1.31

0.7
0.9
0.8

0.5
0.7
0.8

0.7
0.8
1

0.22
0.77
0.17

0.09
0.86
0.25

—
—
—

—
—
—

—
—
—

SOU RCE : adapted from the U.S. Department of Health and Hum an Services, Substance Abuse and
Mental H ealth Services Administratio n, Detailed T ables from the 20 01 N ation al H ouse hold Survey on Drug
Abu se; Tables fro m the 20 00 N ation al H ouse hold Survey on D rug Abuse; Tables from the 1999 National
Ho useh old Survey on D rug Abuse; Tables fro m the 19 98 N ation al H ouse hold Survey on Drug Abuse [Online].
Available: http://www.samhsa.gov/oas/NHS DAtabs [August 1, 2003 ].
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% White
% Black
% Hispanic
Annual
%Wwhite
% Black
% Hispanic
past 30 days
% White
% Black
% Hispanic
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1997

Hallucinogens
1998 1999 2000

2001

1997

1998

Heroin
1999

2000

2001

11.33
2.78
5.66

11.49
4.84
5.31

13.1
4.9
7.8

13.7
5
6.9

14.7
5.1
8.1

0.88
1.01
1.36

1.01
1.91
0.7

—
—
—

—
—
—

—
—
—

2.08
0.74
1.67

1.82
0.44
1.55

1.6
0.4
1.4

1.8
0.6
1.2

2.3
0.9
1.6

0.2
0.55
0.57

0.1
0.24
0.14

—
—
—

—
—
—

—
—
—

0.87
0.37
0.48

0.77
0.15
0.72

0.5
0.1
0.5

0.5
0.2
0.3

0.6
0.3
0.5

0.1
0.43
0.21

0.05
0.14
0.08

—
—
—

—
—
—

—
—
—

Overall, these surveys consistently reflect lower or equal drug use among AfricanAmericans as compared to whites, and practically equal—though in the case of cocaine
higher—use among Hispanics as compares to whites.251
Although these general survey studies are widely considered a better measure of the
nature and extent of drug use than arrest statistics or ethnographies,252 there are naturally
questions about their reliability. Researchers have tested the validity of survey data by
comparing self-reported drug use habits with other, presumably more accurate measures of drug
use. The three primary tests are internal validity tests,253 external validation tests,254 and
251

These statistics only concern illegal drugs. If we were to include prescription mood-altering drugs, like
Prozac or V alium, the disproportionality may be far greater. The use of legal mood-altering drugs exploded in the
199 0s. As Joseph K ennedy rep orts, “B etween 1987 and 1997 , the percentages of outpa tient psychotherapy p atients
using prescribed antidepressant medications, mood stabilizers, and stimulants tripled.” Joseph E. Kenned y, “Drug
Wars in Black and White,” 66 Law & Contemporary Problems 153, 173 (2003). The consumption of these types of
drugs tends to correlate with higher-income white consumers, which suggests that, in reality, whites may consume
drugs at a far higher rate than m inorities. I tha nk Richard Posner for this insight.
252
Lana Harrison, “The Validity of Self-Reported Drug U se in Survey Research: An Overview and Critique
of Research Me thods” in The Validity of Self-reported Drug Use: Improving Accuracy of Survey Estimates.
Harrison, L ana, an d Arthur H ughes (eds) 199 7: 17 -36, at page 18; Royer F. Cook, Alan D . Bernstein, and Christine
M. Andrews. “Assessing Drug U se in the W orkplace : A Com parison of Self-Report, U rinalysis, and Hair Ana lysis”
in The Validity of Self-reported Drug Use: Improving Accuracy of Survey Estimates. Harrison, Lana, and Arthur
Hughes (eds) 1997: 247-272, at page 248.
253
Internal validity is determined by looking at a respondent’s answers to related items on a survey. For
instance , a survey respo nse wo uld be interna lly inconsistent if the resp ondent claim ed to have smok ed m arijuana in
the last 30 days in response to one question and in a later question denied ever having used any illicit drugs over the
course of his lifetime. On the other hand, researchers interpret the high correlation between estimates of friends’ drug
use and aggregate self-repo rted d rug use as evidence of the M onitoring the F uture P roject’s high internal validity.
Both the National Household Survey on Dug Abuse and the Monitoring the Future Study demonstrate a high degree
of internal consistency. See Harrison 1 997 : 19; see also Lloyd D. Johnston and Patrick M . O’Malley. “The
Recanting of Earlier Reported Drug Use by Y oung Adults” in The V alidity of Self-reported Drug U se: Improving
Accuracy of Survey Estimates. Harrison, Lana, and Arthur Hughes (eds) 1997: 59-80.
254
External validity is demonstrated through consistency between self-reports and an official record,
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biological testing.255 For our purposes here, the relevant question is whether there is any
evidence that self-reporting by members of minority groups is less reliable than by whites.
On the racial comparison question, one recent study found that, while self-reporting
grossly under represents the prevalence of drug use in a population, underreporting does not
correlate with race. The researchers there used respondent demographics to create a logistic
regression and mined the data for demographic factors correlated with honest self-reporting—i.e.
a self-report of recent drug use by those arrestees whose urine tests positive for drug metabolites.
The researchers found that black arrestee crack users were significantly more likely to make a
truthful self-report as to use than either white or Hispanic arrestee crack users.256 On the other
hand, Hispanic opiate users were significantly more likely to make an accurate self-report about
use than black arrestee opiate users. No statistically significant race effects were found in the
validity of self-reporting on marijuana and amphetamine use. Another study found no race effect
when comparing the reliability of self-reported drug use by a former drug treatment sample with
their treatment admission charges.257 Other research, however, has reached the opposite
conclusion—namely, that blacks are in fact less likely than whites to make true and accurate self
reports about drug use.258 One such study found, for example, that although the total rate of
recanting on previous self-reports of drug use is quite low, African-Americans recant at a
significantly higher rate than whites when reporting lifetime use of marijuana and cocaine for the
MFP.259 Clearly, this would be the kind of empirical evidence that we need to explore further
when dealing with evidence of offending differentials.260

polygraph test or confirmation from interviews of friends or family. Researchers have found that found that the
external validity of self-reported drug use varies with the type of drug involved, but not with the race of the
respo ndents. See Adele Harrel (1997) “The Validity of Self-Reported Drug Use Data: The Accuracy of Responses
on Confidential Self-Administered Answered Sheets” in The V alidity of Self-reported Drug U se: Improving
Accuracy of Survey Estimates. Harrison, Lana, and Arthur Hughes (eds) 1997: 37-58, at pages 46-48, 52.
255
In biological testing. Urine and hair samples are taken and analyzed for evidence of drug metabolites
and used to impeach or confirm self-reports. Several of these studies, especially the Drug Use Forecasting Study
(DU F) and DU F replica studies, suggest lower than hoped for validity for self-reporting. Validity varies for different
pop ulation group s (arrested offenders versus office workers) and also for different types of drugs. See, generally,
Harrison 1997: 28-30 . Research in the field suggests, for example, that self reports are m ost accurate for the least
stigmatized drugs and least accurate for the most stigmatized drugs, most accurate for reports of lifetime use and
least accurate for reports of recent use, most accurate when self administered and least accurate when responses are
requested aloud.
256
Natalie Lu, Bruce Taylor and Jack Riley. 2001. “The Validity of Adult Arrestee Self-reports of Crack
Cocaine Use” American Journal of Drug and Alco hol Abuse, 27(3): 399.
257
Harrel (1997: 51-52)
258
See, e.g., M. Frederich, and Y. Xu. 1994 . “The V alidity of Drug U se Reports from Juvenile Arrestees”
International Journal of Addiction. 29(8): 971-985; T .A. Gray, and E.D. W ish. 1999. “Correlates of Underreporting
Recent Drug Use by Female Arrestees” Journal of Drug Issues. 29(1 ): 91-1 06; R . Falck, H.A. Siegal, M.A . Forney,
J. Wang, and R.G. Carlson. 1992. “The Validity of Injection Drug Users Self-Reported Use of Opiates and Cocaine”
Journal of Drug Issues. 22: 823-832; W.F. Page, J.E. Davies, R.A. Ladner, J. Alfassa, and H. Tennis. 1977.
“Urinalysis Screened versus Verbally Reported Drug Use: The Identification of Discrepant Groups” International
Journal of Addiction. 12: 439-450.
259
See Johnston, et al 1997: 72-76.
260
There is also the question whether school and home survey data on drug consumption are reliable given
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Public Health Data

Given the difficulty of self-report data, another approach is to look at public health data.
The Drug Abuse Warning Network (“DAWN”), for instance, is a voluntary program run by the
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Administration that collects data on drug-related visits to
non-federal hospital emergency rooms across the nation. The information is provided by an
assigned DAWN reporter, usually an emergency room physician, who reviews the medical charts
of all patients and reports information where the reason for the hospitalization appears to be drug
related, including the visit episode as well as drug mentions (the different drugs used). The
following table represents 2001 DAWN data, with additional percentage calculations:
Table IV.B.ii.4: 2001 DAWN Data for Selected Drugs

ED Drug Episode

ED Marijuana Mention

ED Cocaine Mention

ED Heroin Mention

ED Amphetamines Mention

White
Black
Hispanic
N/T
Race Unknown
White
Black
Hispanic
N/T
Race Unknown
White
Black
Hispanic
N/T
Race Unknown
White
Black
Hispanic
N/T
Race Unknown
White
Black
Hispanic
N/T
Race Unknown

2001
351,245
139,375
79,517
5,209
63,138
57,836
29,455
12,877
875
9,470
71,531
80,022
25,117
720
15,644
40,104
28,706
14,075
381
9,798
11,720
1,271
2,495
194
2,874

Percent
55.01%
21.83%
12.45%

52.33%
26.65%
11.65%

37.06%
41.45%
13.01%

48.39%
34.63%
16.98%

63.17%
6.85%
13.45%

These data suggest overall higher offending among African-Americans and Hispanics for
most drugs than their share of the population. Here again, though, there are important differences
by drug, and so it would be important to specify offending rate by drug type for the particular

that they may overlook homeless drug users and school drop-outs. However, roadway searches probably target
perso ns with cars and more than subsistenc e income. T hanks to John Pfaff for this po int.
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drugs that are being interdicted on the highway in the specific geographic locations where racial
profiling is taking place. And here too, there are questions about the validity of any inferences
concerning real drug use. Drug-related emergency room visits may correlate with socioeconomic status more directly than race. African-American and Hispanic users may have less
access to private doctors and individualized health care, and therefore may rely more on
emergency room medical assistance. Naturally, this would skew the data.
iii.

Search Data

There are significant questions about the reliability of search, arrest and other criminal
justice data given that they are the product of racially disproportionate policing. David Harris
argues correctly in Profiles in Injustice that we should not rely on arrest and conviction data to
measure offending differentials. These are good measures of law enforcement activity, but not of
offending rates. As Harris recognizes, numerous established criminologists have pointed this
out. Aaron Cicourel and John Kitsuse, in their 1963 article on official statistics, emphasize that
criminal justice measure often tell us something about law enforcement activity, but not
necessarily about offending or offenders.261 It is important, in this sense, to be very careful with
any of this data.
Although the search data are skewed because of the disproportional searches of minority
motorists, the internal rate (within each racial group) of persons carrying drugs can be compared
and may represent another data point. Given the large number of searches, the pool of searches
represents a sample of the different racial groups. The Maryland data may be useful here. In the
I-95 corridor, there were 2,146 searches conducted during the period 1995–2000. Of the total
2,146 searches, 33.3 percent involved white motorists (about 715), 59.7 percent involved
African-American motorists (about 1,281), and 5.9 percent involved Hispanic motorists (about
127). In other words, setting aside the small number of Hispanic motorists searched because the
sample is too little and underrepresentative, the police practices provide a sample of about 715
white motorists and about 1,281 African-American motorists. Gross and Barnes break-down
those searches in tables that reveals the relative proportion of drug users by race. What their
tables reveal is that the searches netted a greater proportion of persons carrying drugs for
personal use among white motorists. Among African-American motorists, there was a lower
internal rate of carrying for personal use, but a higher rate of carrying evincing drug trafficking or
dealing (which I discuss in greater length in the next section). Their tables reveal the following
internal rates of offending:

261

Harris 2002:7 7–7 8 (“in his 1 995 Sutherland Prize Presentation to the A merican So ciety of C riminology,
Dr. Delbert Elliot of the Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence at the University of Colorado made much
the same point. ‘W e have fallen into bad habits,’ Elliot said, referring to the continuing use of arrest data to support
conclusions about offender characteristics and behavior. Using arrest statistics this way will ‘lead to incorrect
conclusions, ineffective policies and practices and ultimately undermine our efforts to understand, prevent, and
control criminal behavior’” id. Harris 2002:7 7–7 8).
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Table IV.B.ii.5: Internal Rates of Offending from Maryland Search Data262
White Motorists

African-American
Motorists

All Searches

Total Searches

100%

100%

100%

No Drugs

59.7%

62.2%

62.7%

Any Drugs

40.3%

37.8%

37.3%

Trace or Personal Use Quantities
of Drugs

36.2%

22.4%

26.1%

Small, Medium or Large Dealer
Quantities of Drugs

4.2%

15.4%

11.2%

Again, it is important to be careful with these data because they are biased not only by the
fact of being police searches, but also because of the racial disproportionality and because of the
possible differences in the selective use of other search criteria. Nevertheless, these data tend to
corroborate the self-report surveys in revealing evidence of slightly lower personal drug use
among African-Americans than among white motorists.
(2)

Drug Trafficking and Drug Couriers

The racial break-down of drug traffickers, drug sellers, and drug couriers is harder to
gage. Practically all of the data are produced through law enforcement operations and therefore
potentially biased by disproportional attention to minority trafficking. In addition, there is every
reason here to be even more skeptical of self-report data—the little that there is.
Human Rights Watch reports that the National Household Survey on Drug Abuse,
discussed earlier, contained questions about drug selling during the period 1991–1993.
According to Human Rights Watch, “On average over the three year period, blacks were 16
percent of admitted sellers and whites were 82 percent.”263 Given that African-Americans
represented 11.5 of the United States civilian, non-institutionalized population in 1992,264 the
NHSDA reflects higher drug selling among African-Americans. Naturally, all the same
questions about the reliability of self-report studies apply, if anything even more saliently. The
reliability of self-report studies is inversely related to the seriousness of the activity surveyed, so

262

Adapted from G ross and Barnes 200 2:60 (Tab le 17).
Human R ights Watch, Punishment and Prejudice: Racial Disparities in the War on Drugs (M ay 2000),
Chapter 7, *2 of 7 from http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/usa/Rcedrg00-05.htm. Thanks to Rudovsky 2001:310 for
this reference. I ha ve not been able to locate the data in the relevant N HS DA volum es.
264
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services
Administratio n, National Household Survey on Drug Abuse: Main Findings 1992, p. 17 Table 1.3 (19 95).
263
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these data are even less reliable;265 however, there is debate, again, over the comparative
unreliability by race.266
One of the very few other data points, then, is the search data itself. As the Gross and
Barnes table above suggests, the internal rate of drug trafficking is higher within the sample of
African-American motorist searches: 15.4 percent of African-American motorists searched are
transporting quantities of drugs that suggest dealing, in contrast to 4.2 percent of white motorists.
The difference is actually most pronounced among medium and large dealer quantities, where
12.2 percent of African-American versus 2.4 percent of white motorists are transporting
contraband.267 As Gross and Barnes explain, “Black motorists who were searched on I-95 north
of Baltimore were more than three-and-a-half times as likely as whites to be dealers, and five
times as likely to be medium or large dealers. . . . Of the whites who were found with any drugs
on I-95, 10% were dealers and 6% were medium or large dealers; of the blacks with any drugs,
40% were dealers and 32% were medium and large dealers. . .”268
Clearly, this is an area for more sustained research. A tentative conclusion, from the few
data points available, is that African-Americans have a higher offending rate than whites for drug
selling and dealing—but how much higher is not clear—but similar offending for personal use,
resulting in a slightly higher offending rate overall.

265

See Harrison 1997:28–30 (reporting that self-report studies are more accurate for the least stigmatized
drugs and least acc urate for the mo st stigmatized drugs).
266
The rest of the Human Rights Watch report from 200 0 is not particularly illuminating:
There are no com parable annual statistics on the estimated number and race of drug sellers
nationwide. Nevertheless, such data as exists indicates whites constitute a far greater share of the
drug selling population than of the population arrested for drug selling. . . . According to research
on patterns o f drug p urchase and use in selected m ajor cities, drug users repo rted that their main
drug sources were sellers of the same racial or ethnic background as they were. A large study
conducted in the Miami, Florida metropolitan area of 699 cocaine users (powder and crack)
revea led that over 9 6 percent o f the users in each ethnic/racial category were involved in streetlevel drug dealing, which again would suggest a racial profile of sellers that is comparable to that
of users. Gen eral B arry M cCaffrey has stated that drug transaction s between yo uth are generally
intra-racial, that is, youth tend to buy from sellers of the same race. OND CP ’s former perio dic
repo rt on drug trends, Pulse Check, also indicated a high frequency of intra-racial drug
transac tions, that is, that whites tended to buy fro m white sellers an d minorities from minority
sellers.
Human Rights W atch, P unishm ent and Prejudice: Racial Disparities in the W ar on Drugs (M ay 2000), Chapter 7 , *2
of 7 from http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/usa/Rcedrg00-05.htm. This is, however, entirely vague and does not
help gage the relative offending. Even if there is a high frequency of intra-racial drug transactions, the offending
rates co uld be significan tly different than the demo graphic bre ak-do wn of the pop ulation b y race.
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Gross and Barnes 2002:60.
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Gross and Barnes 2002:60.

B E R NA R D E. H ARCOURT : R E T H IN K IN G R ACIAL P ROFILING

C.

89

The Likely Implications of Racial Profiling
i.

The Long-Term Effect on the Profiled Crime

Based on reasonably conservative assumptions including, first, relatively low elasticity of
offending to policing, second, slightly lower elasticity of offending to policing for minority
motorists, and third slightly higher natural total offending rates among minority motorists, it is
fair to infer that racial profiling on the highways may increase the total number of persons
transporting drug contraband on the roads. From expression (9) earlier, we know that, assuming
minority motorists represent 20 percent of the motorist population and have lower elasticity,
racial profiling will increase crime if the ratio of white elasticity to minority elasticity is greater
than the ratio of minority offending to white offending—in other words if the elasticity
differential is greater than the offending differential. Given the paucity of evidence on both
relative elasticities and offending, it is impossible to know for sure whether racial profiling does
or does not increase the profiled crime. It is, however, certain that under these assumptions,
racial profiling may well increase the profiled crime. Naturally, it would be crucial to do a more
nuanced analysis with better data, exploring the different types of drugs being transported in the
particular geographic location. It would also be important to develop better data on elasticity,
comparative elasticity, and offending. However, based on these simple and reasonable
assumptions, it appears that racial profiling on the highways may be affirmatively counterproductive from the perspective of fighting crime. This certainly seems to be the case in
Maryland based on the little data we have.269
ii.

The Narrow Efficiency of Searches

Given that the police in most jurisdictions are stopping and searching minority motorists
disproportionately in relation to their representation in the general population, it is fair to suspect
that the police are more discriminating in their stops and searches of white than minority
motorists. They likely use additional factors to narrow down which white motorists they stop or
search. In effect, they may pay closer attention to the suspiciousness of white motorists as
opposed to the race of minority motorists. If so, and if the police are successful in properly
narrowing down white motorists, then the selectiveness differential is likely to mask higher real
hit rates among minorities. In other words, if there are similar official hit rates among white and
minority motorists, the selection and sub-search bias may mask comparatively higher offending
rates among minorities. Thus, the consistent findings of equal to lower hit rates for minority
motorists may mean equal to higher hit rates for comparably situated minority motorists. It is, as
a result, impossible to properly interpret the hit rates and reach any reliable conclusion as to the
narrow efficiency of highway searches. Again, this is an area for further research.

269

See Part I.B.ii supra.
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The Ratchet Effect

Racial profiling on the highways likely has a significant ratchet effect on the profiled
population. From the earlier analysis of the basic racial profiling models represented in Graphs
II.B.ii.1, 2 and 3, it is clear that the police may have to subject a disproportionate number of
minority motorists to criminal justice supervision in order to achieve equal offending rates. In all
likelihood, this is exactly what is happening in Maryland. It is hard to imagine, even if we
assume that minority motorists are offending at a higher natural rate of offending than white
motorists, that minority offenders represent 60 percent of all offenders under natural conditions
of offending (i.e. if the police are engaged in color-blind policing). It is hard to imagine that the
offending population breaks down 40 percent white and 60 percent minority. After all, eightyfour percent of motorists in Maryland found with drugs had trace or personal-use amounts, and
68 percent had trace or personal-use quantities of marijuana only; and the survey data seem to
suggest that personal consumption of drugs is relatively even across racial lines. Even if we
assume that the other 16 percent of seizures—those seizures involving large hauls of
drugs—consist entirely of minority motorists,270 then minority offenders would still only
represent approximately 31 percent of offenders and white motorists would represent the other 69
percent.271
The most likely explanation for the disjunction between this hypothesized natural
offending differential in Maryland (30/70) and the actual apprehension differential under
conditions of racial profiling (60/40) is that, continuing to assume elasticity, it takes a lot of
profiling to bring the hit rates down to the same level. In other words, the police need a lot of
volume to get their message out—probably more volume than is appropriate. This may be due to
poor dissemination of information or more generally to low elasticity. Whatever the cause, the
result is a significant imbalance in negative contact with the police—whether the seizure of drug
contraband results in a fine, an arrest, probation, or imprisonment.272 This represents a ratchet
effect that has a significant cost to minority families and communities.

270

Note that this would be an unreasonably conservative assumption. A more reasonable assumption from
the M aryland data is tha t approxim ately 84 percent of the dealer populatio n is mino rity. See Gross and Barnes
2002:59–61.
271
Assum ing that 18 percent o f the mo torists are minorities, if minorities and whites offend at the same rate
with regard to 84 percent of the offenses (personal use seizures) and minorities comprise the entire other 16 percent
of the offenders, then minority motorists represent 31.12 percent of all offenders. (The equation is (18/100 * 84/100
) + (16/10 0 * 1) = .151 2 + .1 6 = .3 112 ).
272
There is, of course , an imp ortant and unanswered question surround ing the “hit” rate and its
consequences: W hat do the po lice do to the motorist when they disco ver evidenc e of drug co ntraband, especially
when it is evidence of trace amounts or amounts suitable for personal use only? This is going to have a significant
effect on how we evaluate the police practice. If the police do not impose any additional burdens for the possession
of small quantities of drugs, then there would be no collateral consequences to the 84 percent of motorists discovered
with drugs carrying small quantities, and the interdiction program would in fact be targeting only drug dealers. The
ratchet effect, as a result, would not be significant. Another way of thinking about this is that one remedy for racial
profiling on the highways could be to prohibit the police from filing charges or imposing burdens on drivers carrying
perso nal use q uantities o f drugs. T his remedy would eliminate som e of the c ollatera l conse quences o f profiling.

B E R NA R D E. H ARCOURT : R E T H IN K IN G R ACIAL P ROFILING

91

V. Conclusion
Racial profiling on the highways may increase the overall number of persons transporting
drugs on the highways and likely produces a ratchet effect on the minority motorist population.
The real problems with racial profiling, then, are not so much problems about race, as they are
about criminal profiling. They are problems that may plague profiling schemes in general,
whether based on race or on gender, wealth, class, status, physical demeanor, etc. In this sense,
the fact that racial profiling on the highway is “almost uniformly condemned”273 is probably the
right result, but for the wrong reasons. The idea that “it is plainly unconstitutional to use race as
a criterion for choosing who to stop or search”274 is simply an exaggeration. And so is the
political rhetoric surrounding the use of race in policing—whether from the right or from the left.
This includes President George W. Bush’s statement denouncing racial profiling on the grounds
that “All of our citizens are created equal and must be treated equally,”275 and F.B.I. Director
Robert Mueller’s statement that “Racial profiling is abhorrent to the Constitution, it is abhorrent
in any way, shape or form,”276 as well as Justices William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall’s
declaration, dissenting in Martinez-Fuerte: “That law in this country should tolerate use of one’s
ancestry as probative of possible criminal conduct is repugnant under any circumstances.”277
Though noble, these rhetorical statements are simply wrong. If we accept that the
government has a compelling interest in combating crime and that the legislature has properly set
forth prohibited conduct in the penal code, there is no valid constitutional barrier to using race in
policing if the three narrow conditions are satisfied—if the policing technique is narrowly
tailored to the traditional law enforcement interest in fighting crime. Race in the policing context
should not be treated differently than race in other constitutional contexts. If racial profiling
satisfies the three narrow conditions, then opposition to racial profiling should be based on the
grounds of affirmative action. Note that, although there may be a compelling law enforcement
reason to engage in racial profiling, there may also be a compelling governmental interest in
reducing the minority representation in the carceral population. The law enforcement interest is
not the only possible compelling interest. Because of this country’s history of institutional
racism—or for other articulable compelling reasons—it could be argued that the police should
minimize the minority carceral population by profiling white offenders. Here too the argument
should be framed in terms of affirmative action, not in terms of barring the consideration of race
in the criminal justice context. Conversely, if racial profiling does not satisfy any one of the
three conditions, then racial profiling should be conditioned on compensating innocent minority
motorists who are searched for wasting their time, for diminishing their dignity, and for instilling
fear. If one of the conditions is not satisfied, innocent minority motorists are being used for other
purposes—for example, to increase search success rates regardless of a ratchet effect—and they
should be compensated for the taking.
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275
276
277

Gross and Livingston 2002:1431.
Gross and Barnes 2002:106.
Quoted in Mosher, Miethe, and Phillips, The Mismeasure of Crime at 183.
Quoted in Alschuler 2002:163 n.3.
428 U.S. at 571 n.1 (B RE NN AN , J. , dissenting).
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In the end, the overwhelming opposition to racial profiling is a beacon that sheds light on
the larger issue of criminal profiling more generally. This is counter-intuitive because most
people in the criminal justice system endorse criminal profiling as a law enforcement tool.
Practically no one questions the practice. In fact, even those most adamantly opposed to racial
profiling support the larger practice of criminal profiling. David Harris, for instance, writes
about criminal profiling in glowing terms:
In practical terms, there simply aren’t enough police officers or resources to keep
every person and every place under surveillance. . . so officers welcome any tool
to help them identify the most likely lawbreakers. Profiles enable the police to
create portraits of criminals using facts instead of gut instinct or wishful thinking.
Profiles can systematically pool collective police experience into information that
is comprehensive, solid, and accurate—something much better than the selectively
remembered war stories of individual officers. Compiling this information into a
real picture of criminal activity on the street should offer a better basis for
suspicion than simple intuition.278
Harris argues that certain kinds of profiling are dangerous—namely the informal, “less
rigorous and less structured” types of profiling (Harris 2002:26)—but not that criminal profiling
itself raises any problems.279
The trouble is, criminal profiling tends to aggravate the prejudices and biases that are
built into the penal law and criminal law enforcement. The criminal law is by no means a neutral
set of rules. It is a moral and political set of rules that codifies social norms, ethical values,
political preferences, and class hierarchies. Criminal enforcement priorities exploit these values
and preferences. They help promote the interests of some and hinder the interests of others.
Every decision to deploy law enforcement resources in one particular direction privileges the
security of some over the security of others. The decision to expend a lot of law enforcement
resources on gun-oriented policing, for instance, involves a trade-off. It may mean less police
presence on university campuses, which may result in higher incidences of sexual assault. It may
mean less investment in enforcement of securities regulations and more insider trading. It may
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Harris 2002:16.
Harris argues that the danger of informal profiling is that the profiles are most often wrong. “Drawing
on only a small, unrepresentative sample of events,” Harris explains, “these less formal profiles can easily become
dangerously inaccurate” (Harris 2002:2 7). H e con trasts these inaccurate, informal p rofiles based on hunches to
formal profiles “based on hard data accumulated methodically over time.” (Harris 2002:26). The problem,
according to Harris, is the increased reliance on the informal and inaccurate profiles. ‘When informal profiling is the
norm , evidence that supports a view other than the pre vailing wisdom will not change what an officer thinks, even if,
in any fair and obje ctive sense, it strongly contradicts these beliefs. Thus the use of informal profiling presents a
stark and real danger” (H arris 20 02:2 7–2 8). T his dichotom y betwe en accurate and inaccurate profiles, ho wever, is
off the mark. An inaccurate p rofile is, ob viously, useless and dangero us. The question is whether an acc urate p rofile
also has consequences. In this essay, I argue, there are two important and troublesome consequences: first, the use of
the profile may in fact increase long-term crime trend s. Second , the use of profiles per se create social d istortions.
These apply to profiling especially when the pro files are reliable.
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mean less attention to identity theft and more cases of credit card fraud. Where the state allocates
law enforcement resources reflects not only a moral evaluation of harm and, too often, a
pragmatic assessment of where it is easiest to detect crime, but also importantly an ideological
dimension that has a lot to do with class, power, and politics. The decision to enforce and
penalize robberies more severely than, for example, corporate malfeasance—even though the
financial consequences of the latter may dwarf the former—reflects not only a moral assessment
of harm, but also importantly an ideological dimension. As sociologist Jack Katz provocatively
suggests in Seductions of Crime, any group that is the target of criminal law enforcement is, at
that point in time, either no longer an elite or in battle with the established powers.280
Most of the time, our criminal law definitions and law enforcement priorities emphasize
the frailties of some and ignore the frailties of others. We do this, in part, to protect
ourselves—hiding our own frailties at the expense of others. This too is human. It is, itself, a
way of privileging oneself or ones own—a normal tendency born of ambition, self-preservation,
and compassion for our kind, mixed with a desire for power and social standing, politics and
ideology. But the reality is, human frailty is pretty well distributed across race, class, and social
distinctions. If we look carefully, it is even well distributed across gender lines. Domestic
murders, for instance, are almost even male-female.281 Criminal profiling serves only to
accentuate the ideological dimension of the criminal law. It aggravates the structural prejudices
and biases built into the law. It hardens the purported race, class, and power relations between
certain offenses and certain groups. In this sense, it serves to polarize social and political
divisions rather than defuse them. This is, naturally, a good thing for those of us who are on the
winning side. It is also a good thing if we think that we have developed a criminal law scheme
that actually does identify and isolate the truly terrible crimes. It is great when we pursue child
molesters, terrorists, and serial killers. But the problem is, the criminal law is by no means
limited to these heinous and egregious crimes. Instead, the criminal law preoccupies itself with
the grey area—drug use, delinquence, quality-of-life offenses.
Criminal profiling is problematic precisely because it exacerbates the correlation between
the profiled crime and the profiled trait, reinforcing the public perception that certain groups are
more prone to crime than others. It may be efficient to target resources this way, but it also
makes matters seem worse than they really are. If law enforcers profile for nepotism among
politicians, they are likely to give politicians a bad reputation. If regulators profile for crimes of
financial greed among industry leaders, they are likely to aggravate perceptions of capitalist
greed. If administrators profile for plagiarism among historians, they likely are going to ruin the
reputation of history as a discipline. Assuming that these profiles are accurate—that the
enforcers are focusing on correct predictive traits—there is every reason to perceive politicians as
nepotistic, industrialists as greedy, and historians as plagiarists. However, profiling will make
matters seem worse than they really are. Profiling will accentuate these associations. And this

280

Jack Katz, Sed uctions of C rime: Moral and Sensual Attractions in Do ing E vil 43 (New York: B asic
Bo oks 1 988 ).
281
See Katz 1988:47.
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becomes particularly problematic when only certain offenses are criminalized, targeted, and
enforced.
Because of the ratchet effect, racial profiling is likely to significantly boost the general
perception that minorities are drug users and drug couriers and unevenly distribute criminal
records, corrections, and post-punitive collateral consequences. In this sense, racial profiling is
an excellent example of how criminal profiling accentuates embedded prejudices in the criminal
law. But the same problem would attach to any other form of profiling, whether of the wealthy
for tax evasion or of single mothers for welfare fraud. The goal of our law enforcement should
not be to aggravate our distorted prejudices about human frailty by optimizing on specific traits,
but to respond evenly to incidences of crime and thereby distribute the coercive force of the law
more evenly across society.
There is an idea shared by most in civil society that the criminal law merely polices the
civil boundaries between individuals and is, in this sense, neutral. This is a liberal political
theoretic idea that goes back to Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. The idea is that the civil laws
serve as “hedges” that keep citizens from interfering with each other and that the criminal law
merely polices these “hedges”—that individuals should be allowed to pursue their own
conception of the good freely, unhindered by the actions of others, within these neutral
boundaries. The liberal tradition in the 19th century expanded on this insight, helping to define
the hedges in terms of “harm.” The harm principle, in this sense, represented a sustained effort
to locate the hedges in a neutral way, acceptable to all. In the 20th century, conceptions such as
the veil of ignorance or neutral principles were introduced to shore up the tattered neutrality of
those hedges.
The criminal law, however, does not merely police the civil hedges. The criminal law
locates where those hedges are. It places the hedges, and in the process, distributes wealth,
power, and social status. The criminal law and criminal law enforcement are, in this sense,
instruments that are deployed by some and experienced by others. It may be hard to avoid this.
What can more easily be avoided, though, is allowing a few of us to use criminal profiling as a
leveraging mechanism to magnify and accentuate those distortions.
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Appendix

I.

Under Conditions of Equal and Constant Elasticity of Offending to Policing:

Assuming resource constraint, racial profiling will decrease the profiled crime under
conditions of equal and constant elasticity of offending to policing if the minority motorist
offending rate is greater than the white motorist offending rate. This can be derived from the
definition of elasticity.
For purposes of notation, let r 0 {M, W} denote the race of the motorists, either minority
or white. Let Popr denote the representation of each racial group in the total population. Let Or
denote the offending rate of each racial group. Let ) Or denote the absolute value of the change
in the offending rate of the racial group from Time 1 (no racial profiling) to Time 2 (racial
profiling). Let Ir denote the internal search group rate for each racial group. Let ) Ir denote the
absolute value of the change in the internal search rate for each racial group from Time 1 to Time
2. Let S denote the search rate for the total population.
From the definition of elasticity, if minority and white motorists have the same and
constant elasticity, then the following is true:
( ) OM / OM )
-------------------( ) IM / IM )

=

( ) OW / OW )
---------------------( ) IW / IW )

(A1)

Given that, at Time 1, the police are engaged in color-blind policing, the internal group
search rates are going to be the same for both racial groups. In other words, we know that:
S = IM = IW

(A2)

We also know that the change in internal search rates as between the different racial
groups will offset each other since, as noted in text, we are assuming a resource constraint such
that there are fixed law enforcement resources. This implies that S is a constant: the total number
of searches does not vary, what the police need to do is distribute their searches between white
and minority motorists. Since the total number of searches does not vary, the overall rate of
searches for the total population remains constant. By definition, then, the search rate of
minority motorists is related to the search rate of white motorists. We can determine the
relationship between the change in the internal search rate for each racial group as follows, given
that the Time 1 total search rate will be the same as the Time 2 total search rate:
S = PopM IM + PopW IW = PopM ( IM + ) IM ) + PopW (IW ! ) IW )

(A3)
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If we work this through the same way we worked through equation (1) in text, this
implies that:

) IM

Popw
= ---------- ) IW
PopM

(A4)

Given that we are assuming a minority motorist representation of 20 percent, equation
(A4) is the same as:
) IM =

4 ) IW

(A5)

Using equation (A2) and (A5), we can substitute values for the denominator in equation
(A1). From the definition of elasticity, if minority and white motorists have the same and
constant elasticity, then the following is true:
( ) OM / OM )

= 4 ( ) OW / OW )

(A6)

If we work this through, equation (A6) is the same as the following:

( ) OW / ) OM )

=

0.25 ( OW / OM )

(A7)

We know from equation (6) in text that racial profiling only decreases crime if:
) OW
,

0.25

-----------) OM

(A8)

If we substitute from equation (A7), this holds true only if:

0.25

OW
, 0.25 -----------OM

(A9)

This is only true if:
OM ,

OW

(A10)

In other words, racial profiling will only decrease crime under these conditions if the
offending rate of minority motorists is higher than that of white motorists.
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Under Conditions of Lower Elasticity of Offending to Policing for Minority Motorists:

Assuming resource constraint and lower elasticity of offending to policing for minority
motorists, racial profiling will only decrease the profiled crime under very specific conditions
concerning the relationship between elasticities and offending. This can be derived, again, from
the definition of elasticity.
From the definition of elasticity, if minority motorists have lower elasticity than white
motorists, then the following is true:

x

( ) OM / OM )
-------------------( ) IM / IM )

=

( ) OW / OW )
---------------------( ) IW / IW )

where x , 1

(A11)

If we let Er denote the elasticity of offending to policing for each racial group, this is
equivalent to saying that:

x =

EW / EM

(A12)

Using equation (A2) and (A5), again we can substitute values for the denominator in
equation (A11). From the definition of elasticity, then, the following is true:
x

= 4 ( ) OW / OW )

( ) OM / OM )

(A13)

If we work this through, equation (A13) is the same as the following:
( ) OW / ) OM )

=

0.25 x ( OW / OM )

(A14)

We know from equation (6) in text that racial profiling only decreases crime if:
) OW

0.25

,

-----------) OM

(A15)

If we substitute from equation (A14), this holds true only if:
OW
0.25

, 0.25 x ------------

OM

(A16)
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This is only true if:
OM , x OW

(A17)

In other words, racial profiling will only decrease crime under these conditions if
minority motorists offending is greater than white times their elasticity differential x, which from
equation (A12) we know is EW / EM .

III.

Under Conditions of Lower Elasticity of Offending to Policing for White Motorists:

Assuming resource constraint and lower elasticity of offending to policing for white
motorists, racial profiling will decrease the profiled crime if minority motorist offending is
higher than white motorist offending. This can be derived, again, from the definition of
elasticity.
From the definition of elasticity, if white motorists have lower elasticity, then the
following is true:
( ) OM / OM )
-------------------( ) IM / IM )

( ) OW / OW )
= x ---------------------( ) IW / IW )

where x , 1

(A18)

Using equation (A2) and (A5), again we can substitute values for the denominator in
equation (A18). From the definition of elasticity, then, the following is true:
( ) OM / OM )

= 4 x ( ) OW / OW )

(A19)

If we work this through, equation (A19) is the same as the following:

( ) OW / ) OM )

OW
= ----------------------4 x OM

(A20)

We know from equation (6) in text that racial profiling only decreases crime if:

0.25

,

) OW
-----------) OM

(A21)
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If we substitute from equation (A20), this holds true only if:
OW
-----------4 x OM

0.25

,

OM ,

OW
-------------x

(A22)

This is only true if:

(A23)

But since x is greater than 1, this is going to be true whenever minority motorist offending
is greater than white motorist offending. In other words, racial profiling will decrease crime
under these conditions if minority motorists offending is greater than white offending.
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GRAPH II.B.ii.2: Assumptions Necessary to Avoid a Ratchet Effect
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GRAPH II.B.ii.3: Different Elasticity and Offending, But No Equal Hit Rates
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